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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1893, Hamilton Brown, President of the Boone Valley Coal and 
Railway Company, built a town for the purpose of mining coal. Located 
in central Iowa on the Des Moines River in Boone County, it was to be 
named Fraser, Iowa, after one of Brown's key investors, Norman D. 
Fraser. Fraser was a company town. Initially it had a company store, 
post office, 25 company houses, a boarding house, and a company of-
fice. The town reached its peak population in 1905 at 1,243 people. 
The town had a school of over 200 students, three main churches, three 
hotels, a restaurant, barber shop, stables, blacksmith, three grocery 
stores, a miners' hall, a pool hall, a number of taverns, and a park 
complete with a baseball diamond. 
The town boomed and declined with the cyclic fortunes of the coal 
mines. The significant mines were played out by 1910, and the profit-
ability of opening others was not attractive. By 1910, the population 
had dropped to 487 persons. This thesis will deal with Fraser, Iowa, 
for the years from 1893 to 1915. 
The history of Fraser is a history of people building social 
institutions in the midst of what many would see as oppressive and 
transient conditions. It 1S a history of control over the miners and 
their families by the owners of the mines and the town, the control of 
those owners by outside interests, and of people building their own 
communal institutions independent of owners control. The econom1C base 
and external economic control of Fraser set parameters to its 
~. 
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development, but allowed communal forms of social organization to 
develop as well. However, once Fraser was no longer profitable to 
absentee capital, those parameters narrowed, bringing the demise of 
Fraser as both an economic operation and social community. 
That communities have experienced some level of outside influence 
comes as no surprise. Theoretical perspectives have been developed to 
analyze the extent and nature of such external influence. In order to 
understand the social history of Fraser, this thesis utilizes commu-
nity literature, coal-mining and company-town literature, and litera-
ture on center-periphery theory. 
Roland Warren (1972) proposed that a great change distinguishes 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, 
communities experienced a predominance of horizontal or internal rela-
tionships. In the twentieth century, however, vertical or external 
relationships predominate community relations according to Warren 
(1972). Horizontal patterns are defined as structural and functional 
interactions within the community among units in that community. 
Vertical patterns refer to the same kinds of interactions between 
units within the community and units external to the community. 
Warren (1972) felt that this change led to a loss of autonomy and 
cohesion in twentieth century communities (Bernard, 1973). 
This study of Fraser, Iowa, is a contradiction to Warren's find-
1ngs. Fraser was a nineteenth century community where vertical ties 
were more prevalent from the beginning and horizontal ties developed 
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later in this context. How did Fraser residents establish horizontal 
ties within the vertical constraints presented by company ownership of 
the mines and town? One of the ways in which the local communal 
organizations developed control over their own life was to establish 
competing vertical ties to countervail the power vested 1n the 
company's external domination of the community. Fraser started with 
vertical ties being most significant and as horizontal and 
countervailing vertical ties became stronger, the company lost 
interest in Fraser. The town'declined as a result and thus returned 
to the domination of it by outside interests. This is a case of 
vertical ties in the nineteenth century. 
In contrast to Roland Warren (1972), the literature on company-
towns and coal-mining company towns has shown a clear pattern of 
external controi of such towns. This was true in the late nineteenth 
century as well as in the early twentieth century. In this 
literature, external control of company towns is the norm. This same 
literature gives evidence of the kinds of social institutions that 
typically developed in coal-mining company towns. 
A third body of literature, the center-periphery theory, will be 
used 1n this thesis as a way to understand the external control of 
Fraser, Iowa. While center-periphery theory is generally used in a 
world systems perspective, it is also used as a way of analyzing rela-
tions within nations, both nations at the center and nations on the 
periphery. This thesis will argue that center-periphery theory is the 
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best way to understand the relations of dominance, whereby control was 
exercised over Fraser from a center, especially St. Paul, Minnesota. 
Contrary to Warren (1972), this structural feature of external ties 
that dominated life in Fraser was not a twenthieth-century change, but 
was there from the inception of Fraser. The tenor of this thesis will 
be the predisposition to accept the center-periphery perspective as 
most illuminative of Fraser, Iowa, with a corresponding rejection of 
Warren's (1972) great change thesis. However, the case of Fraser will 
also present a view that moderates the usually completely negative 
image of life on the periphery. For all the imperialism at the cen-
ter, life in the periphery developed in ways that gave expression to 
the- cCeativity of the community in developing mechanisms to moderate 
its external control. 
- In order to conduct this study, historical methods and materials 
were necessarily employed. The most fruitful materials were documen-
tary and archival. Interviews were used, but most people old enough 
to remember events between 1893 and 1915 were either dead or unable to 
recollect events accurately. For this reason, newspapers, county rec-
ords, company correspondence, and old photographs were most helpful 1n 
reconstructing the past. A few articles, published in the Boone 
County Historical Society, contained history of coal mining in Boone 
County, and recollections of old residents about Fraser. The 1895 and 
1905 Iowa State Census, and the 1900 and 1910 Federal Census all gave 
a quantity of data about Fraser residents on numerous social and 
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econom~c indicators. Since the town was built for m~n~ng and railroad 
interests, published guides to railroads and State Mine Inspector's 
Reports were also valuable in g~v~ng data on the operations ~n Fraser. 
Finally, on site visits were made to Fraser on numerous occasions. 
What follows in this thesis is a social history and community 
study of a coal-mining and company town at the turn of the century. 
In order to best understand the sociology of such a community, Chapter 
Two will develop the theoretical perspective. Chapter Three will 
present the historical research methods used in reconstructing the 
story of Fraser. Chapter Four will give the economic reasons for the 
development of Fraser and establish the rationale for considering 
Fraser a town on the periphery. Here, the economic operation of 
Fraser and its external domination will b.e shown. Chapter Five will 
give the origins and composition of the population of Fraser, and show 
how the population of Fraser was a function of the economic base of 
Fraser. Chapter six will document the organization of communal 
control over the non-economic aspects of the lives of Fraser 
residents. In the midst of external control over the econom~c 
institutions ~n Fraser, the residents began to build social 
organizations that gave them countervailing control over some of their 
own lives. Significantly, when Fraser residents began to gain some 
control over their own lives, the company lost interest in the town 
and Fraser went into permanent decline. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORY 
This thesis is about the external control of a community and the 
effects of that control on its internal communal organization. Since 
external control of a community 1S clearly related to the external 
ties to that community, no such study could be done without reference 
to Roland Warren's (1972) work in community studies, a work which 
deals with external ties to a community. However, the literature on 
company-towns and coal-mining company-towns presents a significant con-
tradiction to Warren's (1972) perspective. Finally, a theoretical 
perspective which was initially framed with external control 1n mind, 
center-periphery theory, 1S used as a way of understanding the way 1n 
whIch-Fraser, Iowa was developed. 
Horizontal and Vertical Linkages 
Roland Warren (1972) studied the kinds of linkages that commun1-
ties developed with other communities and other institutions. Accord-
ing to Jessie Bernard (1973), Warren updated Parson's (1951) terminol-
ogy from social systems theory, building on the concepts inherent in 
internal and external relations of a community. In the place of inter-
nal and external relations, Warren substituted horizontal and vertical 
relations. Warren (1972) used the term horizontal patterns to speak of 
the structural and functional interactions within the community among 
units in that community. An example might be the pattern of relation-
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ships between local churches, schools and businesses. He used the 
term vertical pattern to refer to the same kinds of interactions 
between units of the community and units external to the community. An 
example might be a local church's relationship to its denomination. 
Another example might be a local school's interactions with the federal 
government in terms of funding and regulations. More pertinent to this 
thesis would be the kind of vertical tie exhibited by a local business 
enterprise that is actually a part of a corporation with headquarters 
elsewhere. 
Warren (1972) postulated a great change that occurred 1n this cen-
tury. He did not find the prevalence of vertical linkages 1n the 
nineteenth century that he found in the twentieth century. Warren's 
great change thesis suggested that nineteenth century communities·were 
characterized by horizontal linkages whereas vertical ties characterize 
twentieth-century communities. One can hear hints of Tonnies' 
Gemeinschaft giving way to Gesellschaft. Warren (1972) considered that 
the replacement of horizontal relations with a predominance of vertical 
relations led to a loss of community cohesion and autonomy (Bernard, 
1973). 
This study of Fraser, Iowa, presents a case of a community that is 
an example of a nineteenth century community that knew a predominance 
of vertical ties from its inception. Of interest to the present study 
1S how residents built horizontal linkages within the constraints 
presented by the vertical linkages that predominated from the beginning 
of that community. The irony of this study, in contradiction to 
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Warren's (1972) great change thesis, is that the very time when hori-
zontal linkages began to show themselves most viable was also the time 
when the vertical linkages were diminishing and this resulted in the 
decline of Fraser. 
Actually, the vertical ties were nearly always the central feature 
of coal-mining company-towns. This is clear from company-town 
literature. 
Company Town Literature 
A rev~ew of company-town literature, and coal-mining company 
towns will show that their history is one of being dominated by exter-
nal forces (Allen, 1966; Brandes, 1970; Corbin, 1981; Schweider, 1983). 
Nor orrly were they founded for the sole purpose of the profit of absen-
tee capitalists, but the pursuit of profit and thus control was extend-
ed-into all facets of the workers' lives. The most common features of 
this control were at the workplace and the building of company stores 
and houses. By owning the workplace, stores, and houses, the company 
profited on the most basic elements of the workers' lives (Corbin, 
1981). The company extracted profits through the workers' production 
and consumption, production in the workplace, and consumption in the 
stores and housing. In the most basic necessities of life, the company 
could extract continuous profits from the workers. This was the only 
reason for the towns and when this reason was no longer viable, neither 
were the towns. 
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But the company was often not satisfied to own the economic struc-
tures of the town. Often control was exercised in non-economic insti-
tutions as well. Companies often exercised some level of control over 
recreation, law, health care, education, and voluntary organizations 
such as churches and lodges (Corbin, 1981; Brandes, 1970). In the case 
of the latter voluntary organizations, some were indigenously organ-
ized, but partially influenced by company control. 
Much of the interest in voluntary associations and recreation by 
the company owners was another way of controlling one of their most im-
portant costs, labor (Brandes, 1970). Labor organiztion was a constant 
threat to the owners. Ownership of the economic structures of the town 
as well as control of the non-economic institutions was strategic 1n 
cOI1!=rojling labor. In times of labor shortages, such as the time of 
the study of Fraser, European immigrants were brought to the coal-
mining- company towns. When they organized, they were rep laced wi th 
blacks from the South. 
All of this, the ownership of all economic structures 1n the com-
munity, the control of non-economic institutions, and the concerted 
attempt to control labor were hallmarks of a company town and were 
direction functions of external control over a local community. 
History of company towns 
The term company town conjures up mixed images. . For some, it 
brings to mind the worst of social control and exploitation of workers. 
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For others, it 1S the forerunner of modern industry's concern for the 
welfare of the worker. 
The first major experiment of a company town was the town of New 
Lanark, in Lanarkshire, England. The cotton mills in New Lanark were 
purchased in 1791 by Robert Owen, a free-thinking social reformer. 
While the town was not a terrible place to live by the standards of 
industrial villages of its day, Owen intended to improve it. Not only 
did he make New Lanark a model of community life, it became legend. 
Owen improved the houses and, mainly by his own personal 
influence, encouraged the people in habits of order, cleanliness, 
and thrift. He opened a store at which goods of sound quality 
could be bought at little more than cost price and at which the 
sale of alcoholic beverages was placed under strict supervision. 
His greatest success, however, was in the education of the young, 
t~ which he devoted special attention (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
1982, Vol. 13:801). 
One could also see strong elements of paternalism in his ordering of 
life for all within the community, but there was general agreement that 
life in New Lanark was good. 
Owen had not only proved that one could improve the lot of the 
worker in an industrial community, but also that one could make a prof-
it at it. That he did, and quite handsomely. Owen was able to 
guarantee his investors a five percent return (Encyclopedia 
Britannica:80l) and amass a fortune of 60,000 pounds for himself. 
(Heilbroner, 1980:107). No doubt this was more impressive to many 
businessmen than improving living conditions for workers. 
Soon Francis Cabot Lowell would pattern his cotton mill-town, 
Lowell, Massachusetts, on similar methods. He opened a series of 
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boarding houses for young women, as an incentive for them to come to 
work in his mills. He also funded libraries, schools and churches 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 1982, Vol. 9:497). 
Definition and mean1ng 
There was a great deal of variation in the communities that were 
company towns. There was variation in the extent of company ownership 
as well as the degree to which the company controlled the lives of 
workers living 1n such towns. Some company towns were completely owned 
and controlled by the company, even to the point of having barbed wire 
fences around the perimeter and armed guards at the entrance (Corbin, 
1981). However, most company towns were not owned and controlled to 
such an extreme. Company ownership of businesses, housing, and land 
seemed -to be the norm for company towns. 
Allen 0966:6) defined a company town as follows: "any community 
which is owned and controlled by a particular company." He would not 
include a single industry town in the definition if the company sold 
the land and encouraged private ownership of housing and businesses. 
Allen (1966:5) also noted that the remoteness and nature of the 
particular industry determined the making of a company town. It was an 
economic necessity in isolated areas to provide housing and stores to 
get workers to locate there. Lots could not be sold if they may well 
lie over a resource that would later need to be extracted. 
This view underestimates the fact that many company towns were 
built for the purpose of making a profit, not only on the workers' 
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labor, but also on their necessities for living. Equally important was 
the social control that owning workers' homes or engendering indebted-
ness of workers gave to the employer. Corbin (1981:9) showed that the 
desire for profit and social control were both important in the build-
ing of company towns: 
The operators defended their building and use of the company 
town as a necessary instrument for supplying and housing the 
thousands of workers whom they imported to dig coal. The 
company town was also economical, and profit was the supreme 
goal of the coal operators. 'We are not running a Chris dan 
Endeavor Camp meeting or Sunday School,' an operator wrote 
his superintendent in 1896; 'never lose sight of the fact 
that the sole purpose of the organization is to make money 
for their stockholders and matters of conduct •.. that tend to 
produce a contradictory result should be promptly squelched 
with a heavy hand.' The existence of the company town made 
it relatively easy to squelch opposition with a heavy 
hand. 
Brandes (1970: 38) argued agains t the use of the term "company 
town"-C1t all. In his v~ew, the term tells us little s~nce many indus-
trial centers in the Northeast were filled with company owned housing, 
but were never referred to as "Company Towns." However, in the same 
context, he noted that "the degree of company ownership and control 
varied from place to place, in some places it was total, and ~n others 
it was nonexistent (Brandes, 1970:38)." It may be difficult to get 
complete agreement on the level of company ownership and control before 
a community can be called a company town. However, the term has mean-
ing in the context of extensive company ownership of life's necessi-
ties, well as company control of secondary institutions. 
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The connotation of the term "company town" does not hold the same 
meaning for everyone. Brandes (1970:38) rejected it as mere invective, 
apparently unwarranted. Corbin's (1981) study of company towns in West 
Virginia's coal mining fields gives the impression that invective is 
deserved. Schwieder (1983:11), who studied coal mining in Iowa, 
concurs: 
The typical American coal miner, like his British 
counterpart, lived in an isolated mining village in which 
the company controlled his life. Consequently, coal miners 
regarded company housing and company stores as the bane of 
their existence. 
In Allen's (1966) view, the company was much more benign. Allen 
0966:xi) attempted to "counteract the almost universal negative l.mage 
which seems to exist ••• " relative to conditions 1n company towns. 
External domination 
.- -Company towns in the coal ml.nl.ng industry were invariably started 
by external forces. Often, they were built to meet the needs of the 
railroads and industrial centers. Allen (1966:52) noted how that: 
When the Union Pacific Railroad began to span the continent, 
the necessity of maintaining a permanent supply of coal led 
to the opening of mines in Wyoming and to the establishment 
of a number of company-owned towns. 
Corbin (1981) found that the availability of coal in West Virginia 
was well-known, but had not been developed indigenously for over one-
hundred years. In the 1880s, the railroads began to come into that 
state. 
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The state became a battleground for the railroad robber 
barons. Realizing potential profits, notables such as J.P. 
Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, E.H. Harriman, Collis P. 
Huntington, Henry H. Rodgers, Abram Hewitt, Peter Cooper, and 
John Camden all competed and connived to build the roads that 
would carry West Virginia coaL.. (Corbin, 1981:2). 
Southern West Virginia had generally become the possession of 
New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and London. By 
1900 absentee landowners owned 90 percent of Mingo, Logan and 
Wayne counties and 60 percent of Boone and McDowell counties. 
By 1923 nonresidents of West Virginia owned more than half of 
the state and controlled four-fifths of its total value 
(Corbin 1981:4). 
He also pointed out that 94 percent of the m1ners 1n West Virginia 
lived in company towns (Corbin, 1981:8). They were part of a region 
that Corbin 0981:1) refers to as an "economic colony." 
Incorporation was unusual 1n company towns. According to Allen 
(1966:56, 120), this was because incorporation removed control from 
the company, and the control the company exercised kept incorporation 
from taking place. 
Company towns were started in the coal mining regions, primarily 
to supply external needs of railroads and industry. They often de-
clined and died because of mineral depletion or when those external 
demands were filled elsewhere. When railroads switched to diesel fuel 
and industry to natural gas and oil, many coal mining company towns 
died (Allen, 1966). Conversely, many coal-mining company towns had a 
short life-expectancy because the mines had short life expectancies. 
Schwieder (1983:32) stated that it was a rare coal seam that lasted 
more than twenty years and that 1.n Iowa " ••• few mining operations 
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lasted longer than ten years." When the need that gave r1.se to these 
towns decreased, the towns died. Many coal mining company towns were 
boom and bust towns. They were externally conceived, born overnight, 
and died from forces beyond their control. 
The community 
Although company towns obviously had to have many things, such as 
houses and stores that were common to all communities, there were 
un1.que forces shaping their services and institutions. Allen (1966:80) 
found that while most of the later coal mining company towns were laid 
out along " ••• rec tangu lar lines of survey and were charac terized by 
wide streets and ample lots ••• ," most did little to enhance beauty. 
"L~ns, trees, and other greenery were rare, and pub lie parks were 
few (1966: 83)." 
Company store 
One of the central features of most company towns was the company 
store (Brandes, 1970). Allen 0966:28) noted that it " ••• was once 
perhaps the mos t typical feature of the company town." Often, the 
company store was a separate entity from the company, but the board of 
directors or the chairman was often the same for both store and 
company. For example, the Colorado Supply Company was incorporated 1.n 
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1888 to serve as the mercantile for the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, 
a coal and iron mining company (Allen, 1966). 
Schwieder (1983:137) sensed that the company store 1n Iowa coal 
mining towns was an "economic grievance" to the m1ners. Brandes 
(1970:45) recorded the tremendous antipathy to the company stores 1n 
company towns reflected in the nicknames dubbed them such as: "'gip-me 
stores,' 'pluck-me stores,' 'gip-joints,' and 'robber-salaries.'" 
Brandes also noted that countless strikes from 1849 onward were attrib-
uted by miners in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region to their 
grievances against the company store. 
Brandes (1970:45) grouped the grievances against the company 
st9re~ into four categories; 1) overpricing, 2) poor selection, 3) lack 
of competition, and 4) compUlsion to shop there. Investigations done 
by ~OaL mine operations 1n 1923 and by a government agency in 1934 both 
found company stores to be higher priced (by two to ten percent) than 
those independently owned (Brandes, 1970:45). 
Allen (1966:135) also found prices slightly higher at company 
stores. He attributed the pr1ce differences to higher quality merchan-
dise, shipping to remote locations, lack of competition, and costs of 
credit to customers (Allen, 1966:133-4). 
Corbin (1981) quoted coal miners testifying to a u.s. Senate 
Committee that wage increases were meaningless because they were always 
immediately negated by a corresponding price hike at the company store. 
Schwieder (1983:137) noted that in Iowa coal-mining company towns, the 
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'~iners were convinced that they paid more for their food, clothing, 
and mining supplies at the company store than if they traded else-
where." She noted also that the general rule 1n one district in Iowa 
was that miners were required to purchase their blasting powder from 
the company store for an inflated price (Schwieder, 1983). 
Most writers agreed that coercion was practiced to force workers 
to shop at the company store. How widespread it was 1S not known for 
sure (Schwieder, 1983; Brandes, 1970; Corbin, 1981; Allen, 1966). 
Probably the most effective kind of coercion was much more subtle, 
credit at the company store. Many miners could not survive from pay-
check to paycheck on what they earned, especially in light of work 
stoppages, slowdowns, and seasonal layoffs (Brandes, 1970; Schwieder, 
1983). 
_ ~ether or not company stores stocked quality merchandise is 
debated. Allen (1966:133) thought that the quality was generally as 
good or better than other stores, while Brandes (1970:46) felt that 
since company stores controlled competition, they were not required to 
stock quality items. It may well be difficult to generalize on this 
matter. There was lack of competition in general for the company 
store, but while this may have served the interests of the company 
store, the company did not always keep out competitors (Allen, 1966). 
It seems that the company was able to corner a better share of the 
market, even where it allowed competition, because of its almost un-
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limited ability to absorb the credit needs of its workers (Schwieder, 
1983). 
Company housing 
The reason for building company housing is often debated. The 
owners of company towns, especially in the coal mining industry, argued 
that building company houses was necessary in the absence of private 
developers. The tenuous nature of coal-mining employment precluded 
many miners from building their own home, and most could not have 
afforded to do so had they chosen to (Brandes, 1970). If the mine 
owners were to attract and hold workers, a place was needed for miners 
and their families to live. Company housing was also profitable. A 
little investment paid off quickly. Given the predictably short life-
span of a mine and coal mining town, the owners built the houses as 
cheaply as possible. Schwieder (1983:163) noted: 
In the late 1890's and early 1900's, a coal camp house could 
be built at a cost of about $150. All sources indicate that 
the overwhelming majority of operators did little or nothing 
about maintenance or improvements. Therefore, at the pre-
vailing rents -- houses rented at an average of $8.00 per 
month -- an operator could expect to payoff the cost of a 
house within 18 months and the remainder of the time the 
house was rented, it represented, with the exception of 
taxes, almost pure profit. Following the abandonment of the 
mine, the operator usually sold off the houses for $50.00 
each. He incurred no expenses with these sales because each 
buyer was responsible for moving his house. 
In a national survey (Brandes, 1970) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Ln 1916, it was found that over a five-year period, owners received an 
8.3 percent return on their original investment through rent receipts. 
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A large company in Southern West Virginia found that when they sold 
their housing to the miners, in a move to win greater worker support, 
they lost $422,894 profits in the following three years (Corbin, 
1981). Actually, as Schwieder (1983) and Brandes (1970) found, housing 
and stores were one of the most consistent forms of profit for the 
owners. Brandes (1970:46) stated: 
Even in slack times (and fluctuating economic conditions were 
characteristic of early twentieth-century American industries, 
particularly many which maintained company houses and stores, like 
bituminous coal mining), employers had an incentive to maintain 
full occupancy in company houses. For it was more desirable to 
have thirty men working short weeks with full occupancy than to 
have twenty men working full time with ten vacancies; rent 
receipts and store sales would both be higher. 
Schwieder (1983) noted that in the Iowa coal mining industry, the fact 
that awners could profit so greatly from houses and stores took a great 
deal of pressure off their need to be efficient and show profit 
abtliry on the mining end. In Iowa, the profitability was such on com-
pany houses that some companies coerced employees to live in company 
houses even when other housing sources were available (Schwieder:1983). 
Attracting workers to mining towns and making profits was not the 
only rationale for building company houses. Company housing also gave 
owners a form of social control over the m1ners. This control could be 
both positive and negative. Positively, it was a kind of mild control 
that induced miners to come to company towns and through low rents kept 
some of the better workers there. They could not afford to leave. 
Negatively, the social control could be much more direct and ominous. 
~. 
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Evictions were a persistent threat should the worker displease the own-
ere Union activities were probably the easiest way to get evicted 1n 
some towns (Schwieder, 1983). One m1ne owner 1n West Virginia put the 
matter cogently: 
'If we rent a miner a home, it is incidental to his employ-
ment, and if a miner would undertake to keep anyone at that 
home that was undesirable or against the interests of the 
company, we would have him leave or have the miner removed.' 
(Corbin, 1981:9) 
Eviction could be preceded by official notice with a modest time 
to find new lodgings, or it could be immediate and without notice 
(Corbin, 1981). Eviction or its threat kept the owners authority 
visible. Corbin (1981) notes the irony in the simple eviction notice 
sel).t ~o a number of fired miners, "I want my house." The miner lived tn 
the house, but could not forget who owned it. In the case of a strike, 
the company house was ideally suited for use by the company, for by 
evicting the strikers, one also provided housing for the strikebreakers 
(Brandes, 1970). 
What were company houses like? The answer to that question 1n 
general would be as diverse as the nation's geography and culture 
(Allen, 1966). However, within any given region and industry, 
uniformity would be the rule. There was not a great deal of variation 
in the style of company housing within a g1ven town (Allen, 1966). The 
exception might be the housing for a superintendent (Allen, 1966:86). 
In coal mining communities, the company houses were almost uniformly 
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small wooden structures. Allen (1966:86) who generally presents a 
positive picture of owners treatment of workers, claimed: 
If the truth were. fully know it would probably be seen that 
coal companies provided only that which was essential to keep 
employees working, and that homes of the ordinary miner were 
very cheaply structured. 
In a 1920s survey of coal company houses throughout the United States 
(Allen, 1966:87) it was found that: 
••• 95 percent of the houses were constructed of wood. Over 
two-thirds were finished outside with weatherboard, usually 
nailed directly to the frame with no sheathing or, sometimes, 
with paper sheathing. Composition paper was used for two-
thirds of the roofs. Foundations were generally of posts, 
and no cellars were included. Most houses, except the 
poorest 'shanties,' had porches. Inside finish consisted of 
wood sheathing for half the houses and plaster for an 
additional 38 percent. 
Schwieder (1983:88) described the following typical Iowa town houses Ln 
a coal mining community, Highbridge, Iowa: 
The houses are of the usual mining camp construction--shiplap 
nailed directly on studding, lathed, and plastered about 1/8 
inch thick. The foundations are of brick, and in fairly good 
condition generally. A few foundations need some repairs. 
The houses are old, the shiplap has loosened, the window 
sills are loose, and the doors warped. Many of the roofs 
leak, the plastering is in bad shape, and the paper has come 
off in patches. Single flooring only is provided. Conse-
quently, the houses are cold in winter, wet in spring, and 
not particularly inviting. 
She also found evidence (1983:87) that the mLne owners failed to maLn-
tain the houses so that "leaky roofs, broken windows, and sagging doors 
were commonplace," and miners lost motivation to personally care for 
their own home. 
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In the coal mining towns at the turn of the century, indoor 
plumbing was not common. A study done in 1916 (Allen, 1966) found that 
1,214 company houses checked in Colorado and Wyoming, "none of them had 
ins ide toi Ie ts • " 
A national study in the 1920s of coal mining company houses 
(Allen, 1966: 87) found that: 
13.8 percent had running water, 2.4 percent had bathtubs, and 
3 percent had flush toilets inside. A water system of some 
sort existed in only 49 percent of the communities. 
If it is true that the coal mining companies constructed their 
homes as cheaply as possible, that they were cold in the winter, small, 
generally poorly maintained, and lacked indoor plumbing, were there 
incentives to live in such housing outside of coercion by company of-
ficials? Yes, there were three basic incentives to live in such hous-
ing: _1.) credit, 2.) some security, and 3.) low rent. Like the com-
pany store, the company houses were opened to miners who came to town 
penniless. Not only was credit extended initially upon coming to town, 
but it was also available during slowdowns or shutdowns in the m1ne. 
That of course accounted for the element of security. They would not 
lose their house simply because work was slow. Schwieder (1983:91) 
states that: 
When the mines shut down for the summer months or when the 
miners could work only one or two days a week, families re-
mained in their homes. Many women commented that regardless 
of the length of unemployment in the mine, operators did not 
evict the families nor did they raise the rent. 
23 
The cost of renting a company house has generally been quite low 
and was incentive to locate in the town and rent from the company. In 
the coal company towns in Colorado and Wyoming of 1916, "rent varied 
from $5.00 to $18.00 a month, with 78.5 percent renting at less than 
$9.00." (Allen, 1966). In Iowa in 1919, "the monthly rent varied from 
$8.00 for a four-room house to $10.00 for a six-room house, although 
mining families found the larger houses in short supply (Schwieder, 
1983:88)." 
Company towns also made housing prov1s10ns for m1ners who were not 
married. All company towns had some kind of boarding house or motel, 
the primary purpose of which was to house single miners. This was 
us~al~y provided with a restaurant or cafeteria (Allen, 1966:92). 
Recreation 
At the turn of the century, company-town owners were beginning to 
strongly encourage local participation in recreation (Brandes, 1970). 
Baseball was the sport of choice for company towns. Allen (1966:98) 
found that, "nearly every community had its baseball diamond, and 
competition with other towns in the vicinity ran high." Brandes 
(1970:77) saw 1n the proliferation of company-sponsored recreation a 
well chosen alternative to the "evils of leisure." Such activities 
were to the employer a welcome substitute for the saloon (Brandes, 
1970). Clearly, the employer was interested in the hours the employee 
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spent off the job. Brandes (1970:76) captured the concern of the 
employer in the following: 
The worker had some free time; the question was not whether 
he was going to use it, but how, and some of the ways were 
considerably more threatening to the welfare of the company 
than dancing. Just sitting around grumbling about the 
company was bad enough, but there was also the possibility of 
drinking, along with all its usual accompaniments, including 
brawling, being less efficient on the job, thieving and 
general troublemaking in the town, or even union organizing. 
It was also common to have at least one band in company towns. 
The band would play at various social occasions, on holidays, at 
dances, and in parades. It was not unusual for them to participate in 
celebrations in neighboring communities (Allen, 1966). Good athletes 
and musicians received preferential treatment in hiring and sometimes 
pr~ferential treatment on the job (Brandes, 1970). It is not clear how 
extensive this policy was, nor the degree to which it was practiced in 
the eGal towns. However, Brandes (1970) does show some evidence of 
evidence of preferential treatment of mine musicians to the extent of 
causing resentment among other workers. Both baseball teams and bands 
were central to the yearly celebrations held on the fourth of July in 
many company towns. Often there was a company-sponsored picnic, a 
parade, field events throughout the day, and an evening dance (Brandes, 
1970 ). 
The fact that many companies were antagonistic to the saloons and 
dance halls did not keep such businesses out. Allen (1966:12) tells 
how " ••• saloons, dance halls, and gamb ling houses ••• " were " ••• forb id-
den in most genuine company towns ••• " in the West. 
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Corbin (1981:35) found something quite different in the West Virginia 
coal mining fie Ids: "Saloons were numerous in both the commercial and 
company towns in the coal fields." Miners drank to celebrate every 
holiday and special event, such as weddings and birthdays. He also 
noted (1981:36) that many miners made their own alcohol: 
Stills could be found throughout the company town, in miners' 
homes, in barns, and even in the coal mines where the miners 
often made liquor while they worked or during lunch break. 
The latter practice was so common that the chief of the West 
Virginia Department of Mines, concerned with the safety 
hazards that could result, issued a circu1ar that ordered 
mine inspectors to check for stills in the mines and to 
report them to the police. 
For many miners, making moonshine was a supplement to an otherwise 
meager income. This became all the more crucial during "slack runs and 
stiike-s" (Corbin, 1981: 37). However, the ml.ne owners were unan1.mous 1.n 
their opposition to saloons which they viewed as detrimental to coal 
production (Corbin, 1981). 
Law and medicine 
Order in company towns was often maintained by a hired company 
policeman, who was deputized by the county (Allen, 1966). In the best 
of company towns, he probably operated much like a local constable, 
albeit in the best interests of his employer, the company. In the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, brutal policies led to insurrection Ln 
a number of camps. Employees charged them with uSLng camp marshalls to 
"browbeat residents into submission to arbitrary policies." (Allen, 
1966:63) Company marshals were also used to combat union activities. 
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They used an armored car known as the "death special" (Brandes, 
1970:2). 
In West Virginia, company-town law enforcement probably reached 
its lowest level of corruption. The companies hired the notorious de-
tectives from the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency to break strikes, 1n-
filtrate unions as sp1es, and protect the m1n1ng operations. They reg-
ularly used violence and murder to keep out the unions (Corbin 1981). 
In 1912, "The Baldwin-Felts guards built iron and concrete forts that 
they equipped with machine guns throughout the strike districts" 
(Corbin 1981:88). In the same year, they prepared a train called, "the 
Bull Moose Spec ial," 
¥ith iron-plate siding and machine guns, and then at night, 
with its lights turned out, and with coal operator Quinn 
Martin and Kanawha County Sheriff Bonner Hill aboard, they 
drove the monster through the valleys, machine-gunning the 
- ~eople in the tent colonies on the sides of the hills 
(Corbin, 1981: 88). 
Brandes (1970:2) discovered company armies 1n coal regions: 
In 1923 Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot estimated that 
police employed by coal and iron companies outnumbered state-
employed police by twenty to one. The Pittsburgh Terminal Coal 
Company organized its force by rank--colonels, captains, 
sergeants, privates and so forth. 
The degree to which such company hired law was given free reign proba-
b1y was dependent on state and county attitudes toward law enforcement 
1n the coal company towns. The fact that West Virginia was dominated 
by outside mining interests, these also controlling the state 
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legislature, probably made policies there more abusive than the typical 
mining company town. 
It was common practice for companies to provide a doctor for work-
ers and families in company towns. The charge to the worker was often 
one dollar per month (Allen, 1966; Brandes, 1970). By 1902, the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company had in every company camp, a doctor who 
not only treated patients but also lectured in schools on sanitation 
and inspected homes for health conditions (Allen, 1966). 
However, a company doctor was not appreciated for the full range 
of his services. He was perceived, like other aspects of company town 
life, as an appendage of the company and the company's policy. For 
instance, some companies would not pay for health conditions supposed 
to be brought about through abuse or neglect, as in the case of drunk-
enness. In other cases, the doctor personally checked in the home of 
those who missed work to ascertain their condition. In either case, 
his decision could easily be perceived as company control over the life 
of the worker (Brandes, 1970). 
There were the other abuses of medical practice, such as when doc-
tors refused to treat striking miners or their families, or when doc-
tors served as informants to the company, or when doctors were detec-
tives (Corbin, 1981). Even with these abuses, however, it was a decid-
ed advantage in most cases to workers in such towns to have a licensed 
and qualified physician at a reasonable price (Corbin, 1981). 
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Education 
Brandes (1970) chronicled the short time 1n company towns, between 
the erection of housing and the building of a school nearby. "Colorado 
Fuel and Iron, which owned thirty company towns, was a model of educa-
tional efficiency (1970:55)." That company provided large school 
buildings and helped purchase texts in bulk to save money for local 
schools. It even helped in recruitment of teachers (Brandes, 1970:55). 
A "typical practice was to construct a school building or partially to 
subsidize a teacher's salary" (Brandes, 1970:53). 
Subsidizing education had important benefits. First, education 
had a socializing influence on the miners and their families. Not only 
was toe school a place to Americanize the children of immigrants by 
teaching them English, they also learned the proper attitude toward the 
company from their teachers (Brandes, 1970). Of course, some com-
plained that the teachers were hand-picked for their abilities to 
promote the company. Brandes (170:57) tells of "one student who 
interviewed teachers in Appalachian coal towns found them 'usually very 
guarded in their statements and hesitant about making a decision on 
school matters until the operators are consulted. '" 
The company executives often had a direct say in the day-to-day 
operation of the schools, even when the workers paid for operating the 
schools (Brandes, 1970). Teachers were dismissed for sympathizing with 
the United Mine Workers of America (Brandes, 1970). In short, the 
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schools along with other institutions In the company town served the 
purposes of the owners. 
Voluntary associations: Churches and lodges 
Churches The classic work on religion In company towns was 
done by Liston Pope (1942). Popels (1942) study of Gaston County, 
North Carolina, covered the years from 1880 to 1940. It probed the 
social meaning of religion In a company town. Pope (1942) argued that 
religion in the mill towns made a valuable contribution to the 
employers in providing a disciplined work force. One way the churches 
did this was In prohibition work. Cotton mills needed a dependable 
work force that was neither drunk nor hung over. "Liquor was denounced 
as detrimental to industry as the Igreatest oppressor of the laboring 
man lll (Pope, 1942:28). The focus on prohibition kept other issues from 
.rising to the surface. Pope (1942:28-9) explained: 
The prohibition fight also had important consequences on the 
policies of the churches toward social questions. It taught 
them to explain poverty and other social ills in terms of 
drunkenness or personal shortcomings rather than in terms of 
industrial relations as such. It focused their attention on 
prohibition as a central social problem, and interest in 
prohibition legislation became a substitute for nearly all 
other types of social concern. 
For the mills, the churches were providing better workers and citizens. 
The managers felt church members were more dependable. 
Managers agree ••• that church members are more stable (a high 
rate of labor turnover has been one of the most difficult 
problems the industry has faced) and more dependable (less 
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subject to tardiness or absence from work because of drunken-
ness, gambling, recuperation from debauches, etc.). They 
agree, further, that church members are more 'reasonable' 
making less trouble in the mill and in the community (Pope, 
1942:29-30). 
One person's "reasonable" 1S another's "docility." 
Religion also provided benefits to the worker in the company town. 
Pope (1942:88) saw two benefits of mill religion for the worker, "the 
organization of life, and the transvaluation of life -- though this 
terminology, of course, 1S alien to him." The church in the mill 
village was a "community center." It was the focal point around which 
non-economic life in the village largely revolved" (Pope, 1942:89). As 
such, it provided a training ground for leaders and a place of 
bel~ng~ng for others. Leaders learned to speak in the frequent 
"testimony meetings" and acquired organizational skills working on the 
many_committees in the church (Pope, 1942:89). So Pope noted (1942:89) 
that life was transvaluated either through reassurance or escape. 
By affirmation of values denied in the economic world, the 
church provides comfort and ultimate assurance; in its reli-
gious services it often affords escape temporarily from the 
economic and social situation in which workaday life must be 
spent. The difficulties of life for the mill worker in this 
world help to explain the noteworthy emphasis on otherworld-
liness in his churches. Most of the hymns and sermons in 
village churches point toward a more placid state and have 
little concern with mundane economic or social relations 
(Pope, 1942:89-90). 
Pope (1942) also assessed the role of the revival meeting 1n the 
cotton mill town. A primary appeal of revivals was in providing an 
"emotional massage," for workers trapped in stu It ifying fac tory condi-
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tions (Pope, 1942:90). This particular aspect of revivalism may have 
been less important in coal towns, where the m~ner did not think of 
himself as unskilled and doing monotonous work. However, other aspects 
of revivalism may have been common to coal towns and mill towns. 
For instance, all aspects of the revival meeting were orchestrated 
to produce the "high emotional cris is of 'be ing saved "' (Pope, 
1942:91). This regularized event was the bridge into church membership 
for a very transient population. Since the population was so transient 
in mill towns, Pope (1942:85) described the mill church as a "proces-
sion." Revival meetings provided the device whereby it could con-
tinuously take in new members; many of which would be gone in a short 
tlme _to another town. Because of this, he stated, "at a g~ven moment a 
mill church more nearly resembles a series of meetings than it does an 
estab-lished institution" (Pope, 1942:85). 
Given the important place of churches ~n company towns, they could 
not be left to chance. Churches often came under the direct control of 
the company owners. In Pope's study (1942), he found it common for the 
land, building, and a monthly portion of the pastor's salary to be 
underwritten by the owners ~n nearly every mill town. Often, the 
pastor went to the mill to pick up that portion of his check from the 
mill owner (Pope, 1942). It was uncommon for a minister to be in favor 
of un~ons or criticize the company policies (Pope, 1942). 
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The literature on religion in company towns in general and on coal 
mining towns is similar to Pope's findings. A study (Brandes, 1970:70) 
of 12 representative coal companies in West Virginia in 1923 found that 
"in every single company town, the company had either built a church or 
offered use of a schoolhouse for religious meetings." Allen (1966) 
found similar situations in Wyoming, where the Union Pacific Coal 
Company donated land and material for the construction of a Methodist-
Episcopal church in 1891. Coal operators were motivated in part to 
help in church building by what they perceived to be good business 
sense. Corbin (1981:148) quoted the West Virginia Coal Operators 
Association as saying: 
"The coal companies are intensely interested in their communities 
- ~nd give every instance of developing the spiritual nature of 
their employees and their families. It is a good business 
proposition for any coal company to take an interest and to assist 
_ ..in the building up of religious and community activities." 
The symbiotic relationship between churches and company functioned 
well for the company in good times and in bad. In both cases, it gave 
the company a degree of social control. 
Some preachers openly preached against un~ons. Corbin (1981) 
gives examples of company preachers servlng as labor agents to recruit 
blacks as strikebreakers. If preaching against unions proved 
ineffective, the company still had means of control at their disposal. 
Churches were boarded shut during strikes. If local preachers refused 
to join the anti-union cause, national preachers, such as Billy Sunday, 
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were all too willing to appear on the scene to preach the evils of 
unions (Corbin, 1981). Brandes (1970:73) tells of a preacher, the 
Reverend W. Gilbert Nowell: 
pastor of the Fawcett Methodist Episcopal Church at Hill Station, 
Pennsylvania, a town owned by the Pittsburgh Coal Company. 
When Howell became pastor in 1926, he received the customary 
rent-free house and free coal with which to heat it. The 
following year a strike occurred, and while he did not speak 
from the pulpit, Nowell sympathized with the strikers and 
openly conversed with members of his congregation on their 
picket line. Hearing of this, the local mine superintendent 
called Nowell into his office and demanded that he remain 
entirely neutral. The pastor refused, saying, 'there is no 
neutrality in me, I am either one side or the other, and I am 
on the side of organized labor.' What followed was disputed--
Nowell claimed that he was given ten days to vacate his house, 
and the company denied that such short notice was given-- but 
the eviction itself was undisputed, and when Nowell made it 
public, the company threatened to fire any non-union parishoner 
who attended his services. 
Allen (1966) found the charges of company control of religion to 
be exaggerated. However, he substantiated his claim from company 
publications which were produced for public relations purposes (Allen, 
1966). It is reasonable to assume that much company control of reli-
g10n remained passive until a crisis arose. 
Lodges Another form of voluntary association found 1n the 
company town was the fraternal organization or lodge. While little has 
been written on the role these played in the company town, apparently 
they were encouraged by company officials (Corbin, 1981). They were 
often allowed to use company property, and some companies built lodges 
(Corbin, 1981). Corbin (1981:74) noted that they " ••• provided a 'moral 
uplift' (immorality, adultery, or drunkenness for example was 
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reason for expulsion)." Not only did the worker enjoy the company of 
his fellows, but lodge membership gave them economic benefits as well. 
Many coal miners could not obtain lire insurance because of the hazards 
of the occupation. The benevolent societies provided for these needs 
(Corbin, 1981:74). While voluntary associations gave some meaning to 
the miners' lives outside the mines, most of their lives were 
circumscribed by their work. 
Labor in the coal mining town 
This thesis deals with life in a coal mining town Ln Iowa from 
1893 to 1914. The situation Ln the coal mining industry at that time 
was constrained by a general shortage of labor and from 1893 to 1897, 
and was constrained by the economic depression of 1893. 
European immigrants To sustain the labor needs of the growing 
mining industry in the late nineteenth century. mLne owners looked to 
Europe. Corbin (1981:8) shows that in West Virginia, for instance, "In 
1880 there were 924 European immigrant miners in the state; by 1910 
there were 28,000." Schwieder (1983) noted the influx of British as 
well as Italian miners to southern Iowa. The British were especially 
noted for their experience with trade unions in England, experience 
which translated into action Ln this country. 
The Depression of 1893 Schwieder (1983:131) showed how " ••• the 
Depression of 1893 forced the miners to concentrate on the basic issue 
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of survival." She also noted (1983: 131) that miners l.O Iowa in 1895 
took maj or pay cu ts "from $1. 00 to either $. 75 or $.80 per ton." In 
fact, '~age reductions constituted the major reason for strikes 
throughout the 1890's" (Schwieder, 1983: 134). Schwieder 0983: 134) doc-
uments the miner's inadequate wages: 
Iowa miners shared this problem with miners everywhere. On 
April 20, 1891, the Journal editor reported that in Pennsyl-
vania, Missouri, and Illinois, the miners' daily wage averaged 
well below $2.00. In Pennsylvania, out of 1,763 coal miners 
canvassed, the majority earned less than $1.50 per day. In 
Missouri, 74 percent of the miners had a daily income of less 
than $1.50 per day. In Illinois, a special commission 
looking into the strike of 1889 reported that miners in the 
Spring Valley District averaged $31.63 per month. In Iowa, a 
miner who recently emigrated from England wrote to the 
Journal that he earned $1.75 a day, a wage that would not 
support his wife and five children. He added that he paid 
$4.50 for his house rent along with $.50 a month for water. 
These figures supported the national UMW official's view that 
throughout the country, coal miners earned less than a living 
wage. 
Not only were wages inadequate, but m1ners were plagued by season-
al layoffs and slowdowns. Corbin (1981) noted that the lack of 
railroad cars was a continual problem in West Virginia, and miners lost 
as much as 50 percent of their workdays as a result. According to 
Schwieder (1983), non-industrial states like Iowa had work slowdowns 
during the summer when little coal was needed for home heating. This 
was compounded nationally by overproduction in general since the Civil 
War (Schwieder, 1983). She (Schwieder, 1983:23-4) found that, "Between 
1890 and 1930, the most days averaged per year was in 1918 when the men 
averaged only 249 working days." As a result, Iowa miners often took 
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part-time work outside the mines (Schwieder, 1983). Hunting and 
gardening also became an important part of providing basic needs for 
m~n~ng families (Corbin, 1981). 
If work conditions were too bad, the option of greener pastures 
was generally available for the miners. Corbin (1981) notes that for 
many miners in West Virginia, leaving was a form of protest when condi-
tions got too harsh. Iowa miners moved often (Schwieder, 1983). But 
moving was not without costs. One cost was being without work while 
moving and getting settled (Corbin, 1981). 
The Union 
The miner's primary way of dealing with intolerable conditions, 
especially poor pay, was the union and the strike. The United Mine 
Workers of America operated with varying degress of success in the Iowa 
Coal fields in the 1890s and early 1900s. The Depression of 1893, 
according to Schwieder (1983), was a major setback in unlon organizing 
and gaining concessions from coal operators ~n Iowa. Union organizing 
was reason enough to be evicted from one's home. Often, since the 
homes were owned by the mining company, they would not allow outsiders 
suspected of union sympathy into the homes with the miners. Often, 
m~ners would have to meet organizers on country roads to sign up for 
unions (Allen, 1966). Miners who succeeded in forming a union could 
expect to be evicted from company housing if they did strike (Allen, 
1966; Corbin, 1981). 
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In the case of strikes in the l890s, if the operator needed to 
keep up production, he would often use the weapon of importing black 
strikebreakers to take the place of union miners. Help wanted adver-
tisements would be run in papers in the South (Foner and Lewis, 1979). 
Barnum (n.d.,19) found many companies used blacks and " ••• 'judicious 
mixtures' of Negroes, native whites, and foreign whites, ••• playing 
one group against the other." Labor recruiters would be sent to bring 
in blacks by the trainload (Foner and Lewis, 1979). 
The reception of blacks by whites was mixed. At times, whites 
would try to reason with the blacks, hoping they would return to their 
origins. At other times, they resorted to violence (Foner and Lewis, 
1979). Often, the trains would have to be heavily guarded. It was not 
always clear whether the blacks were being guarded from violent whites 
or guarded to prevent their escape once they heard the real conditions 
underwhich they would be working (Foner and Lewis, 1979). Schwieder 
(1983) found that in 1895 most Iowa coal mining communities had some 
blacks but they were a small minority of the population. However, the 
tactic grew in popularity among operators and was used for over thirty 
years in the case of strikes in Iowa. 
Corbin (1981) discovered that blacks were generally uninterested 
1n the union in West Virginia. When compared to what they were used to 
1n marginal subsistence farming, they may have experienced relative 
~. 
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gains by ml.nl.ng. Leola Nelson Bergmann (1966) in liThe Negro l.n Iowa," 
estimated that " ••• a few thousand southern Negroes came into the Iowa 
coal fields during the eighties and nineties." 
The practice of using blacks as strikebreakers hardly had a posi-
tive effect on race relations in the coal mining fields. Labor was a 
continuous problem for the owners through the 1890s and mechanization 
seemed like part of the solution. Schwieder (1983) noted that mining 
machines were in operation in a number of Iowa mines as early as 1895. 
The review of company town literature clearly shows that external 
control, the most negative form of Warren's (1973) vertical linkages, 
was a vital element of company town life. Company towns were 
established for the purpose of profits for absentee capitalists, and 
control over economic and non-economl.C features of commnity life was 
maintained at all costs. While the community was profitable to 
external interests, it was viable. When it was no longer profitable, 
it began its inevitable decline as a community. All of this fits well 
into a perspective provided by center-periphery theory. 
The Center and Periphery Theoretical Perspective 
International level 
Immanuel Wallerstein's (cf. Ritzer, 1983) world-systems theory was 
written about regional domination of peripheral areas by center areas. 
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The relationship that he described is analogous to what is being 
examined in this thesis. World-systems theory and its correlary, 
center-periphery theory, were developed about international 
relationships. Ritzer (1983:291) found that in Wallerstein's writings: 
••• the core geographical area dominates the world economy 
and exploits the rest of the system. The periphery consists 
of those areas that provide raw materials to the core and 
are heavily exploited by it. 
This relationship of economic domination was one that produced what 
Wallerstein (Ritzer, 1983) called monoculture or undifferentiated, 
single-focus society. This thesis examines the domination of Fraser, 
Iowa by St. Paul, Minnesota. This was for the purpose of exploiting 
Fraser's coal. Thus, Fraser was a single-focus economy, centered in 
coal m1n1ng. 
John Galtung (1980:261) examined the inquality in the world be-
tween nations and within nations " ••• in almost all aspects of human 
living conditions, including the power to decide over those living con-
ditions ••• ," noting that, liThe world consists of center and periphery 
nations." In his analysis, there are relationships established between 
the center and the periphery based on a disharmony of interests that 
lead to a domination of the periphery by the center (1980). The inter-
actions in the relationship are vertical and the structure of the rela-
tionship is feudal. The interaction is vertical because most of the 
interactions with the periphery are monopolized by the center so that 
there is little interaction between various peripheries (1980). 
Fraser, Iowa was built and maintained in a disharmony of interests with 
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the town's owners In St. Paul. The power to decide over living condi-
tions was held by those in St. Paul. There was more communication 
between Fraser and Lehigh, Iowa on the periphery than between Fraser, 
Iowa and St. Paul. Communication between the towns at the periphery 
was dominated by the center. 
Daniel Chirot (1977) used the terms core societies and peripheral 
societies in much the same way that Wallerstein (1974) and Galtung 
(1980) use the terms center and periphery. Chirot (1977:3) defined 
core and peripheral societies as follows: 
1) Core societies: economically diversified •.. , rich, 
powerful societies that are relatively independent 
of outside control. 
2) Peripheral societies: economically overspecialized, 
relatively poor and weak societies that are subject 
to manipulation or direct control by the core powers. 
__ Aundre Gunder Frank (1975) analyzed the same sort of phenomena 
with the terms metropole and periphery. He found that the development 
of the metropole led to the underdevelopment of the periphery. He saw 
this as a relationship of economic imperialism or colonialism. While 
capital at the center develops, labor at the periphery underdevelops. 
David Harvey (1980) noted the importance of transportation (most 
notably steam) in the process of concentration of capital and dominance 
of the metropolis over the periphery. First, it was necessary for fast 
and efficient forms of transportation, such as railroads, to be de-
veloped before commodities, such as coal, could be easily and quickly 
controlled and transported to the metropolis. 
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Harvey (1980:314) notes that: 
The capitalist mode of production promotes the production of 
cheap and rapid forms of communication and transportation in order 
that 'the direct product can be realized in distant markets in 
mass quantities' at the same time as new 'spheres of realization 
for labour, driven by capital' can be opened up. 
Marx (cf. Harvey, 1980:315) referred to this process of dominion over 
great distances through improved transportation, as the "annihilat ion 
of space by time." 
In Marx's (Harvey, 1980:316) understanding, there was a connection 
between circulation of capital, extending of credit, and maintaining 
control of others. Capital increased through circulation. When it did 
not circulate, it did not increase. Therefore, the domination that 
co~ld~ot be completed through improved transportation could be 
completed through the use of credit. 
- Long distance trade, because it separates production and 
realization by a long time interval, may still be characterized 
by a long turnover period and lack of continuity in the 
employment of capital. This kind of trade ••• forms 'one of 
the material bases .•• one of the sources of the credit 
system. ' 
The credit system allows of a geographical extension of the 
market by establishing continuity where there was none 
before. The necessity to annihilate space by time can in 
part be compensated for by an emerging system of credit. 
Instead of building Fraser from St. Paul, capital was loaned to an 
Iowa capitalist who was then indebted to St. Paul. In this way, Fraser 
was both profitable and amenable to the wishes of a capitalist in St. 
Paul. All of these theorists see the relationship between the center 
and periphery, as one in which the center, more developed and powerful, 
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dominates and extracts from the less developed periphery. In the proc-
ess, the center continues to develop at the expense of the periphery, 
the periphery underdevelops, and the periphery becomes more dependent 
on the center. Harvey gives a Marxian analysis of this to show that 
the development of technology, specifically transportation, allowed for 
this trans-spacial domination. Harvey (1980) also made the connection 
between capital infusion into the periphery by allowing the center to 
increase its capital, all the while tightening its grip on the 
periphery through credit. 
These analyses of center and periphery relationships in world 
systems perspective have much to offer in analyzing the relationships 
between the centers or metropoles of St. Paul, Minnesota, and Fraser, 
Iowa, and the metropole of Chicago and Fraser. It must be granted that 
th~se_analyses were developed in world systems perspective, but the 
argument could be made that the same relations of imperialism or 
colonialism are operative on a more regional basis. In fact, some of 
the theorists take the further step of looking at center and periphery 
relations on a regional basis. 
Intranational level 
Galtung (1980:261) suggested that, "The world consists of center 
and periphery nations; and each nation, ln turn has its centers and 
periphery." Centers in center nations, referred to as center-centers, 
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hold dominance over both the periphery in their own nation, and over 
periphery nations 1n other parts of the globe. Galtung (1980) stated 
that: 
••• the center in the Periphery only serves as a transmission 
belt (e.g. as commercial firms, trading companies) for value 
(e.g. raw materials) forwarded to the Center nation. 
Thus, there is a comprom1se of the business class in the periphery 
nation for the profit of the capitalists in the center of the center 
nation. The points that hold salience here are that in both center 
and periphery nations, there are centers and peripheries. Secondly, 
1n the peripheries, the business class are co-opted for the purposes 
of domination by the powerful interests at the center of the center. 
Iu-Fraser, the local business class was co-opted for the profit of more 
powerful interests in St. Paul. Hamilton Browne's Boone Valley Coal 
and Railway, which built Fraser, was little more than a conduit of 
resources and profits to St. Paul. While Hamilton Browne ostensibly 
controlled Fraser for his own profits, he was also controlled from St. 
Paul. 
Frank (1975) pointed out that the phenomenon of the metropole and 
the periphery could be found both on a global level between nations or 
or on a national level within a nation. This thesis will look at the 
latter type of metropole and periphery relationship within a nation 1n 
the relationship between St. Paul, Minnesota, and Fraser, Iowa. 
Although others have chronicled the history of exploitation in mining 
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regions (cf. Caudill, 1978), again Frank (1975) places this kind of 
exploitation within the context of the metropole and the periphery. 
Frank stated that in the periphery " ••. capital was extracted from land 
and mine not to be reinvested in domestic commerce or industry but to 
be used instead for the development of the metropole." This often 
leaves "ghost regions" when extractive industry leaves (Frank, 
1975:31) .. This thesis will argue by analogy that when extraction was 
complete or no longer profitable, towns like Fraser became ghost towns. 
Most literature on center-periphery relationships focuses on the 
center of the center nation and its relationship with the center and 
periphery of the peripheral nation. This thesis is looking at just 
su~h a_relationship within a center nation between the center and 
periphery in that nation. This thesis argues that St. Paul Minnesota, 
was-a~enter 1n a center nation around which Fraser, Iowa, was a 
periphery. James J. Hill, a capitalist railroad builder from St. 
Paul, owned a number of properties in northern and central Iowa. Hill 
co-opted a business class operator from central Iowa, analagous to the 
periphery of the center nation, whose name was Hamilton Browne. Browne 
became the link between the periphery in the center nation, and the 
center 1n the center nation, represented by James J. Hill. 
Like Wallerstein's analysis, the periphery here provided raw 
materials to the core and was exploited by the core. Thus, the build-
ing of Fraser produced what Wallerstein referred to as monoculture or 
undifferentiated, single-focus society. Fraser was built for the pur-
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pose of profit from coal mining. It declined with the declining for-
tunes of coal mining. Fraser became a ghost town ~n a way that was 
analogous to Frank's ghost region when extraction was no lo·nger profit-
able. 
As Galtung (1980) pointed out, life on the periphery was charac-
terized by a lowered standard of living that subsidized the wealth at 
the core, and the people at the periphery were unable to control their 
own decision making. It was at least the perception of many of the 
Fraser residents that their lives were lived in substandard conditions 
that subsidized the profits of the owners. The people tried repeatedly 
through the early years of the town to take control of decision making 
in~o their own hands. It was not until the coal resources were begin-
ning to be depleted that the workers gained control over their own 
lives-~n Fraser. Thus, life for labor in Fraser remained underdevel-
oped while it developed for capital at the center (Frank, 1975). 
Harvey (1980) already pointed out the connection between transpor-
tation and the domination of the periphery. It was precisely through 
the development of the railroad that St. Paul, Minnesota, dominated the 
newly built railroad and coal mine town, Fraser. 
Harvey (1980) also saw the connection between the extension of 
credit and the domination of capital on the periphery by capital 1n the 
center. Fraser was built because James J. Hill of St. Paul, Minnesota, 
loaned the major funds to Hamilton Browne of Boone, Iowa. Through that 
loan, James. J. Hill effectively controlled Browne and Fraser. Pre-
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V10US to building Fraser, the coal mining fields were owned by 
interests in St. Paul; specifically James Jerome Hill of the Great 
Northern Railroad. Why did Hill loan the money to a local operator, 
Hamilton Browne, to develop those coal fields when he had the power and 
money to develop them himself? It was because he maintained a more 
regular profit and control through loaning the funds to do so to the 
local operator, Hamilton Browne. If coal mining there proved unprofit-
able, he was not concerned, for he was investing capital for a fixed 
rate of return. And through extending credit to Browne, Hill con-
trolled him as effectively as if Browne were employed by Hill. Fraser 
may have been too far from St. Paul for a direct and profitable trading 
relationship on a sustained basis. By extending credit to Brown, Hill 
could allow Browne as a local to carryon unequal terms of trade with the 
local-P0pulation. 
Hill profited through the payment of interest and the control he 
exercised over one portion of a coal mining region. 
Since, Browne could not meet his payments, he was thus directly 
controlled by Hill. Hill was constantly allowing Browne extensions on 
his past-due accounts. Henry Bernstein (1979) sees this activity, 
which in the international sector 1S referred to as "debt servicing," 
falling squarely within the center and periphery form of domination. 
Combined Literature Perspective 
This thesis presents a case study of a community on the periphery. 
Whereas most center-periphery literature is about the relations between 
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center and periphery nations, this thesis looks at that sort of rela-
tion within a center nation. St. Paul is considered a center or 1n 
Frank's terms, a metropole. Fraser is considered a periphery. 
The previously cited literature on company towns (Corbin, 1981) 
made clear that whole reg10ns were owned by absentee capitalists. 
Nowhere was this more true than in the coal mining industry. This 
would suggest that for the understanding of coal mining and company 
towns in the late nineteenth century, the conclusions of Warren (1963) 
needs modification. Contrary to Warren (1972), in coal mining company 
towns, the vertical ties were the strongest from the beginning. The 
horizontal ties, if allowed to develop, came with in the context of 
ve~tical ties. Warren's (1972) distinction between horizontal and 
vertical linkages 1S still useful and will be used in this study. 
- The suggestion that vertical linkages developed first and were 
most powerful makes the center-periphery perspective a logical choice 
for understanding the town of Fraser, Iowa. Although the center-pe-
riphery literature was used to understand international relations, this 
thesis suggests that it is the best theoretical perspective from which 
to view the relations between the center and periphery within a center 
nation. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a social-historical-community study of Fraser, 
Iowa, from 1893 to 1910. There is precedent to doing sociology as 
history. The founders of modern sociology, especially Weber (1981), 
used this method (Bailey, 1982). There is good reason to do sociology 
as history. Some things are best understood at a certain level of 
concretion (Nisbet, 1977), and historical study allows us to do a 
comparison over time (Bailey, 1982). This is the case 1n the study of 
Fraser, the evolution over time of external control and the indigenous 
response to it. 
This thesis will use a case study of social history of a 
coaL-mining company town at the end of the nineteenth century. Liston 
Pope's (1942) study of South Carolina cotton-mill company towns was a 
soclai-history of religion in company towns. This thesis will be a 
social history and sociology of community, specifically a sociology of 
the external locus of control relative to a community, Fraser, Iowa. 
The purpose of this thesis will be to reconstruct the history of 
Fraser. Important to that history will be the study of the external 
control of Fraser, the emergence of internal control 1n that context, 
and the return to external control with the decline of Fraser. 
Much social research is synchronic, done at one point in time. 
This thesis will attempt to use synchronic as well as diachronic 
analysis, looking at a phenomenon through time. Many social relations 
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cannot be understood outside of a context which the reconstruction of 
the historical process gives. The building and decline of a 
coal-mining boom town is just such a phenomenon. 
Robert Nisbet (1977:3) argued that much which is central to 
sociology, specifically such themes as " ••• community, masses, power, 
development, progress, conflict, egalitarianism, anomie, alienation, 
and disorganization ••• ", themes related to the effects of industriali-
zation and modernization need to be studied in a diachronic way. He 
refers to the work of the sociologist as painting a landscape of the 
" ••• soc ial, economic, and political setting ••• " of an age (Nisbet, 
1977:7) • 
••• what Tocqueville and Marx, and then Toennies, Weber, 
Durkheim, and Simmel, give us in their greatest works, rang-
ing from Democracy in America and Capital to Toennies on 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft or Simmel on Metropolis, com-
pelling as any to be found among the greater novels or paint-
ings of their age ••• (1977:7). 
This thesis is also historical in that it contains traditions 
conversant with change theory about horizontal and vertical community 
relations, company-town literature, and center-periphery literature. 
Documents and Interviews 
Since the period of interest of this study is just beyond the 
reach of the memory of people alive who lived in Fraser, most of the 
data in this study were obtained through the study of documents. 
Census data 
Studying a census at one period of time allowed for studying a 
population on a number of social indicators at a specific historical 
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time. This thesis looks at four censuses over a twenty-year period 
from 1895 through 1910, charting both social indicators at specific 
times, but also looking at social change over that time period. By 
combining elements found in all four censuses, individuals found in 
Fraser through time could be followed, and generalizations could be 
made about geographic mobility. That proved to be important since 
geographic mobility was a key result of external control in Fraser. 
The study of social indicators from specific censuses and across four 
censuses allowed a description of the population. Many of the 
characteristics of that population, such as ethnicity, country of 
origin, mobility, housing status, employment status, age, and gender, 
were a result of the external control and external development of 
Fraser. Thus, the study of census data was crucial for gaging the 
effects of external control on the population of Fraser. 
The State of Iowa conducted a census in 1895 and 1905. Taken with 
the Federal Censuses for 1900 and 1910, these give a census record of 
Fraser at five-year intervals from 1895 to 1910. The 1895, 1900, and 
1910 censuses were all available on microfilm rolls. 
The 1905 Iowa State Census was not available as a unit. It had to 
be completely reconstructed. All three of the other censuses were 
recorded from 30 to 50 entries per page, listing the town of Fraser 
separately from the rest of Boone County. The 1905 census was done on 
individual 3 X 5 cards. In 1905, these cards were not kept together as 
the town of Fraser, but were placed along with all names in Boone 
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County, by the first letter in the last name. A master list, contain-
1ng only the names of all residents of Fraser was also compiled by the 
censustaker. It was referred to as the post office list. This list 
became the basis for reconstructing the 1905 census. By going through 
the microfilm of all the names in Boone County, the cards were located 
with the address of Fraser. The data from each card were then 
transferred to the appropriate line on the reconstructed census. Out 
of 1,243 names in 1905, 25 could not be located on individual cards. 
Of these, 10 individuals were found either in the 1900 or the 1910 
census and their data were read into the 1905 census to fill in the 
gaps. This left only 1.2 percent of the 1905 names with no data. 
The 1905 census cards had used pencil to cross out the categories 
of-race and gender. This did not photograph well on the microfilm. 
Data on blacks in Fraser, showing which 1905 residents were black, was 
taken-instead from the 1900 census. The fact that a small number of 
blacks remained in Fraser in 1905 was corroborated in the newspaper 
accounts of blacks leaving Fraser. A decision was made about the 
gender of each individual with the 1905 census on the basis of the 
first name. In cases where it was questionable, a judgement was made. 
Sometimes gender could be corroborated 1n the 1900 and 1910 census. 
Figure 1 shows the data pertinent to this thesis that were given 
1n each of the four censuses. For instance, religious preference was 
only listed in 1895. Home value was listed only in 1905. From home 
value in 1905 the status of home ownership or rental could be deduced. 
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Father's Mother's Year Months Home 
Household Marital Place of Place of Place of of Immi- Occu- Unem- Own/ Home 
Size Name Relation Race Age Gender Status Birth Birth Birth gration pat ion played Rent Value Religion 
1895 X X X X X X Ccunty Foreign Foreign X X 
(Iowa) or or 
or foreign native native 
country 
1900 X X X X X X X U.S. state / U.S. U.S. state / X X X X 
foreign state/ foreign 
country foreign country 
country 
1905 X X U.S. state/ U.S. u.s. state/ X X X 
foreign state/ foreign 
country foreign country 
country 
1910 X X X X X " X u.s. state/ u.s. U.s. state / X X X X A 
foreign state/ foreign 
country foreign country 
.. country 
Figur~ 1. Fraser census data by year and category of information included. 
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If no home value was listed, it was assumed that the home was rented. 
The 1905 census did not clearly demarcate households like the other 
censuses did. 
Ethnicity was compiled by looking at the birthplace of the 
residents or the parents. Even if the person was born in the United 
States, if one parent was foreign born, they were counted as ethnic. 
The 1895 Iowa State Census gave problems in deciding the ethnic 
background of the parents for two reasons. First, the information 
given on the parents was simply "F" for foreign and "N" for native. 
Another problem occurred in that the two columns carrying the 
information of "F" or "N" for the father and mother were located at the 
center crease in the census-taking book. When the book was 
microfilmed, many of these were lost in the crease. If the ethnicity 
of the parents was listed in their own place of birth, this was no 
problem. If it was not, for some residents, the information was lost. 
For this reason, data on ethnicity were not computed for 1895. 
The 1895 Iowa State Census and the 1900 and 1910 Federal Census 
were all available on microfilm in the Iowa State University Library. 
The 1905 Iowa state census was available on microfilm at the State 
Historical Library in Des Moines, Iowa. 
By making a card with each family or individual from each census, 
alphabetizing and comparing them, the names that were the same in each 
census could be extracted from the rest. In this way, a fifth census, 
those living 1n Fraser for more than one census, was constructed. It 
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was called a measure of residential stability/mobility. This census 
gave the name, age, sex, marital status, occupation, ethnicity, race, 
months unemployed, home ownership or rental status, and property value 
of those living in Fraser more than one census. This allowed for 
social indicators of who was more or less geographically mobile. It 
also allowed for the possibility of seeing individuals Who changed 
marital status or occupational status over time. From this mobility 
measure, the number and percentage of persons living in Fraser for one, 
two, three, and four censuses were calculated. A scale was constructed 
where those living in Fraser for one census were highly mobile, and 
those living in Fraser for four censuses were highly stable. 
Census information was also helpful in making sense out of 
ne3sp~per reports. For instance, when lists of school board members or 
town officers were found in the newspapers, often their occupations 
could-be found in the census. In this way, the census could provide 
social indicators for the newspaper data. 
County newspapers 
Newspapers published in Boone County carried weekly columns on 
Fraser, beginning with its planning stages 1n 1892. Over 1,500 pages 
of newspaper were obtained by photocopying them at the Boone County 
Courthouse. These carried columns on Fraser or specific events that 
made the news in another part of the paper. Within this collection 
there was about a 25 percent redundancy rate since often one newspaper 
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would print the same news about Fraser as another. Sometimes the 
redundancy was verbatim. 
The Boone County Republican, The Boone County Democrat, The Boone 
News, The Boone News Republican, The Boone Weekly News, and the Ogden 
Reporter were all useful sources of Fraser history. An exhaustive 
search of the Boone County newspapers was made for the years 1892 
through 1914. This was done in the summer of 1983. 
The newspapers highlighted all the major events surrounding 
Fraser's history. They also gave a runn1ng, although incomplete, 
account of the mundane. They listed births, marriages, visits to and 
from Fraser, many of the people who moved to and from Fraser, and other 
items of minutiae of interest to those living in Fraser. Social and 
recreational functions were both advertised and reported on with 
regularity. When there was major labor unrest, both sides in the 
confrontation would argue their case 1n the papers. 
The newspapers were crucial for filling in the human elements in 
what would have been raw census data. The newspapers allowed for look-
ing at the census data that appeared every five years as a part of a 
continuing process. When blacks appeared as a sizeable proportion of 
the population in 1900, and were nearly absent aga1n 1n 1905, the 
newspapers gave the detailed accounts of how and why blacks were 
brought to Fraser and why they were nearly all gone by 1905. 
The newspapers gave valuable running accounts of the effects of 
external control on Fraser. Most important in this category were the 
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problems associated with labor unrest. The newspapers gave detailed 
accounts of how labor disputes arose, how strikes were dealt with by 
the company, the bringing of blacks to Fraser, the response of whites, 
the failure of some strikes and the success of others. Both miners and 
company officials took great pains to argue their cases in the news-
papers. 
The newspapers also gave detailed information and running accounts 
of communal organization life 1n Fraser. Some of this communal organi-
zation was with the help of the company and some was an expression of 
local initiative. In the newspapers were descriptions and dates rela-
tive to the development of communal infrastructure such as the school, 
churches, businesses, bridges, park, railroad, power plant, and the 
min~r'~ hall. There were detailed accounts of the fraternal organiza-
tions, recreational activities, and entertainment. There were accounts 
of community crises such as disease epidemics, major mine shutdowns, 
killings, accidents, and how the community dealt with such crises. 
Without the newspaper accounts, there would be no interpretative 
element in the raw data from the census accounts. 
Published historical materials 
Other published historical materials were also helpful, although 
quite limited. Goldthwaite's (1914) History of Boone County, contained 
an insightful page on Fraser. The Boone County Historical Society (1976) 
published two articles on Fraser by Nayse Daugherty in their Trail 
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Tales~ as well as an article on coal mining 1n Boone County. The State 
Mine Inspector's Reports, from 1895 to 1910 provided information on the 
specific mining statistics in Fraser. Poor's Manual of Railroads 
(1895-1912) gave useful information about the railroad that owned 
Fraser, its boards of directors, its value, trackage, rolling stock and 
engines, as well as changes in ownership. 
Institutional publications 
Institutional records, published and unpublished, were collected 
from both churches and the school. All three main churches and some of 
their leaders were found in published denominational sources. The Iowa 
Baptist State Convention Annual Minutes (1898-1908) gave some statis-
tical records of the Fraser Baptist Church, as part of the Iowa Baptist 
Association (colored). The Primitive Methodist, Record and Messenger, 
and later called Primitive Methodist Journal, gave information on the 
founder of the Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser. The Western 
Christian Alliance, published by the Gospel Tabernacle 1n Boone, gave 
information on the founder, Charles Crawford, of their satellite con-
gregation in Fraser. Lois Crawford also recently published a book on 
the life of her father, Papa and I (1981), that contained information 
on Fraser. The family history of William Morris, founder of the 
Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser, included geneologies and numerous 
written and published accounts of his life. The Primitive Methodist 
Church, still functioning, gave access to all its Sunday School records 
and Ladies Aid Society Records, and church business meeting records. 
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The County allowed duplication of the school records from Fraser, 
including lists of school board members, teachers and students, as well 
as treasurers reports. These included salaries for teachers, janitors, 
and board members. 
These institutional records gave the opportunity to reconstruct 
the organization of the local communal organizations such as education 
and religion. They provided both personal biographical information on 
key figures as well as data on such things as size of meetings or 
organizations, and interpretations of the founders. They also allowed 
comparative data on the financing of these institutions unavailable 
elsewhere. Since these records were often kept for purely institu-
tional use, they were sometimes more reliable than some of the news-
p~er_accounts which were sometimes produced for public relations pur-
poses. 
County records 
County records Ln the recorder's office were also quite useful. 
Approximately 100 deeds gave early property transactions, property 
values, locations of residences and businesses, and length of time 
between sale and resale. These combined with a map of Fraser from 
1896, showing the buildings at that time, allowed some reconstruction 
of the infrastructure of the town. The same office contained numerous 
Articles of Incorporation both for corporations, social and religious 
organizations. These gave the names of the original officers in the 
corporation or organization, the purpose of the entity, and other 
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information. The Articles of Incorporation for the town of Fraser 
listed 112 workers and their occupations, the first town officers and 
the conflict surrounding the decision to incorporate. The same source 
yielded numerous contracts, sales agreements, mortgages, releases, 
satisfactions, and mining rights agreements. Most of these contained 
information unavailable from other sources. Without these county 
records, the value of land, the price of mineral rights, the degree to 
which external owners dominated land purchases and mining rights, the 
classes of people interested in starting specific communal organiza-
tions, and the factual comparison between the owner's projected profits 
and real earnings would have been impossible. They provided a non-
biased comparison with newspaper accounts and information provided in 
co~pany correspondence. 
James ~ Hill papers 
As this thesis argues, Fraser was intimately tied to the inter-
ests of James Jerome Hill, railroad builder from St. Paul, Minnesota 
and his papers provided a rich source of historical information. The 
James J. Hill Reference Library in St. Paul, Minnesota, contains an 
archives known as the James J. Hill Papers. Found in these archives 
were correspondence between Hamilton Browne and James J. Hill specifi-
cally related to Browne's building of Fraser. These told of financial 
plans, the decision to build the town, corporate relationships, labor 
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disputes, decisions to recruit black strikebreakers and a strategy for 
such recruitment, the infrastructure and housing stock owned by the com-
pany, mining procedures, and profitability, all of which were important 
to the study. 
This correspondence between Hill and Browne provided an insider's 
v~ew of the company and the way ~n which Hill controlled Browne. They 
also provided a view of the way 1n which Browne intended to continue 
control of Fraser. By comparing much of the information contained 1n 
the letters by dates, with that found 1n the newspapers and county 
records, a composite reconstruction of events, as well as company 
motives and interpretations, was possible. There were notable occa-
sions where the company presentation in the newspapers was markedly dif-
f~renf than that found in the private correspondence. 
Photographs 
Nearly 100 photographs gave a more intimate face both to persons 
and structures in Fraser, as well as panoramic views of the town and 
scenery. They compensated for a number of missing details from the 
other data. 
Sometimes buildings could be identified in photographs. A compar-
1son of various store, hotel, and community buildings gave insight into 
the level of domination of the community by the company. For instance, 
visually the company store dominated the ma~n street. The photographs 
also gave a great deal of visiual information on such things as building 
composition, exterior, and comparative location. These compared 
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with a map of Fraser for 1896, gave some indication of the way the town 
would have looked to those living there. Comparing land records with 
these gave some indication of locations, style and construction of com-
pany housing. By comparing early and later photographs, a sense of the 
development of the community could be appreciated. 
Personal interviews 
Finally, interviews with eight older residents of Fraser gave a 
personal and living witness to the experience of those who chose to 
stay with Fraser for years after this study. Nearly all of them were 
too young to remember the events that are central to this study. Some 
could no longer remember events of their own youth, but some had recol-
lections of their parents conversations of earlier days ~n Fraser. The 
interv1ews were gathered by traveling to Fraser and Boone. Each person 
interviewed suggested someone else who may have further information. 
The data from the various sources were as never self-explanatory 
and sometimes contradictory. In the case of contradictions, newspaper 
accounts took precedence over the memory of individuals. The 
individuals were quite young when the events in this study took place. 
Often two or three sources would be used to confirm or explain each 
other. Newspapers were especially helpful in clarifying two or three 
different accounts of the same event. The newspapers and censuses were 
especially helpful ~n casting light on each other. 
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When there were disagreements among sources, a process of 
triangulation (Bailey, 1982), or uS1ng a number of sources together, 
was useful. Often judgements had to be made as to the best 
interpretation if there were apparent contradictions. By immersing 
oneself in the data at any stage, new sources of data su~faced. For 
instance, reading newspaper accounts of various institutions or events 
led to searching county records to corroborate those events. Often 
after researching newspaper and county records, more intelligent 
questions could be addressed to interviewees with the result that more 
information was obtained. This is comparable to the process of 
snowballing which is (Bailey, 1982) used in observational research and 
community studies. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF FRASER AS AN ECONOMIC OPERATION 
The Center and the Periphery 
The town of Fraser, Iowa, did not indigenously develop. It did 
not develop as a trade center or as a transportation and distribution 
hub. It did not develop out of a need for a post office, church, or 
school, to serve a farming region. 
In the late nineteenth century, the forces of industrialism were 
being felt in Iowa. The industrial revolution had created an ever 
growing need for fuel and coal was the primary fuel for that time. 
Fraser was built to supply that coal. The coal was primarily for 
metropolitan use and for transportation needs between metropoles. 
Built to extract coal, the primary purpose of Fraser was to make a 
profit for its owners. 
This chapter will show that the town of Fraser was developed and 
controlled by external interests. That external control was exhibited 
on two levels. Fraser was ultimately controlled by interests in the 
center, St. Paul, Minnesota. James J. Hill, the original owner of the 
coal fields where Fraser was built, held notes on the mining operation 
in and railroad built to Fraser from St. Paul. As Harvey (1980) 
pointed out, often the center is able to control the periphery through 
the extension of credit and the resultant debt servicing when the 
periphery cannot make the payments. In this way, Hill controlled 
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Browne who was unable to keep up with his payments from the beginning. 
The first part of this chapter develops the relationship between Hill 
and Browne, which led to the building of Fraser and Hill's control of 
Browne. 
Hamilton Browne was the link between the periphery and the cen-
ter, functioning for the interests of the center. In the local econ-
omy, everything from employment in the mines, housing, and store was 
structured for the profit of the company. Inevitably, the miners' 
lives were largely controlled by Browne and, in turn, Hill. All major 
economic areas of life were involved. Browne profited on the miners in 
their production or labor and on their consumption 1n housing and goods 
1n the company store. In this way, external economic control was a 
centra~ feature of Fraser and the miners' experience in Fraser. 
External economic control was the reason for founding Fraser and was 
str~ct~red into its basic existence from the beginning. 
This external control constituted a vertical tie of the very sort 
that Warren (1972) considered the artifact of twentieth-century commun-
ities. Indeed, it was a striking example of the control of a peripher-
al area for extraction of minerals by a center, much as the analysis of 
Frank (1975) delineated. That external domination led to a dissimilar-
ity of interests between the center, St. Paul, Minnesota, and the 
periphery, Fraser, Iowa. As Galtung (1980) noted, this was what led to 
the necessity of the center controlling the periphery. Fraser was 
controlled so that the dissimilar interests could be maintained both by 
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the center, James J. Hill, as well as the link to the center, Hamilton 
Browne. 
Hamilton Browne and James Jerome Hill 
Fraser was built by the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company ln 
the fall of 1893, by the corporation's President, Hamilton Browne. 
Browne's coal mining interest led him to form ties with James J. Hill. 
James Jerome Hill One of the most powerful American capital-
ists of the late nineteenth century was James Jerome Hill. He was 
called "America's foremost railroad builder" (Grant, 1982:373). David 
Mountfield called him, " ••• the last great empire builder" 0979: 159). 
He was " •.. best remembered for turning the woebegone St. Paul and 
Pa~if[c Railroad into the giant, efficient, and enormously profitable 
Great Northern Sys tem" (Grant, 1982 : 373). 
Hill's interest in Iowa was for coal. By 1876, he had " •.. be.en 
for many years the leading fuel merchant in St. Paul" (Nute, n.d:lO). 
He was planning a takeover of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, and 
may well have anticipated coal needs for railroad use (Nute:n.d.). In 
time, he would own two Iowa railroads; the Sioux City and Northern, and 
the Mason City and Fort Dodge Railroad (Grant, 1982). The latter 
served the two Iowa towns of Coalville and Lehigh in Webster County, 
where Hill held coal mining interests (Grant, 1982). Hill invested in 
a number of properties in central Iowa in search of coal. These were 
located in both Boone and Webster Counties (Grant, 1982). In his 
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coal mining interests ~n Iowa, Hill was closely allied with an Iowa 
native, Hamilton Browne. 
Hamilton Browne Hamilton Browne's father, John Browne, was a 
Federal Land Commissioner. He also worked as an agent for the River 
Lands Company, a land speculation company owned by E.C. Litchfield, of 
London and New York (Nute, n.d.: Martin, 1976). One of the 
Litchfields, E. Darwin Litchfield, formed a corporation with Hill for 
railroading in Minnesota (Nute, n.d.). It was in this way that John 
Browne's son, Hamilton Browne, came to be close friends with James 
Hill. 
In 1878, Hamilton Browne and Hill joined others in forming the 
Iowa Coal Land and Mineral Prospecting Company. Hamilton Browne became 
Hill's key Iowa operative (Nute, n.d.:8). By 1877, Browne was running 
a ~oal mining operation near Ft. Dodge, Iowa, for Hill (Martin:1976). 
Since Hill's Iowa Properties were close to St. Paul and Hill's rail-
road interests, Hill hoped to develop them into a reliable and cost 
effective source of coal. This also led Hill into his involvement ~n 
railroading ~n Iowa, so he could transport his own coal (Martin, 
1976). 
Hill did not have the time to devote to direct oversight of the 
Iowa Properties and he apparently trusted Browne a great deal. Grace 
Nute states that Hill: 
not only backed Browne financially, but also got his most im-
portant friends, such as Richard B. Angus, Lord Mount 
Stephen, John S. Kennedy, D. Willis James, and Samuel Thorne, 
to invest heavily in some or all of the Browne companies 
(Nute, n.d.:8-9). 
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Hill owned Iowa Properties referred to as Lehigh, Clyde, pilot Mound, 
and Coal Valley which he incorporated into the Clyde Coal Company some-
time around 1884 (Nute, n.d.:11-l2). Martin (1976:233) notes that: 
He invited just about everyone to join in opening more m1nes, 
including George Stephen and he lent some money to Browne, 
and to E.N. Saunders, his former partner in the fuel business, 
so that they could pay for their shares of the stock. By 1884 
he valued his own holding in Iowa coal properties at $400,000. 
It is the coal fields known as the pilot Mound fields that are the 
subject of this study. The town that was built in the pilot Mound coal 
fields was Fraser, Iowa. 
Decision ~ develop the pilot Mound Coal Fields 
Initially, James Hill had intended to sell his portion of the Iowa 
P~operties now held in the Clyde Coal Company. Apparently, he had 
gained very little profit in their earlier mining efforts on that 
prpperty. Hill had instructed Browne to sell the Clyde property as 
early as 1891 (Browne to Hill, Aug. 22, 1892). Browne complained that 
all the buyers who had been interested were apprehensive since Hill 
wanted to sell all the properties. Potential buyers thought that it 
must mean there was something wrong with those properties. Browne 
suggested that Hill could retain half interest in the properties until 
they could be made profitable at which time he could easily sell the 
final half. Hill was unwilling (Browne to Hill, July 15, 1892). He 
was putting pressure on Hamilton Browne to get the property sold so 
Browne could repay Hill what Hill had advanced Browne thus far in the 
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project. Browne was unable to make his obligations to Hill at this 
point and, as had always been the case, was dependent on Hill for a way 
to get out of his trouble (Browne to Hill, Aug. 20, 1892). In 1892, he 
repeatedly asked Hill to allow him to develop the pilot Mound Fields 
and interests at Lehigh. While Hill developed Lehigh himself, where he 
already had railroad ownership, he made it possible for Browne to 
develop the pilot Mound Fields. 
In December 1892, Hill agreed to allow Browne to purchase the 
1,140 acres in the pilot Mound fields and the mining equipment from 
Hill's unprofitable Coal Valley mine in Webster County. Browne would 
have to come up with between $35,000 and $50,000 for the down payment 
on the purchase price of $140,000 (Browne to Stephen, Dec. 19, 1892; 
BrQwn~ to Hill, Dec. 19, 1892). For this purpose, Browne would form a 
corporation to raise the needed down payment. Hill would not be a part 
of ~hi~ corporation directly. Browne had already assured him, however, 
that Hill could choose several of the officers in the company and they 
would retain Oscar M. Carpenter who was the former superintendent of 
the Clyde Coal Company under Hill and Browne (Browne to Hill, July 15, 
1892). Hill could sell the pilot Mound Fields and continue to control 
them. Essentially, Hill and Browne had a holding company. This 
arrangement allowed Hill to maintain control of Browne's company by 
holding security in that company. The fact that Hill did maintain 
control is more than confirmed by Browne's continual correspondence to 
Hill following that purchase (Nute, n.d.). Browne made few decisions 
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before or after his forming a corporation without Hill's express 
approval. If Browne did make a decision that Hill perceived as adverse 
to his own interests, Browne was immediately confronted with the matter 
and made quick amends. Browne kept up his almost daily correspondence 
with Hill until 1901 when Hill sold the remainder of the Iowa Proper-
ties to his " ••• long-time friend and colleague, A. B. Stickeney, head 
of the Chicago Great Western Railway" (Grant, 1982:374). 
On February 23, 1893, Hill and Browne signed an agreement whereby 
Hill agreed to sell Browne 1,140 acres in the pilot Mound Coal Fields 
for $140,000 (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway to Minneapolis 
Trust Co., Nov. 15, 1893, Browne to Hill, Feb. 8, 1893), or $123 per 
ac~e. Browne would later claim, 1n a moment of anger, that he paid 
over twice what these fields were worth. It was the highest price by 
far-h~paid for land, indeed twice what he paid for some mining land 
(Browne to Toomey, Dec. 16, 1898). The mortgage was not signed until 
November 15, 1893, so Browne would have enough time to make the neces-
sary improvements on the property. 
The agreement was that Browne would take the $35,000 to $50,000 he 
could ra1se for a down-payment and put it into improvements on the 
pilot Mound Fields and townsite of Fraser, all of which would be 
secured in the mortgage (Browne to Hill, Dec. 19, 1892). The mortgage 
was held by the Minneapolis Trust Company of which Samuel Hill, James 
J. Hill's son-in-law, was president (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and 
Railway Co. to Minneapolis Trust Co., Nov. 11, 1893; Martin, 1976). 
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Significantly, Browne continued his correspondence, not with Samuel 
Hill or the Minneapolis Trust Company, but with James J. Hill. The 
terms of the mortgage allowed foreclosure of the property and all its 
improvements in the pilot Mound Fields, ln case of thirty days failure 
to payoff bonds when due. Foreclosure of those properties and 
improvements would have been foreclosure of essentially all of the 
holdings of the Boone Valley Coal and Railroad Company. 
Not only did the mortgage allow for foreclosure, but it allowed 
for the Minneapolis Trust Company to appoint someone to run the 
holdings of the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, and use the 
rents and profits to payoff the indebtedness until such time as a sale 
could take place (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to 
Minneapolis Trust Co., Nov. 11, 1893). Significantly, Hamilton Browne 
was not able to meet the terms of the mortgage, and wrote to Hill on 
numerous occasions asking for protection from foreclosure (Browne to 
Hill, April 12, 1894; May 7, 1894; July 20, 1894; Oct. 20, 1894; Oct. 
23, 1894; Browne to Stephen, May 13, 1894; May 14, 1894; May 17, 1894; 
Browne to Ward, Mar. 3, 1895; Browne to Healion, July 22, 1895; Oct.5, 
1985; July 1, 1897; Browne to Toomey, Feb. 24, 1898; Dec. 16, 1898). 
This must have been a tremendous card in Hill's hand. Browne had also 
purchased from Hill another part of the Clyde properties, known as the 
Milford Fields and was in arrears on payments for this purchase from 
time to time (Browne to Stephen, Feb. la, 1894). Browne was at Hill's 
disposal. It seems that foreclosure was seriously threatened by Hill's 
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attorneys In 1898 (Browne to Toomey, Dec. 16, 1898; Toomey to Browne, 
Aug. 23, 1899). It may have been averted when Browne borrowed $40,000 
to catch up on payments and make improvements in the company, from the 
Illinois Trust and Savings Bank (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and 
Railway Co. to Illinois Trust and Savings Co., Dec. 1, 1898). 
The Local Economy on the Periphery 
The Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company and the early economlC 
operation of Fraser 
Mining As soon as Hamilton Browne had signed his initial 
agreement with James Hill for the development of the pilot Mound 
Fields, he began to solidify complete control of mining interests In 
the rest of the surrounding area. At the same time, the Boone Valley 
Coal and Railway Company was incorporated. To ralse the needed 
down-payment for the purchase of the pilot Mound Fields from Hill, 
Browne needed between $35,000 and $50,000 to be put into improvements 
on the property. 
Browne initially intended to come up with $50,000. He had 
contacted D. R. Fraser and Norman D. Fraser, of the firm; Fraser and 
Chalmers, machinery manufacturers In Chicago, who agreed to $20,000 
(Boone County Republican, Oct. 31, 1894; Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 
1893). William Messervey, President of the First National Bank of Ft. 
Dodge, agreed to $5,000 (Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). Herman A. 
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Uhl agreed to $5,000 (Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). J. H. Strong 
and F. M. Gage agreed to jointly contribute $5,000 (Browne to Stephen, 
Je. 15, 1893). Hamilton and Mary Browne would each contribute $5,000 
(Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). This would give D. R. Fraser 
4/10ths control and Hamilton and Mary Brown 2/10ths control. As it 
turned out, Uhl, Strong and Gage backed out, and D. R. Fraser picked up 
their shares to hold 6/10ths control (Boone to Hill, Oct. 31, 1893; 
D. R. and N. D. Fraser to Hill, Nov. 14, 1893). Browne had $45,000 of 
the expected $50,000 (Articles of Incorporation, Boone Valley Coal and 
Railway Corporation, Feb. 16, 1893). 
While he was obtaining subscribers for his new corporation, Browne 
also was in the process of obtaining control of mining rights in the 
area. _Earlier, a mine had already been in operation on the Zunkel 
family property (BCR., Sept. 13, 1893). Browne made agreements with 
both k. W. and Margaret Zunke 1 in the summer of 1893 to lease and 
purchase mining rights for that mine on 260 acres of land, as well as 
purchase five acres of surface land (Agreement, A. W. Zunkel and 
Browne, Aug. 21, 1893; ~argaret Zunkel to Boone Valley Coal and Railway 
Co., Jl. 1, 1893). He also purchased 29 acres from Henry Ehlers, and 
five acres from John Peterson (Henry Ehlers to Boone Valley Coal and 
Railway Co., Jl. 2, 1893; John Peterson and Boone Valley Coal and 
Railway Co., Aug. 29, 1893). 
His purchase of mineral rights cost him between $40 and $100 per 
acre. If he purchased all he agreed to in this particular mine, the 
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Zunkel mine, he would have spent nearly $6,500 for the m1n1ng rights 
and land to begin mining. This m1ne was about one-half mile north of 
Fraser on the opposite side of the Des Moines River. Hamilton Browne's 
land purchased from James J. Hill, the pilot Mound Fields, was directly 
to the west of Fraser across the river. A mine was opened here in late 
1893 also. It was to these two mines that the first railroad spur was 
built in 1893. It was a three-mile spur to the Minneapolis and St. 
Louis Railroad, running between Dayton and Ogden, Iowa. At Dayton, the 
Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad connected with the Chicago and 
Northwestern Railroad, to whom Hamilton Browne expected to sell most of 
the coal from the Fraser mines (Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892; Poor's 
ManuaL of Railroads, 1895, #28:1374). 
Browne also bought half interest in the Mineral Ridge Coal Com-
pany,-which owned 1,300 acres on the east or Fraser side of the Des 
Moines River to the north of Fraser (BCR, Sept. 13, 1893). Most of 
this would not be mined until much later. 
Since the initial mines would be the old Zunke1 m1ne and the newly 
opened mine on the land directly across the Des ~oines River from 
Fraser, the m1ners would have to cross the river to go to work. 
By late September, 1893, Browne was laying track on his three 
miles of railroad from his two mines to the Minneapolis and St. Louis 
Railroad (Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893). He was getting the track 
from the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, with the intention of 
paying for it in coal (Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892). He had sunk the 
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shaft for the first mine and had purchased the Zunkel m1ne and was 
nearing readiness to produce coal (Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893). He 
had purchased the machinery for the #1 mine; the stationary steam 
eng1ne, boiler, and topworks for about $4,000 from the Clyde Coal 
Company mine at Coalville 1n Webster County; now closed by Hill (Browne 
to Hill, Apr. 23, 1894). He was more than pleased with both #1 and #2 
mines. By April of 1894, he planned to begin digging on #3, just to the 
south of #1. Number 3 mine proved to be excellent, with a seam of 3'8" 
1n thickness (Browne to Stephen, Feb. 10, 1894). 
Building ~ company town While the opening of m1nes 1n a remote 
place, or relatively remote place by nineteenth-century standards, 
ne~essjtated providing some kind of housing and stores. The typical 
pattern in company towns was to structure that necessity into a profit-
able- virtue. In every way the economic structuring of the company town 
was intended to bring profit to the owner. 
Hamilton Browne fully intended to profit on all aspects of the 
miners' economic existence. In housing, it mattered little whether the 
miner chose to build or rent. Hamilton Browne stood to profit hand-
somely either way, through property sales or through house rents. If 
Browne sold the property, he maintained mining rights so that what was 
most valuable, the coal, stayed in his control. If the miner did 
choose to buy, they were less capable of protest by strike or 
geographical relocation. If they had a house 1n the community, they 
were more strongly tied to the community. If they chose to rent a 
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company house, Browne profited on their rent and could evict them if 
they became unionized or struck. By building a company store that 
dominated the business sector and buying out the competition, he 
profited on the consumption needs of the miners and their families. If 
other businesses wished, they could purchase land and build in Fraser. 
Business lots were especially profitable to Browne at their higher 
prices. If the business was a failure, Browne had profited on the sale 
of land to a failed competitor. If the business was a success, Browne 
bought out the competition. By· maintaining control over the business 
sector through the company store, Browne could assure himself of 
profiting on the miners' necessities. Thus, building the company town 
was a necessity for which the owner could be thankful. 
The townsite Having secured the mining rights that he 
needed, Hamilton Browne had a partial section of land in the southwest 
corner of Dodge Township, Boone County, platted into town lots for a 
town to be known as Fraser, in September, 1893 (Goldthwaite, n.d.). 
He purchased the platted land from C.J.A. Erickson (~ortgage, Boone 
Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, Sept. 21, 1893). 
Erickson was an early resident of Boone County, Who had made some of 
his money on a general merchandise store in Dodge Township at Mineral 
Ridge and later in a store in Boone, Iowa. He was one of the 
organizers of the First National Bank in Boone and also an Iowa State 
Senator (Goldthwaite, n.d.). Browne had earlier planned on building 
Fraser on land owned by Hill in the pilot Mound Fields (Browne 
76 
to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892; Jl. 22, 1895). It may be that Erickson was 
planning to start another store and sell town lots to miners, and 
Browne bought out his first competition. Such an explanation may 
answer the question of why Browne built Fraser across the river from 
the m~nes. 
The original plat for Fraser had 70 blocks, the northern 35 blocks 
having ten lots to the block and the southern 35 blocks having 12 lots 
to the block (Boone County Platte Book, 1896). Given the irregularity 
of some blocks, due to river frontage, there was a total of 683 lots. 
The uppermost two tiers of blocks were on the flat topside of the bluff 
to the Des Moines River Valley. The next tier of blocks descended 
steeply to meet the main street of the town, Bruce Street, on the 
fourth and relatively flat tier running through the center of Fraser. 
Fro~_there, the lana dropped to the flood plain. All along the River, 
the lower tier on the west and the lower three tiers of blocks on the 
south lay on a flood plain. Flooding would be a perennial concern in 
the spring when the ~ce broke loose. 
A slight creek ran through the eastern part of the town. Like 
most of the valley along the Des Moines River, Fraser had many beauti-
ful, if somewhat scrubby, trees. Given its proximity to the River and 
its wooded hillside, the town was much more pleasant than many of the 
Iowa coal camps (cf. Schwieder, 1983). 
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In 1897, an additional 144 acres was purchased from C.J.A. Erick-
son. It had been platted as the First Addition to Fraser (Mortgage, 
Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, Aug. 2, 1897). 
The First Addition had 30 blocks and 119 lots. Many of the lots were 
nearly as large as full blocks in the original plat. 
The town was laid out on a rectangular grid running north and 
south. It had a large main street, Bruce Street, running east and 
west. It also had a large road running along the flood plain called 
River Road. 
Browne purchased the original townsite of Fraser from C.J.A. 
Erickson for $8,443 (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to 
C.J.A. Erickson, Sept. 21, 1893). The townsite was nearly 200 acres, 
and the purchase included approximately 144 additional unplatted acres. 
The First Addition to Fraser of nearly 120 acres was purchased for 
$2,065 (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, 
Aug. 2, 1897). By subtracting the 144 unplatted acres of the original 
purchase from Erickson, from the total of 344 acres which Browne pur-
chased for $8,443, it is apparent that the original townsite accounted 
for 58% of that purchase or a cost of $4,897. Browne told Hill that he 
expected to sell the town lots for $50,000, a sum that would have meant 
roughly a 900% profit (Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892). It was not clear 
how many years he expected to take to sell all the lots. If Browne 
would have sold his 683 original lots at an average of $73.21 each, he 
would have realized his $50,000. 
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Browne did not quickly sell all the town lots. Given his cash 
flow problem, it is unclear why he did not. Unless he had a change of 
strategy, it is apparent that people, most generally miners, could not 
afford to buy town lots. From 1893 through 1901, the Boone County plat 
records show that Browne sold $18,336 in property in the townsite of 
Fraser. This was inclusive of lots sold in the First Addition to 
Fraser from 1897 through 1901. This addition included approximately 
117 lots. Of these, 92 were in the original plat of Fraser. In every 
case, he sold the property but reserved the mineral rights for himself. 
The $18,336 included $2,205 for 25 lots out of 119 lots in the First 
Addition to Fraser. This more than covered the amount of $2,065 which 
Browne paid Erickson for the First Addition. 
The balance of the $18,336 which Browne sold from 1893 through 
1901, or $16,131, was paid for 92 lots in the original plat. However, 
this figure is somewhat inflated since many of the lots had buildings 
on them when Browne sold them. The buildings accounted for about 
$5,600 of this amount, leaving $10,531 as the amount Browne received 
for the lots during this time. Of this, $5,730 was for business lots, 
which generally sold for $300 each, and $4,801 was for residential lots 
that generally sold for about $50 to $75 each. So Browne was able to 
sell $10,531 worth of town lots in the original plat of Fraser which 
was shown above to have cost him $4,897, showing at least 100% profit 
by the end of 1901. However, this is still a bit inflated, since 
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William Messervey, one of the major shareholders in the Boone Valley 
Coal and Railway Company, had purchased 20 residential lots for $2,000, 
and the Fraser Supply Company; a company composed of officers in the 
Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, had purchased three business 
lots for $900. Subtracting these figures would bring the amount that 
Browne had received from outside sources for lots in the original plat 
of Fraser to $7,631 by the end of 1901, on an initial investment for 
that land of $4,897. He still had 591 of his 683 lots left to sell. 
He had sold only 13.5% of the original plat by this time. 
While it appears that Browne did not realize the profit he had 
anticipated on the sale of town lots, he did maintain some cash flow 
thEou~h such sales, and he did realize a sizeable return on his In-
vestment as early as 1901. 
__ Apparently, it was not too difficult to attract initial business 
entrepreneurs. In the final three months of 1893, when Browne first 
built Fraser, he was able to sell more than 11 business lots and three 
residential lots for a total of $3,680. These were sold to at least 12 
different business persons. But Browne also wanted to profit on 
retailing. He would build a company store. 
The company store From the time of his first negotiations 
with James J. Hill regarding the purchase of the pilot Mound Fields, 
Browne intended to build a company store in Fraser. He told Hill that 
" ... the houses and store are good for at leas t $10,000 annually ... " 
(Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892). The structure for the company store 
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was completed by early November 1893 (Browne to Hill, Oct. 31, 1893; 
Photograph of Fraser, Iowa, Oct. 14, 1893). Browne had the store in-
sured for $600 value (Browne to Hill, April 23, 1894). There are no 
records to show the value of the initial inventory. 
From the beginning, Hamilton Browne allowed others to purchase 
land to build stores and other businesses. This may well have been 
related to his early cash flow problems. He needed to sell as many of 
the town lots as possible. But Browne was also quick to buyout his 
competition if they did not leave by choice. In October 1895, M.P. 
Peterson opened a grocery store in Fraser, after previously showing 
some success in that business at Mineral Ridge (BCR, Oct. 16, 1895). 
Peterson left Fraser within five months saying that " ••• business was 
somewhat dull at Fraser" (BCR, March 4, 1896). Another competitor, 
C.E._Bailey had built a store on the same block as the company store in 
March 1894 (Boone Co. Plat Records). This store was originally a 
hardware and grocery store. In April 1896, Bailey sold his grocery 
supplies to the company store and remained selling hardware only (BCD, 
April 24, 1896). 
Both of these cases were part of a concerted effort on the part of 
the company to make the company store a profitable venture. However, 
they first had to overcome an Iowa law that forbade coal companies to 
own company stores (Grant, 1982). Browne got around the law by having 
a separate corporation, The Fraser Supply Company, organized November 
20, 1895 (Articles of Incorporation, Fraser Supply Co.). But 
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the Fraser Supply Company had three of the corporate owners of the 
Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, Hamilton Browne, Norman D. 
Fraser, and William Messervey, as its board of directors (Art. of 
Inc.; Grant, 1982). 
It is doubtful that the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company ever 
directly coerced the miners to trade there. However, in 1897, striking 
miners cha.rged that the Fraser Supply Company had stamped out all compe-
tition, a situation they found incomprehensible for a town so large as 
Fraser (BCD, Jl. 16, 1897). Browne replied to the charge by say1ng that 
the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company did not own the Fraser Supply 
Store and that: 
" ••• no emp loyee of the company is requ ired or has ever been 
asked to trade at the Fraser Supply Store; that less than 
one-half of the employees do their trading at that store: 
that the prices asked for goods at the Fraser Supply Store 
__ are as low as prices at Boone for the same quality of 
supplies; that the Company in no way opposes anyone wishing 
to operate a store of any kind at Fraser" (BCD, Jl. 16, 1897). 
It was true that others did supply miners' needs. Every payday the 
town would fill with peddlers (BCD, Feb. 19, 1897). It was probably 
only the law that prevented Browne from requiring his employees in the 
mines to purchase at the company store. He was not above requiring 
others who worked for him to be paid from the company store. In 
1897, Browne informed Hill of what he was having to pay suppliers for 
m1ne timbers and props. He went on to say: 
We have been able to buy all the props we need at the Jan. 
price and very many at the present price, and always payable 
in goods at the store. If you could make an arrangement at 
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Lehigh to get your props payable in goods, of course, it 
would be a big lift for the store (Browne to Hill, May 20, 
1897 ). 
Browne used coupons in place of scrl.p, which was illegal, as ear ly 
as 1895 (Nute, n.d.). Scrip was being used in 1907 immediately after 
Browne sold the railroad to the Fort Dodge, Des Moines, and Southern 
Railway (BCR, Dec. 5, 1907). This had the predictable effect of 
driving a competing grocery business out of town (BCR, Dec. 5, 1907). 
The company store provided the dually profitable role of limiting the 
workers consuming choices and eliminating the competition. In November 
1898, the Fraser Supply Company purchased the store from the Boone 
Valley Coal and Railway Company. It was now a large building of 
apJroximately 75 ft. by 120 ft., having three lots of land. They 
purchased it for $4,600 (Deed, Nov. 1, 1898). If the three lots of 
laqd _were worth about $900 total, we can assume that the store building 
and inventory must have been valued at about $3,700. 
Company Housing Hamilton Browne had initially intended to 
build 50 company houses (BCR, Sept, 13, 1893). He must have found 
housing to be a worthwhile investment, for he and his associates had 
nearly 100 houses by 1905. When he first built Fraser in October 1893, 
he put up 25 company houses. They were wood frame construction built 
on a foundation of eight or ten strategically placed large stones (Pho-
tograph, Ferrari interview). Mary Sebring, whose parents lived in the 
company housing in Fraser at the turn of the century, recalls their 
telling of snow blowing through the walls and seeing earth through the 
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warped fioorboards. She tells that some were built on such a steep 
grade that the front part of the house was placed on stilts (Sebring 
interview). They were cheaply constructed. Browne was required by his 
investors to purchase fire insurance for these 25 houses. He found 
this nearly impossible to do, given their cheap construction (Browne to 
Hill, Feb. 2, 1894). When he was able to find an insurer, he insured 
the 25 houses for a total value of $3,750, or $150 per house (Browne to 
Hill, April 23, 1894). Again the insurance was annulled in 1895 
(Browne to Hill, Feb. 12, 1895). 
In 1896, William Messervey, one of Browne's investors, purchased 
20 lots for $2,000, twice the going rate (Warranty Deed, Boone Valley 
C~al ~nd Railway Co. to W.O. Messervey, Apr. 16, 1896). Messervey had 
20 houses moved on to these lots in April (BCD, Apr. 10, 1896). The 
lo~ation was the lowest flood plain in Fraser. Did they choose to 
locate company housing here because there was little hope of selling 
these lots to those wishing to build private housing? 
From 1897 to 1899, a large contingent of blacks was brought to 
Fraser as strikebreakers. Hamilton Browne informed Hill that he was 
constructing a number of houses for the black miners that he was 
bringing in (Browne to Healion, Sept. 19, 1897). Apparently, these 
houses were built in the southeast part of the original plat of Fraser 
(BCD, Feb. 3, 1899; BCD, April 21, 1899). This was also a flood 
plain. 
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The 'next major contingent of company houses was built in 1903 
after Browne had sold the company to the Newton and Northwestern 
Railroad Company. They built 40 houses and had them moved to Fraser 
(BCD, Apr. 17, 1903). It was a time of Fraser's largest growth. By 
1905, it would be difficult to find a place to rent in Fraser (BCD, 
Mar. 6, 1905). 
Expectations and realities It is difficult to know for sure 
what Hamilton Browne expected to make in his new enterprise, given the 
limitations of historical documents. The same is true in the matter of 
knowing how much coal he really produced and at what price. Still, 
there is a fair collection of documents that help to reconstruct what 
seems_a meaningful part of the Fraser story; the profitability of 
mining for Hamilton Browne. 
_. ~n trying to sell the idea of opening up the pilot Mound Fields to 
James Hill in 1892, Hamilton Browne told him that he had talked to of-
ficials of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad and that they would 
take 200,000 tons annually from him (Browne to Hill, Jl,15, 1892). In 
conversation with his superintendent, Mr. Carpenter, he fully expected 
to be able to profit on this by $.40 per ton. Out of this $.40 per ton 
he would have paid for the land at $.10 per ton in royalties (Browne to 
Hill, Jl. 15, 1892). That would have left him $20,000 invested in the 
company and $60,000 profit yearly. Those projections may have well 
been exaggerated when one remembers that his investors only produced 
$45,000 to make the down-payment on the company. A $60,000 annual re-
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turn on an investment of $45,000 would be 133 percent annual return. 
This is not to infer that the Fraser mines were unproductive. They 
were not productive as quickly as Browne had anticipated, but they were 
productive. Together with Brown's Milford Fields, they were producing 
1/3 of the coal for Boone County in 1905, the county's total production 
being nearly 422,000 tons (State Mine Inspection, Biennial Report, 
1905). However, productivity of the mines were based on more than one 
factor. It could be restricted by poor markets and by labor 
difficulties. It was inhibited by both in the mid-1890s. 
Browne had no sooner signed the papers to buy the pilot Mound 
Fields when he found himself in the economic depression of 1893. He 
loat tbree of his initial investors and found that the remalnlng lnves-
tors had little cash arid had to sign notes for most of the money 
(Br~wne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893). This set him back in his first year 
because he could not build his railroad or open his mines until he had 
funds for improvements. His mines had only opened when his first 
major installment on his loan came due and he was unable to pay on time 
(Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893; Oct. 31, 1893). The Depression, 
would have other effects besides restricting the money supply. It 
affected the market for coal and the price of labor. 
In the years from 1893 to 1903, the mines in Boone County worked 
an average of 199 days per year (Madsen, 1980). This ranged from 150 
days in 1897 to 225 days in 1899. The labor contracts came up for 
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negotiatibn in April (Browne to Hill, Apr. 12, 1894) and the railroad 
contracts were negotiated in May. The interests of the railroads and 
the miners were in conflict at that time of year. 
In May of 1894, Browne received his first contract with the 
Chicago and Northwestern Railroad for the Boone Valley Coal and Railway 
mines at Fraser (Browne to Stephen, May 17, 1894). In that month, the 
miners also went on strike (Browne to Stephen, May 7, 1894). His 
contract called for delivery of between 525 and 975 tons of coal daily 
(Browne to Hill, Jl. 20, 1894). Given an average of 199 workdays for 
the year, he might have expected to deliver between 105,000 tons of 
coal and 194,000 tons for the year following. The expectation would 
have ~een greater if we calculated on the basis of possible workdays, 
rather than the average. In the 12 months from May, 1894, to April, 
189..5, __ they produced 33,116 tons of lump coal (Browne to Hill, pilot 
Mound Field, 1895). Browne's calculations noted that Fraser usually 
produced an additional 11% lower grade "steam coal" besides their lump 
coal (Browne to Healion, Oct. 30, 1896). Thus, we might assume that 
they produced 36,759 total tons of coal for the contract year. This 
was 18.4 percent of Brown's expected 200,000 tons per year. Figure 2 
shows the production of lump coal for the 17 months from the open1ng of 
the mines in December 1893, until April 1895, inclusive (Browne to 
Hill, pilot Mound Fields, 1895). In the highest month, they produced 
only 3,876 tons of lump coal. In their worst month, May 1894, they 
produced only 360 tons as the result of a strike. The average of those 
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shows th~ production of lump coal for the 17 months from the opening of 
the mines in December 1893, until April 1895, inclusive (Browne to 
Hill, pilot Mound Fields, 1895). In the highest month, they produced 
only 3,876 tons of lump coal. In their worst month, May 1894, they 
produced only 360 tons as the result of a strike. The average of those 
17 months was 2,328 tons per month. Even adjusting this upward 11 
percent for steam coal, it was only 15.5 percent of Browne's expected 
monthly production of 16,666 tons, or 200,000 tons annually. 
In the years that followed, production and profits, while probably 
improving steadily, were still dismally below his earlier projections. 
Browne complained that in 1894 he had been forced to take a $.20 per 
ton cu! in his projection of $.40 per ton profit, losing one-half of 
his profits. In June of 1895, he wrote Hill, "I do not know yet 
wh~ther our men went to work at Fraser this A.M. or not" (Browne to 
Healion, Je. 17, 1895). In October, they began a three-month work 
slowdown to four days per week, in sympathy to other striking mlners in 
the region (Browne to Healion, Oct. 5, 1895). In April, 1896, he noted 
that they were only shipping 14 cars of coal from Fraser daily, half of 
what they should be. They only shipped 4,288 tons for April (Browne to 
Healion, Apr. 18, 1896; Browne to Clyde Coal Co., May 7, 1896). The 
next month the new railroad contract cut their previous year's contract 
in half (Browne to Hill, May 7, 1896). In the fall, the men were idle 
about one-fourth of the time (Browne to Healion, Dec. 6, 1896). Browne 
was delivering coal to rail connections in Ogden for $1.60 per ton. He 
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noted that it had cost him $1.30 in the car at Fraser, and that 
allowing $.10 t $.15 to transport it to Ogden, he was only making $.15 
to $.20 per ton (Browne to Healion, Dec. 6, 1896). At contract renewal 
time in May, he would see the worst strike in Fraser's history. The 
men would be out for five months (Browne to Healion, Apr. 8, 1897). A 
year later in December 1897, he was shipping a large tonnage of 400 
tons daily, but noted that he could sell 800 tons (Browne to Healion, 
Dec. 5, 1897). In January of 1898, he sold almost no coal because the 
weather was so warm that people were not buying coal for domestic pur-
poses (Browne to Toomey, Feb. 24, 1898). Again in August 1899, the 
miners struck (Browne to Toomey, Sept. 22, 1899). It was not until late 
18~9 that prices had risen to a fairly profitable rate of $2.25 per ton 
(Browne to Toomey, Dec. 30, 1899). From 1893 to 1899, Hamilton Browne 
had-been behind on most of his payments. It was in December 1898 that 
Hill's attorneys counseled him to seriously consider foreclosure (Browne 
to Toomey, Dec. 16, 1898). Hamilton Browne refinanced the company 
through other sources and paid his debt to Hill. The fact that Browne 
had failed to meet his obligations to Hill for so long was not a sLgn 
that Browne did not profit on Fraser. It simply meant that it took 
longer to do so. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, the shape of the external control of Fraser, that 
gave rise to building and controlling the economic life of Fraser has 
been described. In the process, the fact of external control, an exam-
ple of what Warren (1972) would see as horizontal ties, was apparent 1n 
Fraser from its inception. It was external economic interests that 
were the very reason for the existence of Fraser. Contrary to Warren 
(1972), the vertical ties were the dominant factor in Fraser from the 
beginning. 
For this reason, this chapter has been developed to show that the 
building of Fraser was an example of the phenomenon described 1n center 
and p~riphery theory. Interests at the center, James J. Hill of St. 
Paul, Minnesota, controlled the smaller capital interests, Hamilton 
Brown~, the owner of Fraser, Iowa. Hill controlled Browne through debt 
servicing on the credit given Browne to build Fraser. Browne con-
trolled Fraser on the local level for profits on the miner's production 
in labor as well as consumption 1n housing and goods in the company 
store. While Browne was unable to meet his credit obligations on time, 
he still profited greatly from the mines, houses, and stores in Fraser. 
It took him longer than expected, but he ultimately paid off Hill and 
made good for himself. In all economic facets of community life, 
Fraser was built for the profits of the center and controlled in the 
interests of the center. It was a community on the periphery. 
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This chapter has delineated the economlC structures of that com-
munity life. The next chapter will develop the shape of the population 
in Fraser that was a result of the external control of that community. 
The population of Fraser developed as a result of the external forces 
that built Fraser for mining coal and controlled that population in 
many respects. 
92 
CHAPTER V. THE SHAPE OF AN EXTERNALLY CONTROLLED POPULATION 
Since Fraser was built 1n 1893 for the interests of investors from 
St. Paul and Chicago, it 1S not surprising that the population of 
Fraser would reflect this external control. The population of Fraser 
was recruited, and the composition of this population and its geogra-
phic mobility were related to external control. 
This chapter will look at the character of the Fraser population 
over time as a result of the external development and control of that 
community. If one V1ews Fraser as a system with population inputs and 
population outputs, a few suggestions concern1ng the effects of exter-
nal control on a population would be in order. 
The population inputs were not local but distant. More accurate-
ly, much of the population came most recently from nearby Fraser before 
coming to Fraser. Almost half of the population had recent European 
ethnic roots, and 1n 1900, over one-fifth of the population were 
blacks. 
When the white workers organized for better wages, black strike-
breakers from the South were recruited. This chapter deals with that 
process, the labor disputes that preceded it, and the results of 
recruiting strikebreakers. 
Labor unrest and poor living conditions also led to a specific 
population output. The mobility of the Fraser population was extreme. 
This was orchestrated by the owners. Workers who had few long-range 
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ties to a community would often leave when work conditions were 
unbearable, rather than unionize. Blacks were used as strikebreakers 
when convenient and nearly as quickly discarded when their task of 
union-breaking was done. In the process, the whole population, whites 
and blacks, made major turnovers. 
The gender and age composition of Fraser reflected that the com-
munity was dominated by one occupation, coal mining. The industry 
needed young adult males. Workers with families were also advantageous 
to the owners s~nce they would rent company houses and buy goods in 
greater quantity at the company store. 
The housing conditions ~n Fraser appear to have changed over time. 
They were much more crowded 1n the earliest years. This was confirmed 
in the fact that taking boarders and boardinghouses were common 1n the 
fi~st __ two censuses, 1895 and 1900, but these completely disappeared by 
1910. 
The availability of housing had greatly increased by 1910. The 
rate of private home ownership also greatly increased by 1910. This 
corresponded with what appears to have been a policy by the company to 
begin dumping houses by 1910, in an effort to get rid of its houses 
before the coal was depleted. Significantly, blacks were recruited for 
a specific purpose, strikebreaking, and they almost never owned homes. 
No blacks owned a home in 1900. 
The occupational structure of the town was overwhelmingly weighted 
towards coal mining. Even those in the retail business and service 
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sector of the economy were most likely to be employed by the coal com-
pany. Women were first employed in taking in boarders. This provided 
both financial help and a place for single men to live in the initial 
housing shortage. When women no longer took in boarders, because of 
increased housing, they began to appear in other occupations. 
Throughout this chapter, the effects of external development and 
control of this community will be seen. This will provide a fleshed-
out view of life on the periphery. 
Origins of the Population 
Fraser was built in Dodge Township, and it would be reasonable to 
ask if the Fraser population was recruited from that township. It was 
not. The 1890 Federal Census was destroyed in a fire. A search of the 
1885 State Census shows that only two families living in the Township 
then were later residents of Fraser. One continued to be a farming 
family with mining as a supplementary occupation. The Fraser popula-
tion did not originate ~n Dodge Township. The population was brought 
in to m~ne coal. 
u.S. state and regional origins 
Not all of the population of Fraser were European immigrants. 
Nearly all of Fraser's population was brought ln from a source external 
to the township, but not necessarily foreigners. For the years 1900, 
and 1905, between 39.9 percent and 54.0 percent of the population were 
not European immigrants, nor children of immigrant parents. 
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The composite population for the three census periods from 1900 through 
1910, shows 51.8 percent of the Fraser population were neither European 
immigrants nor children of immigrant parents CTable 8). 
It has been demonstrated that the population of Fraser was brought 
~n from sources external to the township and that around 50 percent of 
these were not European immigrants. These came to Fraser from other 
places in the United States including Iowa. The origin of this popula-
tion, including blacks, will be analyzed. 
In 1900, 634 or 83.8 percent were born ~n the United States, 
even though 39.9 percent were European ethnics and their children. 
This means that a number of Europeans were born in the United States 
before coming to Fraser. The 386 persons born ~n Iowa in 1900 
comprised 60.9 percent of the 684 persons born ~n the United States 
(Table 2). These 386 persons constituted 51.0 percent of all Fraser 
residents in 1900. Of those born in the United States, exclusive of 
those born in Iowa, three factors are most highly correlated with the 
states from which the Fraser population was drawn: 1) contiguity, 2) 
coal mining regions, and 3) black racial origins. States bordering 
Iowa, states with large coal mining populations, and southern states 
with large black populations accounted for the place of birth of 86.7 
percent of the Fraser residents in 1900. 
Table 3 shows the birthplace of all the Fraser population born ~n 
the United States ~n 1900, exclusive of Iowa. The largest grouping 
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(27.0%) came from two states contiguous to Iowa which had large coal 
mining populations: Illinois (14.5%), and Missouri (12.5%). Another 
12.1 percent originated in Indiana. Of those from Illinois, Missouri, 
and Indiana, over half (55 out of 97, or 56.7%) were black. The blacks 
were recruited in 1897 in Illinois and Missouri. A contingent of those 
born outside Iowa, but in the United States, came from Ohio (4.8%), and 
Pennsylvania (9.3%). These were all white persons. All but three 
persons from the southern and eastern states of West Virginia, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama were black. 
Eighty-three people, or 33.5 percent of those born in the United States 
outside Iowa in 1900, were from these states, including, 53 persons 
came from the coal-producing states of West Virginia (11.3%), Kentucky 
(7.3%), and Tennessee (2.8%); while 30 persons came from states less 
important to coal mining such as North Carolina (5.2%), Georgia (2.0%), 
and Alabama (4.8%). 
In 1900, of all those persons born in the United States, 74.4 
percent were white and 25.7 percent were blac~ (Table 2). However, 
counting only those born in Iowa, only 3.6 percent of them were black. 
Blacks were a recruited population. When one excludes those Iowa-born, 
where whites completely dominate, another interesting phenomenon 
appears; blacks are a clear majority. Only 39.9 percent of those born 
in states outside of Iowa were white, and 60.0 percent were black 
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(Table 3). To summar1ze, whites completely predominated those born in 
Iowa and a majority of those recruited from outside Iowa were black. 
In 1905, (Table 4, Table 5), 78.7 percent of the population of 
Fraser were born in the United States which 1S quite close to the 83.8 
percent born in the United States 1n 1900. Of those born in the United 
States in 1905, 74.9 percent were born in Iowa (Table 4), which is 
substantially higher than the same group in 1900 (60.0%). Blacks 
accounted for a majority of those born outside Iowa in 1900. In 1905, 
the category of those born in Iowa increased since most blacks, born 
outside of Iowa, were now gone. In 1905, 33.5 percent of those born 1n 
the States outside Iowa were from the two contiguous states of Missouri 
(9~4%l, and Illinois (18.0%), as well as the nearby state of Indiana 
(6.1%); all three of which were coal producing states (Table 5). The 
stat~s of Pennsylvania (17.1%), and Ohio (6.1%) were the origin of 23.2 
percent of those born in states outside Iowa states (Table 5); a 
substantial increase in the percentage of Fraser population from these 
states. Only a small part of the 1905 population originated in the 
southern and eastern states where most of the blacks had come from 1n 
the 1900 census. The main difference between the states of or1g1n 1n 
1900 and 1905 was that since nearly all the blacks had left Fraser by 
1905, there was little representation from the states in the south and 
east, and a greater percentage born in Iowa in 1905. 
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Recent Origins The evidence suggests that Fraser was only one 
stop on a continuous pilgrimage for many residents. One measure of 
where people have been 1n recent years 1S to look at where their chil-
dren were born. Of course, this will give a quite limited answer. It 
cannot answer the question of where those without children lived before 
com1ng to Fraser. It also suffers as a measure by overrepresenting 
families that are both prolific and in their primary childbearing 
years. Nevertheless, it gives one measure of where people were living 
previous to coming to Fraser. 
Table 6 shows the birthplace of children from 0 to 14 years old 1n 
1895. Of all 228 children, whose birthplace is listed, the largest 
gr~uping (41.6%) were born in Boone County, the county in which Fraser 
was located. The second largest group (20.6%) were born in Webster 
County, just to the north. 
James J. Hill and Hamilton Browne controlled extensive mining 
operations 1n both counties. Hill owned mines in Coalville and Lehigh 
1n Webster County. Browne and Hill owned mines in Boone County at 
Centerville, Incline, Milford, Angus, as well as Fraser. It looks as 
if most people did not come to Fraser directly from distant regions. 
Most of them had lived somewhere else in Boone County before coming to 
Fraser. It appears that the largest groups of people com1ng to Fraser 
were miners already employed in Hill and Browne mines in Boone and 
Webster Counties, since 66.7 percent of all people 1n 1895 (with 
children) came most recently from Boone or Webster Counties. Besides 
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these people, another 16.2 percent of those with children lived in 
counties directly contiguous to Boone County before coming to Fraser. 
The 1900 Federal Census did not list birthplace by counties, but 
by state. The first census to record blacks living 1n Fraser was 1n 
1900. Out of 298 children under 15 years old, only 46 (15.4%) were 
born outside of Iowa. This again argues that generally, people were 
not moving long distances to come directly to Fraser. The one 
exception to this was the coming of blacks to Fraser. Of the 46 
children born outside Iowa in the 1900 Census, 34 were black. Only one 
black child was born in Iowa. 
The newspapers also gave a record of moves to and from Fraser, 
aLthough it is surely incomplete. There is no way to quantify these 
listings S1nce they are not 1n discrete categories. A specific news-
paper-citation may list one person moving from Boone, or fifty coming 
from Missouri in the case of blacks. However, leaving out the large 
recruitment of blacks which is discussed below, a generalization can be 
made. Most of those recorded in the newspapers as mov1ng to Fraser 
between the years 1896 and 1905 came from other coal mining towns such 
as Boone, Angus, Mystic, Summit, Lehigh, Ogden, Milford, Incline, 
Moingona, Centerville, and Logansport. Moves were generally 
occupationally proscribed, to and from other coal mining camps. Quite 
a number of moves to Fraser in this time were also listed as returnees. 
There appears to be something of a circular movement of population in 
and out of Fraser as well as other mining camps. 
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How and Why Recruits Were Brought to Fraser 
Little is known about how the whites came to Fraser. The most 
distinctive feature of the coming of southern blacks to Fraser was 
that more than any other group, they were a totally recruited popula-
tion. Only the Russians, of whom a large group was recruited as 
strikebreakers in 1899, show similarities in this regard. Still, many 
of the Russians came before the recruitment of 1899. If it could be 
argued that all of Fraser was 1n some sense a recruited population, 
then a distinction would have to be made in both the degree and the 
style of recruitment of the blacks. 
The blacks were recruited for one purpose, strikebreaking. 
Hamilton Browne first contemplated bringing blacks to his various m1n-
ing fields in 1895, but concluded that if he brought blacks to his 
Milford fields, located between Fraser and Boone, the m1ners at Fraser 
would stage a sympathy strike (Browne to Healion, Nov. 23, 1895). 
Browne fully intended to bring in blacks as strikebreakers, but he 
could not jeopardize shutting down both Milford and Fraser at the same 
time. The situation was all the more critical since Browne had not yet 
proven his ability to make his payments to James Hill (Browne to 
Healion, Nov. 23, 1895). He dared not risk a production shutdown yet. 
In 1897, the time for strikebreaking seemed right to Browne. 
Hill's operator in Lehigh, in Webster County to the north, had already 
recruited blacks to work his mines (Browne to Healion, Aug. 23, 1897). 
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Browne wrote to Hill to notify him that he intended to g~ve the m~ners 
at Fraser " ••• a thrashing they will never forget" (Browne to Heal ion, 
Apr. 8, 1897). By that, he meant that his sole purpose for bringing in 
blacks was to teach the whites a lesson. 
It is just possible that the high rate of labor turnover that 
Browne experienced at Fraser was not taken by him to be an indictment 
of his treatment of the miners. It may well have been orchestrated in 
part to preclude solidarity that could come from longevity. He wrote 
to Hill that his bringing blacks to Fraser would deal with the labor 
problems. "I think we will never have any decent treatment in this 
field until we bring in a lot of new blood ••• " (Brmme to Healion, 
Sept. 9, 1897). 
Browne inquired of Hill to find out who the preacher was who had 
recruited blacks for Lehigh, Iowa (Browne to Healion, Aug. 23, 1897). 
It was P. T. Strange of Muchakinock, Iowa (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 
1897). Browne's strategy was to bring in enough black miners to form a 
majority of the work force, so that labor agitators, who were contin-
uously travelling through the camps, would have little effect at organ-
izing the men (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897). Browne was perturbed 
at Hill's operative in Lehigh for not complying with Browne's expressed 
wish that Lehigh also adopt the policy of maintaining a majority of 
blacks. In the letter, one gets the sense that blacks were not always 
easy to convince to come; when they did come, they were equally dif-
ficult to convince to stay. 
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" ••• the colored miners were taken to Lehigh to insure avoid-
ance of work suspensions, and strikes, and so long as they 
were there in sufficient numbers to comprise a strong majori-
ty of the men in our employ there could be but little chance 
or probability of the labor agitators in the district getting 
our men into trouble but as I understand it the negroes have 
gradually left until there are but few of them there, and at 
the same time white miners have been taken on until the mine 
is now under the control of white men and among thel7l a number 
of professional agitators, several of them being men who 
helped to originate our trouble at Fraser and who left Fraser 
and went to Lehigh to create a disturbance there. As an 
increased force of miners was needed at the Lehigh mine it 
would have been a good precaution to have this increased 
force made up mainly by bringing in colored miners so as to 
keep that element largely in the majority but it seems the 
contrary has been done and, worse than all that is the fact 
that, men have got in there whose business it was to bring on 
the trouble which I now understand has developed" (Browne to 
Healion, Sept. 1, 1897). 
It may be that the reason why black mLners moved on as quickly as they 
came was the constant threat of violence they faced. In the above 
letter, Browne told Hill that he had just received word that the Lehigh 
miners had struck. 
" ••• since writing the above I have had a phone message from 
Lehigh stating that the miners there all struck and demanded 
a dollar except the colored miners. I understand the colored 
miners refuse to strike. I hope this is so and that they 
will be so encouraged by you and Mr. Sullivan that they will 
have the courage to stand the attack which will undoubtedly 
be made on them to get them out to make the strike complete. 
The action of the colored miners only confirms what I have 
said above" (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897). 
Browne gave indication of the difficulty of recruiting black workers 
when there was a strike and threatened violence. 
-" 
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"The few colored miners you have if they stand firm will 
serve as a rallying point and will enable you to more easily 
get additional colored miners to go there" (Browne to Healion, 
Sept. 1, 1897). 
Browne was able to recruit black m1ners to Fraser, but it was not 
without difficulty. He hired both the preacher, P. T. Strange, and Mr. 
French, an agent from the Thiels Detective Agency, to recruit blacks 
for him. Mr. French was to go to Illinois and P.T. Strange to 
Missouri. If they could not find recruits there, Mr. French would try 
Kentucky and West Virginia. Mr. French thought that he would have to 
employ four guards on the train coming back to Fraser, and possibly ten 
guards upon arrival in Fraser in the case of threatened violence by the 
white miners (Browne to Healion, Sept. 7, 1897). Apparently, the 
dangers necessitating guards on the train trip to Fraser could be 
diverse. Browne was candid to Hill that the guards were necessary not 
only to avoid " ••• interference by outsiders ••• " but also the 
eventuality that some black miners might change their mind and desert 
(Browne to Healion, Sept. 7, 1897). While blacks, had a high degree of 
geographic mobility, that must never be confused with freedom. 
Browne had success in gathering a group of blacks in both 
Springfield, Illinois, and in Brevier, Missouri, (Browne to Healion, 
Sept. 19, 1897). About 180 blacks arrived by train in late September, 
1897, from Missouri and Illinois. Of these, between 100 and 125 were 
men and began mining coal (BCR, Sept, 30, 1897; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897). It 
was claimed by a white miner who was looking for public sympathy 
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for married white miners who were losing their jobs, that these were 
mostly unmarried black men (BCR, Sept. 30, 1897). The figures g~ven, 
125 m1ners out of 180 blacks com~ng would lend credence to the claim 
that most were unmarried. Only 55 out of 180 persons were W1ves or 
children. As soon as the blacks came, the white union men tried to 
meet with them and convince them of their grievances. They even 
brought a black union miner from Boone to argue their case. But the 
Company kept the whites away from the blacks with armed guards (BCR, 
Sept, 30, 1897; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897). The white miners also claimed 
that on arriving in Fraser, the black miners were exhorted by a 
preacher to obedience to the company. 
" ••• the night after they came, one of the ir number made a 
speech in which he advised the colored man to keep away from 
the white, to go to work, to obey their bosses, to save 
their money and above all to be sure to do as the company 
asked them to do ••• " (BCR, Sept, 30,1897). 
The white miners appealed to the black miners, 
" ••• do not be ridden to death by your priests or ministers. 
Do not let them deceive you with their sophistry and have you 
rob your fellow men •••• Any man who will cover himself over 
with a cloak of religion and tell you it is your duty to work 
and not listen to any other will surely receive his reward for 
thus trying to lead astray men who trust in him." (BCR, Sept, 
30, 1897). 
The reference was obviously to P. T. Strange, the preacher and labor 
recruiter, who Browne had hired to bring the blacks to Fraser. 
The white m~ners were using the newspapers to gain public support 
as we 11 as "begg ing" for food and supp 1 ies for those who were s t i 11 
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striking. There were only thirty-five whites left on strike (BeR, 
Sept, 30, 1897). They claimed that they had been: 
" ••• shoved out of our homes, out of our work and away from 
our families and let such companies as these bring into our 
community the off scourings of the country ••• " (BCR, Sept. 
30, 1897). 
Apparently, the company had evicted the white strikers to make room for 
the blacks. 
Whether it was the white miners' antipathy, or the company's 
disinterest in the blacks once it had achieved its goal of teaching the 
white miners a lesson, nearly all of the blacks in Fraser left within 
six months of their coming. The columnist in the Boone County 
Republican reported that, "Colored people are very few in our town 
[Fraser] now and still are leaving us" (BCR, Feb. 24, 1898). The next 
week the same column stated that; "Everyone has a smi Ie on the ir face 
at Fraser, as they believe confidence has been restored once more" 
(BCR, Mar. 3, 1898). The strike was over and the blacks had played 
their part and left on schedule. They were recruited to Fraser as a 
group and left as a group. Apparently, most had gone to surrounding 
towns. 
Within the month, they began returning from nearby towns to Fraser 
(BCR, Mar, 31, 1898). In April, a large contingent of blacks came to 
Fraser from Lehigh (BCR, Apr. 7, 1898). It may be that those who left 
Fraser took work with the related employer in Lehigh and in other places 
still controlled by James Hill. By mid-April, there were 190 blacks in 
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Fraser aga~n. Forty-five of them had been recruited from Texas (BCR, 
Apr. 14, 1898). 
The issue causing the strike in the spring of 1897 was the com-
pany's rollback of wages to $.65 per ton, which was below wages at 
other places in the region. Through bringing in black miners, the 
company had succeeded in getting the new contract signed at that rate 
for 1898. By 1899, more white miners were leaving with the third 
failure to get a raise from $.65 per ton. In July, most of the whites 
had left Fraser. The paper told the story: 
"The white miners at Fraser are leaving here rapidly. Over 
thirty have left since trouble commenced and what are left 
intend moving as soon as possible as they claim they cannot 
make wages at $.65 per ton and they claim they are going 
where they pay the district price, but we are very sorry to 
see them go as it is impossible to find a better class of 
citizens then we had in Fraser" (BCR, July 7, 1899). 
By the end of July, there were only 40 white m~ners left in Fraser. 
Over 100 white miners had left town, many of them homeowners (BCR, July 
27, 1899). It was claimed that the company had recently brought in 50 
more black miners from allover the south, many also coming from the 
prison mines at Leavenworth, Kansas (BCR, July 27, 1899). 
Even though the whites were now in the clear minority ~n Fraser, 
they were not without reinforcements and not above intimidating the 
blacks. Over 200 white men came up to Fraser from Milford to have a 
"talk" with the black miners (BCR, July 27, 1899). The blacks respond-
ed by forming a 23-man militia, fully armed with Winchester rifles and 
pistols. They patrolled and target practiced in town to the great 
annoyance and alarm of the whites (BCR, July 27, 1899). Another 42 
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blacks were recruited from Kentucky (BCD, July 28, 1899). It was also 
at this time that Russian miners were recruited to come to Fraser (BCD, 
July 28, 1899). 
When one looks at the origin of the blacks that came to Fraser on 
the basis of their birthplace, the largest group (17.2%) originated ~n 
Virginia (Table 7, U.S. Federal Census, 1900: no distinction between 
East and West Virginia). The second largest group originated ~n 
Missouri (16.0%). An equal portion came from Kentucky and Illinois 
(10.4%) each. Only 8.6 percent originated in Iowa, and two of these or 
1.2 percent, were children born in Iowa after their parents came to 
m~ne coal. 
It is clear that the blacks were recruited specifically for 
strikebreaking. Their tenure as a population group was less than s~x 
years. With the exception of one family which stayed beyond this 
period, no blacks owned homes. The company may have had a policy 
against selling to blacks. As a recruited population, specifically for 
strikebreaking, blacks were unique in being treated as a group rather 
than as individuals. They came as a group and left as a group. In 
Fraser, life on the periphery was one where the external controls were 
structured to keep labor from organ~z~ng. To accomplish this, tactics 
such as using disenfranchised ethnic and racial groups against other 
workers often were used (Barnum, n.d.) 
The blacks who came to Fraser were recruited ~n groups and left in 
groups. In 1900, there were 163 blacks ~n Fraser, where there had been 
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none ~n 1895. By 1905, the number had decresed to 29, and by 1910, 
there were only 13 blacks left in Fraser. 
Population Composition 
Ethnic population 
From the beginning, Fraser had a large immigrant population (Table 
8). Counting all those with one parent born outside the United States, 
in 1900, 39.9 percent of Fraser's population was immigrant population. 
In 1905, 51.0 percent were immigrant and in 1910, 54.0 percent of the 
population was immigrant. Taking the composite of all four censuses, 
48.2 percent was immigrant population (Table 8). 
Various European ethnic groups were represented ~n the early years 
of Fraser's existence (Table 8). The 1900, 1905 and 1910 census showed 
20.1 (152 persons) to 26.9 (131 persons) percent of the Fraser popula-
tion was from the British Isles (English, Welsh, Irish, and Scottish). 
The Scandinavians (Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian) comprised 11.1 (54 
persons to 12.2 (152 persons) percent of the population. Slavic groups 
such as the Hungarians, Bohemians, Austrians, and Lithuanians 
contributed .5 (4 persons) to 3.9 (19 persons) percent of Fraser's 
population. Although a small percentage in 1910, the Slavic population 
had grown a great deal from 1900. Russian immigrants were present ln 
the 1900 (1.7% or 13 persons) and 1905 (3.5% or 44 persons) census and 
absent in the 1910 census. The Italians were represented by .3 (2 
persons) percent in 1900, and 6.2 (30 persons) percent in 1910. Other 
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groups of immigrants such as Canadians, French, and Swiss were 
represented in small numbers (1.4% overall). 
Gender composition 
The gender composition of the Fraser population was greatly influ-
enced by the fact that coal m~n~ng was a male occupation, and the popu-
lation was both recruited and immigrant. The four censuses used from 
1895 through 1910, show major categories of the adult population where 
males outnumber females by as much as twice (Tables 11, 12, 13, 14). 
In the four censuses, there were a number of cells in the age 
categories between 20 and 64, the age where most coal miners would be 
found, with a much higher percentage of men than women. Taking the 
total of men and women in the ages of 20-64 years in 1895, the men were 
67.2 ~ercent, and the women 32.8 percent. In 1900, the men were 61.7 
percent whereas the women were 38.3 percent. In 1905, the men were 
59.0 percent, whereas the women were 41.0 percent. In 1910, the men 
were 56.4 percent whereas the women were 43.6 percent. The men greatly 
outnumbered the women because the town was built completely on a male 
occupational structure. 
Age composition 
It is possible to generalize about the age composition of Fraser 
over four censuses in the following ways. The population decreased in 
nearly a uniform manner with each age category (Figure 3). Over a 
third of the population were children (0-14 years), the blacks having a 
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somewhat smaller percentage of children. Nearly two-thirds of the 
population were adults between 15 and 64 years of age. 
In 1895, 36.7 percent of the population were children (0-14 years 
of age), in 1900, 37.5 percent were children, in 1905, 36.6 percent 
were children, and in 1910, 41.3 percent were children. The 1910 
population was composed of a greater percentage of persons in families 
than the other censuses. The 1910 census showed no unrelated boarders, 
and no boarders lived in a motel. 
The blacks, who were mainly in Fraser for the 1900 census, had a 
lower percentage of children (29.1%, 0-14 years old) than the general 
population for any census. Whites in 1900 had 39.7 percent children. 
This may be explained by the fact that blacks were recruited from ~uch 
further away, and those families with children were much less likely to 
risk coming to Fraser, especially under threat of violence as was the 
case in 1897 and 1899. 
The adults in Fraser (15-64 years) comprised between 55.6 (1910) 
and 61.1 (1895) percent. Blacks were overrepresented in adults. In 
1900, 58.9 percent of whites were adults and 68.1 percent of blacks 
were adults. Again, this is explained by the fact that they were 
recruited under the threat of violence. 
The age group from 65 years and above was .8 (1900) to 2.7 (1910) 
percent of the population in the four censuses. The blacks had a much 
lower percentage of older population (.6%). This can be explained by 
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the fact that· they were recru ited from further away, whereas more 
whites grew old as coal miners living in the region of central Iowa. 
In summary, the population was distributed with about one-third 
children and about two-thirds adults. Blacks, being recruited, were 
overrepresented in adults and underrepresented in children. A small 
percentage of the population in each case was older. 
House and family composition 
Size of households The Slze of households in Fraser 1n these 
early years was at least partially a function of the ability of the 
company and the community to provide increases in housing stock to keep 
up with the population recruitment. In the early years, households 
were much larger ·than 1n the later years. In 1895, the community was 
less than two years old, and there was probably something of a housing 
shortage. By 1910, the community had seen a serious decline in popula-
tion, and there was plenty of housing stock. 
For the purpose of this discussion, the following estimates of 
company owned housing will be used and are bas~d on newspaper reports 
and property records (see Chap. 4, above). In 1895, the company owned 
25 houses; by 1900, they owned 55 houses and by 1910, they had owned 
100 houses. However, it appears that the company must have sold or 
moved many of its houses out of Fraser between 1905 and 1910, since 
only 67 households were rented in 1910. 
These figures may be conservative. For instance, while figuring 
the company ownership of homes at 55 in 1895, the census showed that 98 
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homes were rented. It may be that the company owned more rentals than 
evidence found in newspaper reports. Probably, many who had built 
homes in Fraser and had left town in the labor troubles of IB97 and 
lB99 were still renting their houses to others. Taking the above 
estimates of company housing ownership; ~n IB95, 25 of 98 households 
(25.5%) lived in company housing; ~n 1900, 55 of 155 households (35.5%) 
lived in company households. 
The size of the average household decreased from 1895 to 1900 
(Table 17). In 1895, the average household had 6.0 persons living ~n 
it; in 1900, 4.8 persons, and in 1910, 4.6 persons per average 
household (Table 17). This decrease is accounted for in the increase 
~n available housing stock. 
Conditions for most people were crowded in lB95. In that year, 
53.6 percent of the population lived in houses of seven or more 
persons, and lB.3 percent of the popUlation lived in houses of ten or 
more persons (Table 17). By 1900, the percentage living in households 
of seven or more had dropped to 37.B percent, and the percentage of 
those living in households of ten or more had decreased to 7.1 percent. 
In 1910, the percentage living in households of seven or more stayed 
relatively the same (34.3%); while the percentage of those living in 
households of more than ten persons decreased to 2.3 percent. The 
category of households of four to six persons grew with each new 
census. In lB95, 31.6 percent; 39.4 percent in 1900, and 48.7 percent 
in 1910 lived in these moderate sized households (4.6 persons). 
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Housing conditions improved dramatically over time 1n Fraser, as 
measured by the decreasing number of persons living in each household 
(Table 17). 
Since blacks only lived 1n Fraser as a large group in the time 
measured by the 1900 census, their relative household conditions over 
time cannot be assessed. They can only be compared with all households 
for 1900. Housing conditions as measured by the number of people per 
household were relatively better for blacks than whites. This, 
however, must be qualified so that it is understood that this says 
nothing of the actual quality of the building in which they lived or 
the relative size of such buildings. In all probability, the blacks 
lived in lower quality homes, since all of them lived in company 
housing in 1900. But they did enjoy better household conditions 1n the 
sense that they had less persons living in each household. In 1900, 
there were an average of 5.0 persons per white household and 4.1 
persons per black household. While 26.7 percent of whites lived 1n 
households of seven or more persons, only 21.4 percent of blacks lived 
in such large households. This difference can be accounted for by the 
fact that blacks in 1900 had a much greater percentage of small 
families than whites. This again is probably a function of the fact 
that not many blacks with large families would travel the long distance 
to Fraser under fear of violence upon arrival. 
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In summary, it can be noted that housing conditions, measured by 
the number of persons living in one household, improved over time as 
more houses were built. It can also be stated that the s~ze of black 
households was somewhat smaller, probably a function of the reluctance 
of blacks with large families to come to Fraser. 
Households with boarders Dorothy Schwieder, ~n Black Diamonds 
(1983) makes the connection between the housing of boarders and eco-
nomic necessity in the coal mining towns of Iowa at the turn of the 
century. The fact that in Fraser there was a decrease ~n both the per-
centage of households with boarders and the percentage of boarders per 
household may indicate an improvement in the economic and living condi-
tions of people in Fraser. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
the number of boarders per household may also have been a function of 
available household space in comparison to the recruited population at 
the time. As time passed, there was more housing stock in Fraser, and 
by 1910, the population had greaterly decreased. 
In 1895, 36.0 percent of all households had unrelated boarders 
(Table 18). By 1900, 20.0 percent of all households had unrelated 
boarders, and by 1910, no households had unrelated boarders (see Table 
18). The findings are similar when one examines the number of boarders 
in each census. In 1895, 21.1 percent of the population were unrelated 
boarders. In 1900, 9.5 percent of the population were unrelated 
boarders, and in 1910, none of the population were unrelated boarders. 
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Later censuses show a decrease in boarders. Two boarding houses 
operating in 1895 and 1900 were closed in 1910. It appears that the 
major contributor to the decrease in boarders was the greater avail-
ability of housing stock due to the population decline. Thus, there 
was a decline in demand for housing for boarders. It is likely that 
the two boarding houses would have operated as long as it was profit-
able. In 1895, the Donahues and the Meyers both operated boarding 
houses. In 1895, 4.9 percent and in 1900, 2.6 percent of the popula-
tion lived as boarders in these two boarding houses. Both were closed 
Ln 1910. 
Blacks lived in somewhat smaller households than whites, but had a 
greater percentage of households with boarders. Counting the two 
exclusively white boarding houses as white households (Table 18); 12.1 
percent of all white households had boarders in 1900. Excluding the 
two boarding houses, 10.5 percent of all white households had boarders 
in 1900 (Table 19). Forty-three point six percent of households had 
boarders. White homeowner's hesitancy to rent to black strikebreakers 
led to a housing shortage for blacks possibly, and thus, a greater 
percentage of black households had boarders. Five point three percent 
of whites were boarders, counting those in boarding houses, whereas 
18.5 percent of blacks were boarders in 1900. 
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There were two boarding houses or hotels, as they were sometimes 
called: The Donahue Hotel and the Meyers Hotel. In 1895, the Donahue 
Hotel had 23 persons, including the Donahue family, and the Meyers 
Hotel had 19 persons including the Meyers family. In the 1895 census, 
two other homes were distinguished from the hotels or boarding houses 
because they were headed by miners rather than "hotel proprietors." 
The Walker home had 17 persons including the Walker family, and the 
Linquist home had 16 persons including their family. Together, the two 
hotels and two large households housed 75 persons, or 11.9 percent of 
the popUlation in 1895. 
In 1900, only the two hotels remained. The Donahues housed 17 
persons and the Meyers housed 13 persons, or a total of 4.0 percent of 
the population. In 1910, the hotels did not show up 1n the census. By 
1910, housing became more available. 
Family size In two censuses where data was available, 1895 and 
1900, the average family size was between 5.0 persons and 4.4 persons 
respectively (see Table 20) In 1900, the black family averaged fully 
one person smaller (3.4 persons) than the average white family (4.4 
persons) (see Table 21). This correlated well with the finding that 
black population in Fraser had fewer children than the white popUlation 
in 1900. Again this may be attributable to the recruiting of blacks 
over long distances under threat of violence from Fraser whites. 
Blacks with children may have been less inclined to come to Fraser. 
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Home ownership Given the tremendous geographic mobility of 
the Fraser population, the percentage of the population that owned 
homes is surprising. In 1900, 35.6 percent of the households were 
owned and 64.6 percent were rented. By 1910, 64.5 percent were owned 
and 35.5 percent were rented (Table 22). There had been a dramatic 
increase in home ownership. It may well be that by 1910, the company 
was even beginning to divest itself of its company houses, selling 
them to employees before it was recognized that the coal was being 
worked out. Significantly, in 1900, while 47.8 percent of whites owned 
homes, none of the blacks owned a home. While employment was open to 
blacks in Fraser, it appears that home ownership was not. 
While home ownership could be a sign of control of one's life, it 
could also be a painful reminder of the more significant control exer-
cised by the m1ne owners. For those who owned homes were concerned 
about losing their investment in the case of labor trouble. In 1899, 
during one of the major strikes where a large force of black m1ners was 
recruited to Fraser, one of the fears of white miners was that they 
would lose their investment in their homes. They suggested that the 
value of homes dropped disproportionately in such times. In a 
newspaper report (BCR, July 27, 1899), the miners expressed such 
fears: 
••• the larger part of the white men owned their own homes and 
have left their families until they could arrange to send for 
them. It is claimed that all the money invested in these 
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homes will be a clear loss to their owners. One man declared 
that not ten cents on the dollar will be realized today on 
any home owned by a white miner in Fraser. 
There may have also been the implicit racial issue ~n the article, 
implying that the drop in the vaue of property was not just the result 
of labor strikes, but of flooding the town with blacks. Even though 
many miners owned their homes, the external control of Fraser by the 
m~ne owners controlled even this part of their lives. In one sense, 
they felt they were little better off than those who could be evicted 
from company houses in the case of a labor strike. The fact that the 
blacks were only brought in for the purpose of temporary replacement 
may well be further evidenced by the fact that none of them owned 
homes. 
Occupational composition 
A one-occupational class town Fraser was nearly a one-occupa-
tional class town, composed of coal miners. In 1895, 74.4 percent; ~n 
1905, 72.2 percent; and in 1910, 59.1 percent of the workers were 
employed in the mines (see Table 23). It may be that the fluctuation 
in the level of percentages employed in the mines was a reflection of 
how many mines were open at the census time and the level of 
production. 
Another typical feature of boom towns and company towns ~s 
apparent in the fluctuations of percentages of mining population and 
the fluctuation of population. The two censuses in which the mining 
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population was greatest (1895, 74.4%; 1905, 72.2%) were also two 
periods of rapid population expansion. In 1895, the town had grown 
from nonexistence in 1893 to 630 persons. In 1905, the town reached 
its maximum population of 1,243 persons, a 64.2 percent growth over 
1900. In both cases, the service and business sector of the economy 
had lagged behind in ability to service such a large population 
increase and thus was underrepresented in terms of employment. This 
was only exacerbated by the company's intention to control the business 
economy of Fraser through a company store, and antagonism to 
competition. 
Retail and service business, and professional class Business 
owners, managers, and professionals were generally a small percentage 
of Fraser's population. Professionals ranged from 1.9 percent to 4.3 
percent of the employed population in the various censuses. Retail and 
service business owners were 3.7 percent and 3.6 percent in three of 
the censuses. In 1905, they were only .8 percent of the employed popu-
lation. Nearly the same number of businesses served about twice the 
population in 1905. 
In the two censuses where there was the greatest population 
growth, 1895 and 1905, the service and business sector failed to grow 
with the population. In 1895, the business and service sector was 4.7 
percent, and in 1905, only 3.0 percent of those employed. In the years 
where the population had stablized or declined (1900, 1910), the 
business and service sector was a greater percentage of those employed. 
121 
In 1900 and 1910, 9.1 percent of the employed were In the service and 
business sector. Thus, in the retail and service sector of the labor 
force, the number of employees remained stable, even with major 
population lncreases. This reflects the fact that the service sector 
was not demand sensitive. It was externally controlled. At least half 
of those so employed in retail, service and businesss, in each census, 
were employed by the company store. It could be estimated that from 
2.0 percent ot 5.0 percent of those employed in any census were 
employed in privately owned businesses. Company domination was clearly 
predominant in this sector of the economy as well. Maintaining a 
monopoly on business and service was crucial to the profitability 
of a company store. Maintaining such a monopoly in a situation where 
service and business far undersupplied the public's demand could prove 
even more profitable for the company store. 
Support occupational groups 
Farming Some farmers, living on the site where Fraser was 
built, would become a part of the community. Some farmers would mine 
coal, and some miners would quit mining for farming. Examples of both 
can be found in both census and newspaper reports as well as personal 
interviews. The largest representation of farm occupations was found 
in 1895 where 10.2 percent of the workers were farmers. In 1900 and 
1910, 5.3 percent and 5.5 percent of the workers were farm related. As 
the popUlation boomed in 1905, it was mainly in coal mining, and the 
farming sector did not grow proportionately. 
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Artisans The sector of the employed population involved in 
skilled artisan work ranged from 3.4 percent to 5.5 percent of those 
employed. There were 12 occupations listed in this category, eight of 
which were found only ~n two or less censuses. 
Railroad The railroad, owned by the coal mining company, hired 
from 1.1 percent to 3.2 percent of those employed. Most of this time 
it was used only for shipping serv~ces. It was electrified with a 
power plant in Fraser in 1905 under the new ownership of the Newton and 
Northwestern Railroad then owned by Homer Loring of New York (Boone 
Weekly News, June 7, 1906; July 19, 1906). It then operated regular 
passenger service to Ft. Dodge, Boone, Ames, and Des Moines. 
Unskilled labor Although not appearing in the 1895 census, 
unskilled labor accounted for 14.4 percent of the workers in 1900, 14.6 
percent in 1905, and only 3.7 percent in 1910. There was a greater 
demand for labor in the earlier period while the infrastructure of the 
town especially housing was being built and while the population was 
booming. 
Diversification By 1910, decisions had been made so that 
Fraser would never aga~n be a growing coal mining town. Some of the 
mines were playing out, and coal was being mined more efficiently from 
other locations. Along with the declining coal industry in Fraser came 
some diversification in the industrial base. In the 1910 census, for 
the first time, 8.5 percent of the workers worked in industrial work 
besides coal mining. This included 5.5 percent who worked at the 
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electric power plant, and 3.0 percent working at a tile factory, 
building drainage tiles. 
In summary, Fraser's economy was dominated by the coal mining oc-
cupation. Other sectors of the economy were also owned and operated by 
the owners of the coal m~nes. It was not until coal mining began to 
seriously decline that diversification of the economy took place, a 
diversification that accounts for the fact that Fraser after 1914 was 
not completely dismantled and moved to another location. There were 
few businesses not owned by the company. There was little of a profes-
sional or business class. 
Female labor A great number of Fraser households took in 
boarders. This was one way of supplementing a miner's lncome. In this 
way, a great deal of female labor ln the early economy was masked. 
In 1895, when 36.0 percent of all households had boarders; in 
1900, when 20.0 percent of all households had boarders, those house-
holds represented undocumented female labor. It is significant that ln 
these two censuses, the only censuses where taking in boarders was a 
predominant practice, female labor is seen in the visible economy as. 
1.4 percent of all workers in 1895, and 3.2 percent of all workers in 
1900. 
In the 1905 census, it is impossible to tell how many have housed 
boarders, if any. In that year only, one hotel or boarding house out 
of at least three was still in operation. In 1910, there were no 
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unrelated boarders in the census. In the 1905 and 1910 censuses, 
female labor appears in the visible economy (Table 24). In 1905, 9.9 
percent of all workers were female, and 13.9 percent of all women at 
least 15 years old were employed. In 1910, 8.7 percent of them were 
employed. When women were no longer taking in boarders, they appeared 
in the visible economy. Their primary occupational class was that of 
the domestic servant. In 1905, 69.6 percent of the female labor were 
household servants. In 1905, 15.2 percent of employed women were 
teachers. In 1910, there were three women bookkeepers, or 27.3 percent 
of the eleven employed women. 
Women were a part of the economy from the beginning in Fraser, but 
only became a visible part when taking in boarders was no longer 
essential. Women would never be a central part of the visible economy 
since coal mining at that time was a male occupation and it dominated 
the economy. 
Coal miners' wages Actual records of wages paid to the m1ners 
1n Fraser are almost non-existent. However, Hamilton Browne submitted 
his version of miners' wages to the Boone County Democrat (July 16, 
1897) for the previous 12 months. He noted that they were on the basis 
of 253 days work. The average miner made $524.00 that year or $44.00 
per month. It is not surprising that the figures supplied by the State 
Mine Inspector a year later were markedly lower. The m1ners 1n the 
County averaged $346.00 for 1898, or $29.00 per month (BCR, Oct. 13, 
1898). The official figures released for the County in 1901, were 
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$422.00 or $35.00 per month (State Mine Inspectors Report, 1901:93). 
It appears that Hamilton Browne's figures may have been somewhat 
inflated. When the United Mine Workers were effective in organizing 
Fraser in 1899, they struck and effected a $.10 per ton raise in wages 
(BCR, Oct. 12, 1899; Nov. 9, 1899). 
School district wages The wages offered by the school district 
provide an interesting comparison to coal miners' wages. Although it 
was a small part of the economy, it provides the only remaining record 
of wages outside the coal industry. These wages were also important as 
a representation of some of the employment open to women. Two of the 
elected school board members received a yearly salary of $20.00 per 
year in 1897. The salary was increased to $25.00 per year in 1903. In 
1900, three teachers received a monthly salary of $30.00 for nine 
months, or $270.00 for the year. The principal was paid $50.00 per 
month. Some teachers received a raise to $35.00 per month in 1903, and 
$40.00 per month in 1904, and the principal's salary was increased to 
$60.00 per month. The school regularly employed a janitor. The 
monthly salary for the janitor in 1897 was $12.00 which was raised to 
$18.00 per month in 1902. In 1904, with the school enlarged, this 
salary was increased to $38.00 per month. While the school principal 
in the early years was a man, the teachers were women. The earliest 
janitors were women. 
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The employed sector of the economy By figuring the percentage 
of the population employed, what part of the economy remained 
economically dependent, can be deduced. Table 25 looks at the four 
censuses from this perspective. From as little as 24.8 percent of the 
population to as much as 37.6 percent of the population were employed 
at one given time. A more significant way to look at this question, is 
to ask what percentage of those at least 15 years old were employed. 
In 1895, 53.9 percent were employed; in 1900, 39.7 percent were 
employed; in 1905, 59.3 percent were employed, and 1910, 57.3 percent 
were employed. The year with the highest rate of employment, 1905, 1S 
also the year in which women appear most visibly 1n the economy. 
It was to the company's advantage to have a high percentage of the 
population employed at a given time, especially in coal mining. Since 
most of the coal miners were paid by piecework, employing more did not 
necessarily increase labor costs. A common complaint among miners was 
the tendency of the coal company to overcrowd the mines, which had the 
paradoxical effect of bringing individual wages down, but assuring 
company houses and stores were used to full capacity. This may well be 
what is seen in the 1905 census. In that year, the highest percentage 
of the population was employed, the highest percentage of those 
employed were working in the mines, and the total population was at its 
highest. In 1906, the United Mine Workers Journal ran a warning to 
miners to stay away from Fraser because the m1nes were overcrowded 
(BWN, March 15, 1906). Although there may have been a situational 
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context of a temporary nature for this warning, it seems to confirm 
what was found in the census data for 1905. 
Number of paid workers ~ households In 1900 and 1910, two 
censuses which contain the needed data, 41.4 percent and 40.4 percent 
of all households had more than one paid worker (Table 22). Thus, 
nearly 60 percent of all households could survive with only one paid 
worker. In 1900, 20.4 percent and in 1910, 25.0 percent of all 
households had two paid workers. Those households with three or more 
workers comprised 21.0 percent of all households in 1900 and 15.4 
percent in 1910. It appears that economic necessity played at least a 
part 1n the choice of over 40 percent of all households to have more 
than one worker. 
The exper1ence of blacks in Fraser was different from that of 
whites. In 1900, whereas 66.0 percent of white households had only one 
worker, only 46.2 percent of black households had one worker (see 
Tables 26 and 27). Of white households, 15.6 percent had two workers, 
while 35.9 percent of black households had two workers. They had 
nearly the same percentage of households with three or more workers 
(Whites, 18.4%, Blacks, 18.0%). Why black households had more workers 
per household than whites may be accounted for by the fact that blacks 
had less assets when coming to Fraser, and thus had to share more 
households to be able to make ends meet. Blacks had more boarders than 
whites. There may also be the intervening variable of blacks sharing 
housing to a greater degree since they came in smaller families or as 
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singles. It is possible that the company provided less housing for the 
blacks and they were required to share housing with other workers. 
Number of workers per household and home ownership Having more 
workers in a household did correlate slightly with the likelihood of 
home ownership, except 1n the case of blacks. One can only assume 
there must have been a company policy against selling homes to blacks, 
blacks did not want to build or buy their own homes, or they could not 
afford to do so. No blacks owned homes even though they had higher 
rates of households with more than one worker. However, in the case of 
white households, there was a greater likelihood of home ownership if 
one had more than one worker per household. Table 22 shows the status 
of home ownership and home rental by the number of workers per home. 
It is not controlled for blacks, none of which owned homes, who will 
thus "all appear in the rental column. In 1900, 61.2 percent of all 
renters had only one worker per home, while 51.9 percent of all owners 
had only one worker per home. This means that renters were about ten 
percent more likely to have only one worker per household. A much 
greater percentage of homeowners had three or more workers 1n their 
home (27.9%) than did renters (12.3%). Homeowners were much more 
likely to have multiple worker households. 
Forty percent of whites with one worker 1n the home owned a home, 
while 60.0 percent of whites with only one worker in the home rented a 
home (Table 28). Of whites with three or more workers in the home, 
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71.4 percent owned their own homes and 28.6 percent rented homes. More 
workers in a home gave an economic advantage that could be translated 
into home ownership. 
Predictably, in Fraser many of the multi-worker households were 
composed of a number of coal miners. As Schwieder pointed out (1983), 
often a father would take a young son into the mines and would receive 
extra coal cars, and could increase his production even with a youth. 
It 1S to the age of coal miners that the study now turns. 
Age classification of coal miners Coal mining was an 
occupation of young adult men (Table 29). Less than 5.0 percent of 
miners 1n any census were 55 years old. The majority of miners were 
always between 20 and 39 years of age. In 1895, 71.6 percent, and 1n 
the later three census, between 58.3 and 60.3 percent were in this age 
group. Between 24.6 and 28.2 percent of miners in the four censUSes 
were 1n the age group of 40 years and older. Only in 1900 and 1905 
were teen-age miners under 15 years old used. In 1900, 5.8 percent of 
the miners were under 15 years old. In 1895, only 3.1 percent of the 
miners were under 20 years old. In 1900, 15.3 percent; in 1905, 16.1 
percent, and in 1910, 11.2 percent were under 20 years old. 
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Extra-local Interactions 
Newspapers gave a brief mention of travels people made to other 
communities. These were either on business or to visit friends and re-
lations. While a business trip tended to be one day, visits to friends 
and relatives were often longer. The overwhelming majority of visits 
both to Fraser (100 or 15.0%) and from Fraser (196 or 29.5%) were 
interactions with Boone. As would be expected, more interactions with 
Boone would be visits from Fraser, s~nce Boone was a population center 
with a much greater comparative shopping district than Fraser. Visits 
to and from Boone accounted for 44.5 percent of all interactions with 
other communities recorded in the newspapers between 1896 and 1905. 
Another 146 interactions (or 22.0%) were with other coal mining com-
munities within a day's travel by wagon (Angus, Lehigh, Ogden, Incline, 
Moingona, and Logansport). Non-coal-mining population centers (Pilot 
Mound, Ft. Dodge, and Des Moines) accounted for 63 interactions or 9.5 
percent. In summary, of 665 interactions over a ten-year period (1896-
1905), the majority were with the closest large neighboring community, 
Boone, and the second largest group of interactions were with other 
coal mining communities within a day's travel. 
Leaving Fraser 
If one choses to study Fraser diachronically, one sees a changing 
community over time. Institutions come at different times, and some 
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leave rather quickly. More dramatic, however, is the impression that 
comes from looking at population longevity. There was almost none. 
Extremely mobile population 
Fraser might be described as a s1eve or a revolving door rather 
than a community. The one thing that remains constant over four 
censuses from 1895 to 1910 was the coal company. The population were 
sojourners. 
Those coming to Fraser generally came from nearby coal mining 
towns or contiguous counties. The blacks were the exception, being 
recruited in groups from the South and other coal mining regions. 
Table 31 shows the number of state moves by families with children, 
measured by the childrens' birthplace. In 1900, of 127 families with 
children, only 11.0 percent had lived in more than two states as a 
family. In fact, 42.5 percent had never lived outside of Iowa and 46.5 
percent had only lived in one other state before coming to Iowa. This 
fails to measure moves within Iowa, which apparently were at a much 
higher rate. 
A much more sensitive measure of Fraser's population mobility was 
found in the censuses, by comparing the individuals who remained in 
each consecutive census over four censuses or twenty years. This is 
limited as a measure since some people moved to and from Fraser between 
censuses. Those who did show up in the census tracts, however, showed 
an extremely high rate of mobility. Table 32 shows this measure of 
geographic mobility through the four consecutive censuses: 1895, 1900, 
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1905, and 1910. The first column shows all those who lived in Fraser 
during only one of the four censuses. The second column shows those 
who lived in Fraser during two of the four censuses, the third during 
three censuses, and the fourth in all four censuses. Adding all four 
censuses together gives a sum of 3,117 persons living in Fraser. Some 
were overcounted because they lived in Fraser for two or more censuses. 
Adjusting for those overcounted, the actual number of persons ever 
persons ever living in Fraser during the four consecutive censuses was 
2,444 persons. This 1S considered the total population of Fraser for 
the diachronic study of mobility. 
It can now be seen that 1,979 persons, or 81.0 percent of this 
overall population lived in Fraser for only one census or not more 
than five years. Another 282 persons, or 11.5 percent lived in Fraser 
for between six and eleven years; while only 158 persons, or 6.5 
percent lived in Fraser for between 11 and 16 years, and only 25 
persons, or 1.0 percent of the population lived in Fraser for at least 
20 years. In summary, the population of Fraser was extremely mobile. 
Some 58 persons who were listed as somewhat stable and moderately 
stable, by virtue of their longevity through two or three censuses, 
could be categorized as returnees. They left Fraser and came back. 
They were 13.2 percent of those who lived in Fraser for two or three 
censuses (see categories 2b, 2c, 2e, 3c and 3d). These probably left 
during labor disputes and returned at a more favorable time. Although 
they are counted as part of the stable population of Fraser, they are 
really a mark of the mobility or instability of Fraser's population. 
If we count these persons as very mobile, along with all those who only 
lived 1n ·Fraser for only one census, the total is 2,037 very mobile 
persons, or 83.3 percent of the total population. 
Locations of movement from Fraser Newspapers also gave a rec-
ord of people leaving Fraser to live in other towns. Like those who 
came, many moved to other coal mining camps in Boone and Webster 
counties. Many of these were going back to camps where they had lived 
earlier. This points to a circularity of movement betwen the coal 
m1n1ng camps and communities in this part of Iowa. The people were 
highly mobile, but appear to be restricted ln the distance they could 
move. Ironically, if mobility was one way the worker voted against 
intolerable work conditions, they probably could not go far enough to 
encounter markedly different working conditions; and their continuous 
movement probably hampered effective solidarity in forcing wage and 
work condition improvements from the employer. 
Major precipitators of extreme mobility 
It is not surprising that overall conditions ln coal mining towns 
led to major population turnover. Two factors became major accelera-
tors of mobility of large blocks of population at several crucial 
points in the period between 1895 and 1910. Two such factors were 
labor strikes and the outbreak of an epidemic. 
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Strikes and strikebreaking Strikes were a common phenomenon in 
the 1890s, partly as a result of the economic conditions related to the 
Depression of 1893. There were five strikes between 1894 and 1899 in 
Fraser. In 1894, there was a strike at contract negotiation time ~n 
~ay (Browne to Stephens, May 7, 1894). In 1895, there was a work 
slowdown to four days per week for three months, in sympathy with other 
striking miners in the region (Browne to Healion, Oct. 5, 1895). 
Again, about a year later, there was a work slow-down. However, the 
major strikes took place in 1897 and 1899. In both cases, Hamilton 
Browne introduced black miners as strikebreakers. 
The Strike of 1897 Hamilton Browne had intended to uSe 
blacks as strikebreakers as early as 1895 (Browne to Healion, Nov. 23, 
1895). When it appeared ~n April of 1897 that the miners were planning 
to strike at contract negotiation time, Browne began to make plans to 
counter their measures. He wrote to Hill: 
I am afraid that we are going to have trouble with the men at 
Fraser this Spring. Prosperity does not seem to agree with 
them. They have become so overbearing and troublemaking that 
forbearance has ceased to be possible and I am being urged by 
my associates to bring matters to a focus with them. However, 
I am endeavoring to stave it off if possible but do not feel 
very hopeful of doing it. In case we engage in a tussle I 
cannot say how many weeks or months it will last, but do know 
it will not terminate until I have given them a thrashing 
which they will never forget (Browne to Healion, Apr. 8, 1897). 
It was a showdown in which neither side was initially willing to 
give ~n. Browne held three cards that ultimately spelled a winning 
combination; 1) Hill would allow his late payments when he could not 
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meet his expenses, 2) he could obtain black strikebreakers, and 3) he 
could purchase mining machines to reduce his demand for labor. 
The mines closed in mid-May. There was disagreement as to 
whether it was a strike or lockout. The miners refused to take the pay 
scale offered by Browne so he locked them out until they agreed (Browne 
to Healion, May 20, 1897; May 25, 1897; BCD, May 28, 1897). The miners 
had been working under a contract for $.90 per ton. As the new con-
tract came open for negotiations, all the miners in the region were 
being forced to take $.80 per ton. Browne's m1ners in Milford had so 
agreed (BCD, May 28, 1897). 
However, Browne was making a different offer to his Fraser miners 
only a few miles away from Milford. He claimed that Fraser coal was 
Milford. He claimed that Fraser coal was overlaid with "bone coal", a 
variety that fragmented and was only useful to fire steam engines. The 
Fraser miners were previously paid nothing for shoveling the "bone 
coal" into the cars. Browne proposed to pay the miners $.20 a ton to 
shovel out the "bone coal" and $.80 a ton to mine the good coa 1. He 
was concerned that they might try to put "bone coal" in with the good 
coal. He figured that there was one ton of "bone coal" for every three 
tons of good coal. He proposed to pay them $.65 for all coal mined; 
figured on the basis of three tons at $.80 and one ton at $.20, all 
divided by four. He argued that this was giving them a $.05 per ton 
raise, while assurjng himself that the coal was correctly separated 
(BCD, May 28, 1897). 
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The m~ners claimed that he was not taking into account the fact 
that coal had to be mined whether it was "bone coal" or good coal, and 
that his plan assumed that they would normally mine the "bone coal" for 
nothing (BCD, July 16, 1897). In reality, there was a problem with 
m~ners either not mining the "bone coal" or mixing it in with the other 
coal. It is not clear if Browne was on the level with his calcula-
tions. In a letter to Hill months previously (Browne to Healion, Oct. 
30, 1897), Browne had discussed Hill's concern about how much "steam 
coal" Hill was getting at the operation in Lehigh. They were 
discussing the same size and use of coal. Browne told Hill that: 
••• at Fraser, where we m~ne on "Long Wall" system, we produce 
about one ton of steam coal to eight tons of lump coal. 
While at Milford where we mine on the "Room and Pillar" sys-
tem we produce about one ton of steam coal to four tons of 
lump coal •••• 
I should think that mining by machine would make more 
steam coal than mining by hand would •••• If you suspect that 
you are not getting as much steam coal from the mine as you 
should I suggest you inquire whether the miners are sending 
the steam coal out from the mine or shoveling it to one side, 
and allowing it to accumulate in the mine. It often happens 
that miners find it less trouble for them to leave the fine 
coal (for which they are to get no pay) in the mine instead of 
expending the labor necessary to shovel it into the pit cars, 
which they they consider is solely to the benefit of the Co. 
and at the expense of their labor. 
Browne used different figures to explain to Hill and to the newspapers 
how much steam coal was mined ~n proportion to lump coal at Fraser. If 
he paid the miners $.20 per ton for steam coal and $.80 per ton for 
lump coal on the basis of the figures he had given to Hill regarding 
the proportion of coal at Fraser, the pay would have averaged $.73 per 
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ton rather than the $.65 he proposed to the m~ners. Browne knew, as he 
stated in his letter, that the miners felt cheated by having to load 
the steam coal, and they often refused to bother with it. He also knew 
that the change in technology to mining machines would produce more of 
the steam coal and he had to find a way to get the miners to get all 
the coal out of the mines even though they would get paid no more or 
even less. 
When Browne brought in the black miners ~n late September, quite a 
number of white miners left Fraser. They claimed they were pushed out 
of their homes to make room for the blacks (BCD, Sept. 24, 1897; BCR, 
Sept. 30, 1897). There were only 30 to 35 of the Fraser union miners 
left, and apparently many of them had left Fraser (BCR, Sept. 30, 
1897). Before the blacks arrived in Fraer, some whites had started 
back to work in the mines. They were met with nightly harrassment in 
the form of wives and children of the strikers serenading them on pots 
and pans and calling them names as they walked home. 
There were also cases of rock throwing to the point that the Boone 
County Depty Sheriff came out to stop the disturbance. His assistant 
was pelted with a rock when he arrived with him (BCD, Sept. 17, 1897; 
BCR, Oct. 7, 1897). There was a' perceived threat to the equipment at 
the mines so that Deputy Sheriff Bowman and the m~ne superintendent, 
Oscar Carpenter, began staying the night at the m~ne to stand guard 
(BCD, Sept. 24, 1897). When the blacks were brought in, they were 
guarded and provided weapons, and the whites were disallowed from 
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meeting with them (Browne to Healion, Sept. 7, 1897; BCR, Oct. 14, 
1897 ). 
There was no violence at that time. Most of the whites left 
Fraser, and work resumed 1n the mines. By February 1898, Browne had at 
least 12 mining machines 1n operation, said to replace four workers 
each (BCR, Feb. 3, 1898; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897). This, coupled with the 
normal slack in demand for coal in early Spring, together with the fact 
that Browne had broken the union, may have led to a temporary decline 
in need for black strikebreakers. Most of them were leaving Fraser by 
February (BCR, Feb. la, 1898; BCR, Feb. 24, 1898). 
We can see how this particular strike in 1897 led to the move of 
over 100 white miners from Fraser and their replacement by nearly 200 
black miners and only to see the blacks leave within six months to be 
replaced by whites. The high mobility engendered by the strike and its 
result was what Hamilton Browne wanted. It undercut solidarity and 
union activity. Browne had commented to Hill during the strike that he 
thought they would " •• . never have any decent treatment in this field 
until we bring in a lot of new blood" (Browne to Healion, Sept. 9, 
1897). There was evidence that Browne fired some white miners who had 
intended to keep working for him, when he brought in more black miners 
(BCR, Oct. 6, 1898). It may have been part of his strategy to keep a 
majority of blacks in Fraser mines (Browne to Healion, Sept. 9, 1897). 
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No sooner had the blacks left Fraser in February, 1898, than they 
began to be replaced by more blacks in March (BCR, Mar. 31, 1898). By 
now the level of violence was escalating. It was due to racial 
antagonism and the conditions of strikebreaking on one hand and to the 
fact that people were carrying weapons on the other. In March, a poker 
game involving both blacks and whites ended in a black man winning the 
jackpot and a white man claiming fraud. The black man hit the white 
man ~n ,the head with a rock, leaving him unconscious. He escaped from 
whites into a neighboring building Where a black man was a barber. A 
crowd gathered and was go~ng to burn them out. The black man they 
looking for escaped out the back door, and the other pleaded for mercy 
and the crowd dispersed (BCR, Mar. 17, 1898). 
The Strike of 1899 In June 1898, J.F. Reams of Beacon, 
Iowa, and president of the United Mine Workers of America, came to 
Fraser and organized a union there (BCD, June 23, 1899). It should be 
remembered that some of the strikes in the past were union related, but 
that the union was broken in 1897, and that there was to a large degree 
a new population in Fraser in 1899. Now the union was organized again. 
The company wasted no time firing all those who had joined the un~on, 
about 110 whites and 15 blacks (BCR, June 15, 1899). The union held a 
meeting and voted that those union workers who had not been fired would 
not work until the rest had been reinstated and the union recognized 
.... 
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(BCD, June 23, 1899). As a result, the weight bosses, engineers, 
fireman and pit bosses also stopped work (BCD, June 23, 1899). 
A number of blacks continued to work but quickly stopped work too, 
claiming that it got too "lonesome" in the mines (BCR, June 15,1899). 
It appears that they feared for their safety and called a work stoppage 
until they could make plans to assure their own safety. In less than 
two months, most of the white miners had left town, even though most of 
them were homeowners (BCR, July 237, 1899). 
In July, a force of over 200 white miners from Logansport and 
Milford came to Fraser to "talk" with the black miners who continued to 
work 1n the mines (BCR, July 27, 1899). The blacks refused to meet 
with them on several occasions because they felt the whites had come in 
such a large contingent to intimidate the blacks. Instead, the blacks 
formed a militia of 23 men with pistols and Winchester rifles, setting 
up target practice in town and practicing marches on the streets. The 
whites complained of bullets constantly " ••• whistling through the 
streets ••• " (BCR, July 27, 1899). There was fear of a race riot if any 
white were shot (BCR, July 27, 1899). The company also brought in 
Russian miners at this time (BCD, July 28, 1899). 
During July and August, on two separate occasions, blacks got into 
fights with blacks and shot each other (BCD, July 7, 1899; BCR, Aug. 
17, 1899). Although nobody was killed, it illustrates the fact that 
they were wearing arms in public. The Boone County Republican 
correspondent found some humor in the situation at Fraser: 
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In the peaceable and quiet town of Fraser, the modern city of 
brotherly love, night before last a dance was held, a part of 
the program being a cake walk. Two of the colored bells took 
the floor to take part in the walk and one sable brother 
stated that they could not be allowed to participate without 
partners. Another quiet gentleman with a razor up his sleeve 
allowed they could, and to convince the part of the first 
part that his word went, pulled his gun and blazed away at 
the offending brother, unfortunately missing him. Hhether 
the ladies secured partners for the remainder of the walk or 
went it alone this paper is not advised however everything 1S 
quiet and peaceable up there (BCR, Aug. 17, 1899). 
It was, however, not only blacks who were armed and involved 1n 
shooting each other. In September, a white "scab" worker from 
Tennessee shot a white union man, who had accosted him 1n the street 
in front of the hotel where he was staying (BCR, Sept. 21, 1899). The 
man who shot the union miner, together with his brothers, immediately 
took refuge in a building from the gathering crowd, who were talking 
about lynching them. Hhen the Deput Sheriff arrived and promised them 
protection, they surrendered. Everyone was armed with pistols and 
stated that, " ••• they were aware that troub Ie might arise at any time 
and all went armed in order to protect themselves" (BCR, Sept, 21, 
1899). 
Early ln October the company agreed to compromise with the unlon 
workers, giving them a ralse to $.75 per ton and recognizing the 
Union (BCR, Oct. 12, 1899). All workers who had gone elsewhere to find 
work were encouraged to return to Fraser. 
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It seemed that major strikes and labor violence were over for a 
few years. The next trouble came in 1901. In that year, a black man 
shot and killed a white man in the middle of an argument at a shed used 
for a saloon (BN, Aug. 29, 1901). The incident was short lived since 
the black man, Thomas Gibson, was quickly apprehended, tried, and put 
1n prison (BN, Sept. 5, 1901; BWN, Sept. 26, 1901). 
In 1904, a more serious incident occurred in which a black man, 
James Price, fatally shot Thomas Albright, a white miner (Ogden Report-
er, Nov, 24, 1904). Now the black population was in a clear minority 
1n Fraser, with less than 50 blacks and 1,200 whites. The whites 
charged that the blacks had hidden Price after the shooting until he 
could escape undetected from town. The Ogden Reporter noted that: 
Race war is feared as a consequence of the shooting at Fraser 
last Saturday evening, in which James Price, a negro miner, 
shot and fatally wounded Thomas Albright, a white companion •••• 
Most of the men 'carry revolvers and if an affray was 
once started, it would probably be a bloody conflict ••• 
(Ogden Reporter, Nov. 24, 1904). 
After searching in vain for the murderer, the white miners held a 
meeting 1n which they decided to stop work in the m1nes with the black 
m1ners. There were only 15 black workers left and they were also 
members of the union (BWN, Nov. 24, 1904). Price was apparently never 
found, and the workers returned to work. The situation passed 
In 1905, there were only 29 blacks in Fraser, and in 1910 there were 
only 13 blacks left in Fraser. 
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In the labor and racial tension that came with the strikes of 1897 
and 1899, there was an escalating level of tension and violence that 
encouraged many to leave Fraser, contributing to the extreme mobility 
of the population. Mobility made solidarity for the miners difficult 
to maintain. It was a mobility encouraged and used by the company. 
Disease epidemics Another factor that contributed to the 
extreme mobility of the population was not directly amenable to company 
control. It was the outbreak of infectious disease. 
In early 1900, an epidemic of smallpox broke out 1n Fraser. 
Initially, Dr. Shafer, the County Health Officer from Fraser, diagnosed 
the disease as chickenpox or possibly "Cuban itch" (BCR, Feb. 15, 
1900). He was annoyed that rumors were circulating in Boone that there 
was a smallpox epidemic in Fraser. He wrote to the newspaper that 
there was " ••• no danger to the public from it" (BCR, Feb. 15, 1900). 
In late March, a Fraser resident was quarantined by Lehigh 
residents while visiting there (BCR, Mar. 30, 1900). By the end of 
April, the Dodge Township authorities had decided the disease was 
smallpox and that 150 cases had been diagnosed 1n and around Fraser 
(BCR, Apr. 29, 1900). Seventeen families were quarantined (BCR, April 
29, 1900; BCR, May 3, 1900). Hamilton Browne now wrote to the 
newspaper in Boone and stated that there was no cause for alarm, as 
only nine houses were under quarantine (BCR, May 10, 1900). The only 
death from the epidemic was a child of Ed Bass, living near Fraser 
(BCR, May 10, 1900). 
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By the end of May, only three cases were left quarantined (BCR, 
May 24, 1900). By the middle of June, there were no more cases of 
smallpox in Fraser (BCR, June 21, 1900). Some 21 houses in Fraser had 
been quarantined. All buildings in town were fumigated, and all 
outhouses were renovated and the town generally cleaned up (BCR, June 
21, 1900). A number of families had left during the epidemic but now 
returned after it was over (BCR, June 21, 1900). 
Thus far, this chapter has explored the origins of the population 
of Fraser. It has been shown that they were largely of immigrant and 
ethnic heritage with limited opportunities in the American social 
system of their day. The extreme mobility of the population, circulat-
~ng among mining camps, was actually encouraged and to the advantage of 
the employer, Hamilton Browne. The external control of the population 
for the purpose of coal mining shaped the specific nature of the popu-
lation of Fraser. 
Conclusion 
The external development, ownership, and control of Fraser led to 
certain population characteristics. Foremost among these is the 
character of Fraser's recruited population. Fraser was largely 
composed of Euro-ethnics and Southern blacks. Blacks were used for 
breaking the union. They were valued very little by the company beyond 
that function. They were useful as they allowed the company to 
maintain control over the rest of the workforce. 
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While there was some improvement in wages and living standards 
from 1895 to 1910, measured by household size and home ownership, the 
early years were years of struggle by labor against what they consid-
ered abusive conditions from the company. In the light of center and 
periphery theory which suggests that life on the periphery 1S 
characterized by a domination by the center, the labor unrest and the 
extreme measures used by the company to maintain control do make sense. 
To maintain the low wage scale, the workers must be kept from 
organizing. To accomplish this, strikebreakers, blacks not known for 
union activities, were recruited. The correlary to this was the 
eviction of whites from company housing. Both strategies increased the 
already high mobility of the population g1v1ng the company greater 
control and limiting worker solidarity. 
Wages did improve through hard struggles and numerous setbacks. 
The company apparently initiated a policy of selling houses shortly 
before 1910. This suggests at the very time when workers were seeing 
an improvement in the quality of living, the company lost interest in 
Fraser. It was no longer as profitable as it had once been. This is 
the very finding of Frank (1975), who suggested that the metropole 
often extracts minerals from a region all the while underdeveloping 
labor and then retreats leaving a ghost region. 
However, labor in its struggle at the periphery was not alone. 
Indigenous institutions and vertical ties of these institutions, with 
external organizations developed. It is to the development of these 
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horizontal ties as expressions of communal interests, and the 
development of countervailing vertical ties that the next chapter 
turns. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL 
COMMUNITY LIFE IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTERNAL CONTROL 
External econom1C control and its occupational structure 
constrained community life in Fraser, but did not completely control 
that life. The main interest of the company owning Fraser was in 
capital and land. The primary reason for Fraser's existence was as a 
base of operation to mine coal. In order to mine coal, labor was 
needed. This led to housing, and company stores. The company impacted 
the lives of Fraser residents economically as employees in the m1nes, 
and as consumers at the stores, and in housing. This was company 
control in its most explicit form, through economic institutions. 
The company also attempted to extend its influence into 
non-economic institutions such as religion, education, and recreation. 
In this way, the company could gain some influence over the 
non-worktime activities of the miners, encouraging a confluence of 
interest between company and workers. Yet many of the non-economic 
institutions in Fraser would be initiated by the residents themselves, 
others by organizing agents visiting Fraser, and still others by the 
company. 
There were non-econom1C institutions such as the Union and local 
political control that the residents were successful in organizing 1n 
direct opposition to the company's control. Thus, some communal 
institutions did mediate company control in Fraser. The Union was also 
an example of a vertical tie to another external organization that 
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would counterv·ail external control of the company. The local citizen's 
political movement represented horizontal ties to mediate company 
control. 
The company most directly attempted to extend its control over 
non-economic institutions in the case of religious life in Fraser. It 
also attempted some level of control over education. Evidence of the 
company's control over fraternal organizations is lacking. While the 
company tried to maintain complete control over labor and political 
leadership in Fraser, two non-economic institutions, the Union and the 
citizens' movement to incorporate Fraser frustrated the company's ef-
forts at complete control of Fraser. While the company attempted to 
exert control over· religion and education, these may not have been 
resisted, as the company's paternalism may have been fostered by a com-
mon interest. The population were all too happy to receive company 
help in constructing a church or school. External ties were also 
established with groups such as the government and religious 
denominations. 
Religion and Education 
Religion 
While religion was one institution which the company made a 
concerted effort to control, it was also an institution which gave 
expression to communal desires and preferences. When the company 
encouraged religion, it did so with a great deal of communal support. 
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Early residents religious preference The 1895 census was the 
only early census in which religious preference was measured. Unfor-
tunately, the census was taken two years after Fraser was built, and no 
church had then established a foothold in Fraser. What was measured In 
the census was not current attendance, but past preference. Table 33 
shows that of household heads who showed a religious preference, 15.5 
percent were Catholic, 52.4 percent were Protestant, and 32.1 percent 
showed no religious preference. Two churches, the Baptist (7.1%) and 
Methodist (14.3%), both of which would later have a building in Fraser, 
accounted for 21.4 percent of the households. In this way, the 
indigenous communal religious preferences led to the building of 
churches in Fraser. That communal preference complemented the 
company's desire to encourage religion in Fraser. 
The first recorded religious services were held in Fraser in 1894 
by Rev. Abner Williams of the Mineral Ridge Baptist Church, five miles 
north of Fraser (BCR, March 28, 1894). These services did not lead to 
the establishment of a Baptist Church. The Methodist Episcopal Church 
was holding some services mostly Ladies Aid meetings in 1896, but these 
meetings were later to become the Primitive Methodist Church (BCD, June 
12, 1896). The Catholics held services in Bailey's Hall throughout 
1896 (BCD, April 24, 1896). It is clear that not only did religious 
preference of the early Fraser residents lead to the building of 
churches, but that preference led them to invite and encourage out 
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side organizers who came to hold services 1n Fraser. The earliest 
religious expression led to vertical ties with groups outside Fraser. 
William Morris and the Primitive Methodists The founding of 
the Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser was an example of a vertical 
tie which helped the residents give expression to their religious pref-
erence. Early in 1897, Rev. William Morris from Angus began holding 
serv1ces with some women who had already attempted forming a Methodist 
Church in Fraser. The Methodist Episcopal and Free Methodists had been 
unsuccessful in getting a permanent church started (Tyrrell, 1984). 
The Primitive Methodist denomination was founded in coal mining 
regions of England and spread throughout mining regions in the United 
States. It was known as a working-class denomination (Tyrrell, 1984). 
In 1872, Rev. William Morris and his wife, Mary, emigrated from 
England to Rock Island, Illinois. Rev. William Morris was born in 
England 1n 1847. At 17 years old, he began preaching two Primitive 
Methodist Circuits at Leonminster and Webley 1n Herefordshire 
(Tyrrell, 1984). He worked for some time as a lay preacher for the 
Methodist Episcopal Church in Illinois, rejecting their appeals to pay 
his way through college. He wished to remain a lay-preacher. For the 
next ten years, he worked 1n coal mines in Coal Valley near Rock Island, 
Illinois, and pastored a Primitive Methodist circuit there. When his 
health began to give out, he moved to Angus, Iowa, giving up coal 
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mining, to work as a mason (Tyrrell, 1984), but later sold insurance 
instead (Morris family documents) 
Angus, Iowa, in Boone County was a town that was largely developed 
by James J. Hill, and Hamilton Browne, and their Climax Coal Company. 
From 1883 until his death in 1939, Rev. William Morris lived in Angus, 
Iowa. He started and pastored a Primitive Methodist congregation 
there. 
Early 1n 1897, William Morris preached his first services 1n 
Fraser in the schoolhouse (BCD, Jan. 22, 1897). There were only a few 
women meeting there, and they were just about to close their church 
services because of lack of interest (Tyrrell, 1984)). They invited 
Morris to start a church there. He was disinclined to do so at first, 
but later accepted the invitation. Morris had initially come to 
Fraser, not to build a church, but to sell insurance. 
In 1901, Morris held revival meetings both in Fraser and just 
outside Fraser 1n the Wolf School House (BCD, Feb. 21, 1901; Aug. 2, 
1901; Tyrrell, 1984). At that time, those attending formed a society 
in Fraser (Primitive Methodist Journal, Mar. 1901, in Tyrrell, 1984). 
Morris described his work in the following way: 
••• men and women that have not attended a religious meeting 
in years came. Drunkards stopped drinking and some were 
saved. Praise God that there have been seven mothers saved. 
I purposed to stop the meeting on the 13th but the merchants 
requested me to continue two weeks longer. I visited every 
home with good results •••• In my house to house work, saloon 
goers were induced to go there no more. The missions were 
successfuL.. (Primitive Methodist Journal, Mar. 1901, in 
Tyrrell ). 
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Morris began to build a church building in 1902 (Tyrrell, 1984). 
However, this was not without difficulties, one of which was the 
tremendous population turnover. Morris would later recall: 
••• just as we were planning to get into full swing with our 
future programme, the miners went on strike, colored labor 
was brought into the region, and before long the whites were 
moving away. (Fraser never really recovered from this labor 
conflict (Tyrrell, 1984).) 
While most of the striking miners left town, a few stayed and helped 
Morris with the building, as did some of the W1ves of miners who left 
to find other work. Because of these difficulties, it took four years 
to build the church (Tyrrell, 1984). The cornerstone was laid in 
September 1904 (BWN, Sept. 29, 1904). 
The company was interested in encouraging the Primitive Methodist 
Church in Fraser. They gave the land on which the church was built to 
the church (Tyrrell, 1984). The lumber for the building was logged by 
Rev. Morris, one can guess from company land, at a total cost of $6.00 
(Tyrrell, 1984). The church borrowed $300.00 to pay for furniShings. 
To repay this, Morris took work at the coal mines for $3.50 
per day (Tyrrell, 1984). Other miners were making around $1.50 per 
day. It 1S clear that Rev. Morris' pay was more than the company's 
recognition in the industry of a 58-year old preacher. Morris had 
already stopped mining coal due to poor health ten years previous. The 
company was helping the church and buying public relations by hiring 
Rev. Morris at these rates. In 1909, the newspaper carried reference 
to the Fraser Mercantile giving ten percent of one day's dry goods 
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sales receipts to the Primitive Methodist Church (BNR, April 29, 1909). 
The company was probably looking both for good public relations, and 
the civilizing effect of a church on a community. 
Still, Morris was not simply a company man. At his funeral, he 
was eulogized as a union official (Primitive Methodist Journal, January 
1940). Nor was the Primitive Methodist Church simply a company church. 
It had popular support. It could easily attract a crowd of 73 people 
to Sunday School (Primitive Methodist Church Records, 1906). The 
Ladies Aid was well attended by nearly 20 women (Ladies Aid Records, 
1906). 
The Primitive Methodist Church not only had popular support, it 
also had an economic base that was beyond company control. It had an 
independent source of funds supplied by its members. In 1906, the 
Ladies Aid Society raised an average of $16.65 per month through lce 
cream socials, quilt sales, apron sales, and other craft sales. Much 
of this money went to support the general funding of the church. In 
1906, the Sunday School contributed $5.57 per month; in 1907, $3.58 per 
month to its own support. In 1906 and 1907, there was a fund-raising 
drive among members of the church and town to pay for furnishing the 
church. Individuals contributed $464.71 in contributions that averaged 
$3.23 each. With the exception of land and financial help in 
furnishing the building, the company did not give sustained support to 
the Primitive Methodist Church. 
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The Primitive Methodist Church received some economic help from 
the company in land, possibly timber, and money. However, this help 
came only after the residents showed an interest 1n forming a church 
and an outside agent came to help in the organizing process. When the 
church was established, it provided most of its own support. In this 
case, it is possible that the vertical ties of the Primitive Methodist 
denomination were operating with complimentary interests to the 
vertical ties with the company. 
Strike-breaking and the Black Fraser Baptist Church The most 
direct company control of a church was the case of the black Baptist 
Church in Fraser. James J. Hill had used a preacher from southern Iowa 
to recruit blacks to Lehigh, Iowa, and Hamilton Browne would do the 
same in Fraser. The preacher was Rev. P. T. Strange from Muchakinock, 
a coal town in southeastern Iowa (Browne to Healion, Aug. 23, 1897). 
When the blacks arrived in Fraser in 1897, they were accompanied 
by the Rev. P. T. Strange. Rev. Strange immediately gave them a sermon 
on the virtues of hard work and the avoidance of whites and union 
organizers (BCR, Sept. 30, 1897). Clearly, religion was being used by 
the company as a form of social control. 
The Fraser Baptist Church built the first church building in 
Fraser (BCR, Aug. 18, 1898). The cornerstone was laid in 1898. The 
church was cheaply constructed of wood frame laid on a number of stra-
tegically placed stones, much like the early miners' houses. It was 
funded both by the company and the church members. The black congrega-
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tional members raised $180.00 to build the church. This was with the 
assurance of William Kelly, then superintendent of the Coal Company, 
that the company would give " ••• aid in the future" (BCR, Aug. 18, 
1898). It appears from land records that the black church was buil t on 
company land as was the Primitive Methodist Church. 
The value of the building was $1,500, which had an indebtedness of 
$586.00; yet, only $151.00 income for 1903 (Iowa Baptist State 
Convention, Annual Minutes, 1903). Church contributions for 1899 had 
been $319.00, and for 1901, $39.00 (Annual Reports, 1900; 1902). Yet 
the 1900 census shows two black pastors who list no other occupation. 
If we assume that one of them received primary support through pastoral 
work, it is difficult to believe such a small congregation could 
support him. The congregation's membership was only from 14 to 30 
members (Annual Reports, 1900; 1902). Supporting a pastor and 
constructing a building surely took more than their listed 
contributions. Apparently, the company gave a large portion of their 
expenses. It seems that in the case of blacks in Fraser, the company 
gained good public relations and social control through helping their 
church. 
The story of the black Baptist Church in Fraser also included 
something of non-company control. The Fraser Baptist Church joined the 
Iowa Baptist Convention (Iowa Baptist State Convention, Annual Minutes, 
1900). In this way, an external organization provided leadership in 
founding a church, and the members had some non-company control over 
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their lives. This was another example of vertical ties with a 
religious denomination forming a common interest with the vertical ties 
to the company. Indigenous communal control is also seen Ln the fact 
that the blacks raised some of their own support to build the building 
(BCR, Aug. 18, 1898). 
The Gospel Tabernacle The other major church in Fraser's 
history was the Gospel Tabernacle, an independent church founded by J. 
Charles Crawford, who also founded the Gospel Tabernacle 1n Boone 
(Crawford, 1981). When the Gospel Tabernacle did build, it built 
several miles out of Fraser at Four Corners, and was thus unaffected by 
company control (Western Christian Alliance, July, 1910). The Gospel 
Tabernacle was the only major example of a church that did not receive 
land or financial help from the company. The Gospel Tabernacle was the 
result of vertical linkages and indigenous interest, not the company's 
support. 
The Gospel Tabernacle near Fraser maintained strong external ties 
with its parent church, the Gospel Tabernacle in Boone. The Gospel 
Tabernacle in Boone had started a Biblical College and often sent their 
students to Fraser to preach. Some students from Fraser were also re-
cruited to the Biblical College in Boone (Crawford, 1981). 
The primary method of the Gospel Tabernacle was the revival meet-
ing. They shared this in common with the Primitive Methodists, and in 
later years both held joint revival meetings (Lois Crawford, Interview, 
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1984). After most of the blacks left Fraser, the Gospel Tabernacle 
often set up their tent near the Primitive Methodist churches and 1n 
case of ra1n, held serV1ces in the black Baptist Church (Crawford, 
1981). In later years, the Gospel Tabernacle would erect their tent 
next to the Primitive Methodist Church and hold joint Vacation Bible 
School for the children in the summer. In this way, horizontal 
linkages between community churches provided for sharing of resources. 
Revivalism, which the major churches in Fraser held in common, was 
an appropriate response to the mobile population at Fraser. Each year 
a couple of periods of protracted meetings were held for the purpose of 
appealing to the largely unchurched but religious population (See BCD, 
July 31, 1896). At the end of the meetings, baptisms were held to 
solidify any galns. Baptisms were important enough to cut the ice 1n 
the river (BCD, Feb. 2, 1896). In 1905, Rev. Crawford held a revival 
meeting in which nearly 200 persons were converted, and 100 persons 
were baptised (Crawford, 1981). A photograph from that era in Fraser 
shows the levee in the Des Moines River covered with people attending a 
mass baptismal service. 
Liston Pope's classic study, Mi1lhands and Preachers (1942), found 
that revivalism was important in company towns with high population 
turnover. A church's impact had to be quick before people moved on. 
Highly emotional and protracted meetings with mass conversions and 
baptisms played this role in a commpany town with high geographic 
mobility. 
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The emotionalism and the style of ministry was well-adapted to the 
uneducated population in a mining town. This style of service appealed 
to communal sentiments already present in the culture. Lois Crawford 
tells of the style of services when her father preached and Julian 
Ross, a black, attended: 
••. Brother Ross would leave his seat, his big Bible open on 
his left palm, his ill-fitting glasses jiggling on his nose, 
and start to go up and down the aisles. His free right arm 
outstretched toward Papa, he would shout as he walked, 
"Preach it, boy; preach it, boy." Sometimes he would stop, as 
he went up and down, to give a personal nudge or exhortation 
to someone in the audience. Papa said it always made 
preaching easier for him when Brother Ross was there praying. 
Papa liked the shouting, too, and could even outshout Brother 
Ross ••• (Crawford, 1981:123). 
Sometimes Julian Ross, 
••• would jump up and crack his heels together. "One time •.• 
a little dog that had got into the church went up and down 
the aisles, too, yapping at Brother Ross's heels" (Crawford, 
1981;69, also Earl Winters, Interview, 1984). 
Not only were services emotional and appealing to an uneducated 
population, but many of the preachers were either lay-preachers 
and/or uneducated preachers. William Morris, pastor of the 
Primitive Methodist Church, was a coal miner with no ministerial 
education. Charles Davis, pastor of the Gospel Tabernacle in 
Fraser, was a coal miner in one census and a preacher in the next. 
Brandes (1970) found that American industrial capitalists and some 
company town owners saw religion as the ideal alternative to the 
saloon. Here, there was a confluence of vertical linkages with similar 
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interests. That may be why 1n Fraser, William Morris was encouraged by 
the business people to stay longer in Fraser with one of his revival 
meetings. Both Wiliiam Morris and Charles Crawford were 
prohibitionists. Lois Crawford (1981) wrote of experiences when some 
from the meetings 1n Fraser would go down to the saloons to find one who 
was slipping back to drunkenness after having attended the church 
meetings. 
In summary, the churches 1n Fraser functioned to provide some 
social and ideational control of the population for the company and 
serve a highly mobile population through revivalism. The two churches 
that built buildings in Fraser were the Primitive Methodist Church and 
the Black Baptist Church, which were subject to company control through 
financial assistance. Yet, they had strong vertical ties to their 
denominations and a popular base of support from church members. The 
one church that was built near Fraser without company help, the Gospel 
Tabernacle, was strongly linked by vertical ties to its parent church, 
the Gospel Tabernacle in Boone. 
Interest in religion Religion as organized in Fraser was not 
simply the result of the company wanting the population churched and 
carrying out a plan to bring about churches in its town. There was a 
confluence of interests in Fraser such that the people, the external 
religious groups, and the company all wanted the same thing regarding 
religion. All had different reasons. The company wanted religion in 
Fraser as a form of social control, a way of encouraging industrious 
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ness on and off the job. The external religious groups and denomina-
tions were always looking for a new town 1n which to start one of their 
churches. The residents of Fraser, many of them religious before com-
ing to Fraser, wanted a church in which to worship. All three groups 
seemed pleased enough to work together. In some instances, the 
churches were company controlled but they were not forced on the 
people. The Gospel Tabernacle was an instance of a church free from 
company control. The company had an interest in the churches and may 
have hoped that churches would thrive, but the company did not have 
full control of the churches in Fraser. 
Education 
The company did not completely dominate the lives of Fraser reS1-
dents in education. There appears to have been a confluence of 
interests. The company, government and residents all had an interest 
1n a viable educational institution 1n Fraser. 
If the company was to attract labor to Fraser, they needed the 
non-economic institution of education. The more inexpensively they 
could cover that need, the better. The government and the townspeople 
also needed a school. The government had mandated an educated popu-
lace, and the townspeople both needed to meet that mandate and desired 
an education for their chidlren. The company had obvious benefits from 
the school in Fraser, but it was not the only party to benefit from the 
school. 
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Within seven months after Fraser was built, a decision had been 
made to build a school in town (BCR, Apr. 4, 1894). The first school 
used by Fraser residents was located outside of Fraser (Daughter, 1976) 
and was built long before the town was a township school. In the 
summer of 1894, construction began (BCR, July 25, 1894). The Boone 
Valley Coal and Railway Company donated four lots for the school 
(Warranty Deed, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to District Township 
of Dodge, Apr. 4, 1894). The stipulation was made that the Township 
must construct a building of at least $1,400 value. Thus, the company 
was able to get the township to provide a school for the company town 
with as little incentive as $200 worth of property. In 1896, Fraser 
formed an independent school district (BCD, Apr. 10, 1896), and in the 
summer the school was moved and enlarged. In 1904, the school building 
in Incline, Iowa, was purchased and attached to the Fraser school. 
Since Browne's company also owned the town of Incline, one could assume 
that they welcomed the opportunity to rid themselves of that school, as 
a part of dismantling the town of Incline. 
The company may have held some ideational control 1n the school 
through influence over the school board. Of the seven people on the 
school board from 1897-1899 (BCR, Mar. 31, 1898; BCD, Mar. 30, 1900), 
one was a storemanager in the company store, five were coal mlne 
employees, and one was a day laborer. Almost nobody on the school 
board at this time was free from company control through employment. 
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Still, company control over personnel for the school was not 
absolute. Nine different persons served as secretary or treasurer for 
the school district from 1897 to 1904. These were paid positions. 
Of the nine, the employment of seven is known from the census. Four 
were business owners, one a coal company clerk and two were miners. 
Possibly the business owners had skills that made them useful as 
secretary or treasurer for the school district. This may also be a 
small example of the non-coal company business class exercising some 
community control. 
In the educational institution in Fraser, there was a confluence 
of vertical and communal interests. The government mandated an educat-
ed populous. It was a part of enculturating immigrants. The company 
probably hoped to transmit values of hard work and loyalty to future 
employees. The town popUlation wanted their children educated. 
Recreation and Entertainment 
A number of recreational institutions grew up 1n Fraser. Some 
recreational institutions developed with company sponsorship, and 
others developed as community expression. 
Holidays 
Major holidays were celebrated with p1cn1CS 1n the town park, with 
the 4th of July and Labor Day the most significant. They were usually 
celebrated with a p1cn1C, foot races, baseball games, a band, a dance 
and important speakers (BCD, July 1, 1898: Je. 13, 1901). In the years 
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that blacks lived ~n Fraser, they played a central role in these holi-
day celebrations. They held cake walks and barbeques, and invited the 
whites to celebrate with them (BCD, July 1, 1898; July 7, 1899). The 
appearances was that of a company p~cn~c. In 1895, the miners' picnic 
on May 11 was attended by over 500 guests (BCR, May 15, 1895). They 
came by "trains from Ogden, pilot Mound, Lehigh, Ft. Dodge, Angus and 
other nearby towns" (BCR, May 15, 1895). Over 2,000 people attended 
the Labor Day p~cn~c in 1910 (BNR, Sept. 8, 1910). In one case, there 
was an annual Scotch picnic in Fraser (BCD, Jl. 31, 1896). This was a 
communal-ethnic expression and unrelated to company control. 
Atheltic recreation 
The major athletic recreation was baseball. Baseball was some-
thing of an institution in the community. There was weekly competition 
with other towns, sometimes with a purse as large as $100 (BCR, May 28, 
1908). The company provided land for a public park with a baseball 
diamond. Fraser generally had two or three active baseball teams. In 
1899, Hamilton Browne purchased uniforms for the black baseball team 
(BCD, June 9, 1899). The occasion was a time of intense labor unrest, 
when black strikebreakers were tempted to join whites in unionizing 
(BCD, June 9, 1899; BCR, June 15, 1899). Browne's paternalism 
apparently worked, as only a small number of blacks joined the union 
(BCR, June 15, 1899). 
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Competitive foot races were held in conjunction with annual 
picnics (BCR, May 15, 1895). Foot races were also held in competition 
with other towns (BCD, July 19, 1901). Later, a football team was 
organized in Fraser (BNR, Sept. 19, 1907). A bicycle track operation 
1n 1899 met with disapproval from some residents (BCD, Je. 9, 1899). 
In winter, 1ce skating parties were held on the r1ver (BCD, Je. 22, 
1897). Many of these athletic activities were generated by the 
community because they enjoyed them. The company was probably 
supportive of these activities, but knew that the town would support 
these on their own and simply let them do so. 
Entertainment 
There were no shortage of local entertainment events 1n Fraser. 
Often masquerade parties were held, as well as surprise parties in in-
dividual homes (BCR, Feb. 3, 1898; BCD, Oct. 30, 1896). There were 
orchestral concerts, drum-corp performances, amateur nights, and per-
formances by fraternal organizations as fundraisers (BNR, Dec. 27, 
1906; BCD, Feb. 9, 1906; BCD, Je. 8, 1906; BNR, July 30, 1908). Tra-
velling road shows also brought in theatrical performances, medicine 
shows, novelty shows, circuses, stereo slide shows, movies, comedians, 
concerts with bubblemen, operas, and the Canadian Jubilee Singers (BNR, 
Dec. 6, 1906; BCR, May 9, 1907; BNR, Je. 27, 1907; BNR, Jan. 23, 1908; 
BNR, Apr. 2, 1908; BCD, Mar. 30, 1906; BCR, Dec. 5, 1907). The company 
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had no direct interest in these events, and apparently they were 
completely generated by communal interest. 
Fishing 
Some recreation had practical advantages. Fishing was an example. 
At times, the fish were plentiful. In the summer of 1907, it was 
claimed 1,000 fish were caught 1n one day (BNR, Je. 27, 1907). During 
a national coal miners strike, fishing and gardening became an 
important way of providing food (BCD, Apr. 17, 1908). Here, the people 
were organizing their own life in a way that may well have undermined 
company control. Fishing may have been recreational, but more likely 
it was a necessity. Armando Ferrari told of ice fishing in the Des 
Moines River and wondered how people ate the fish and survived. He 
recollected how the stench of sewer gas escap1ng from the hole in the 
ice used to make the fishermen nauseous (Armando Ferrari interview, 
1984). Ft. Dodge dumped its sewage into the river upstream. 
Saloons 
Like many coal m1n1ng towns, saloons and liquor were a significant 
part of the community landscape. The company discouraged saloons. 
However, portable saloons both on wheels and on boats on the Des Moines 
River were common (BCR, May 14, 1896.) One saloon was dubbed the 
"white elephant" because it was built on four posts over the Des Hoines 
River with a walkway extending over to the shore (BCD, Apr. 24, 1896). 
Portable saloons overcame company control that may have disallowed a 
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building in the town. In time a number of saloons opened on the 
fringes of town in sheds and other buildings (Boone News, Aug. 29, 
1901). In one case a bootlegger was said to have pitched a tent and 
used it as a saloon (BCR, Nov. 19, 1896). Yet saloons may be less 
suggestive of internal community control than simple escapism by the 
miners. The local population created a demand for saloons. 
Fraternal Organizations 
Numerous lodges had weekly meetings and occasional celebrations in 
the Miner's Hall. The following men's lodges met regularly in Fraser: 
Odd Fellows, Redmen, Foresters of America, Knights of Pythias, ~odoc 
Tribe, Sons of Daniel Boone, and the Good Templars (BCR, Nov. 30, 1905; 
BN, Jan. 19, 1905; BWN, Dec. 7, 1905). Women also had lodges which met 
regularly: Rebecca Lodge, Court Lilly of the Valley, Companions of the 
Forest, and Circle Pride Lodge (BCR, Nov. 30, 1905; BCD, Jan. 19, 1906; 
BCD, J L 20, 1906) • 
Often lodges held dances or fundraising suppers. In 1905, the 
Court Lilly of the Valley held a Thanksgiving supper for 150 guests, 
complete with musical presentations and guest speakers (BN, Dec. 7, 
1905). The Red Men held a dance and Thanksgiving supper in the same 
week for 53 guests (BN, Dec. 7, 1905). 
It is difficult to know from the sparce records, the composition 
of officers in the lodges. In the Foresters of America in 1903, 
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the store owners and a hotel owner were dominant leaders (BCD, Jan. 16, 
1905). In the Knights of Pythias for 1905, all the leaders were coal 
mine employees (BCD, Dec. 15, 1905). The company had little interest 
in promoting lodges. They were communally generated. They also were 
established by vertical linkages to lodges in other locations. Besides 
the obvious fraternity provided by the lodges, they also provided a 
service to the community and to individuals in need through mutual aid. 
Late in 1909, with the decline in coal mining and population, the 
Knights of pythias closed their lodge, and most other lodges were dying 
out (BNR, Nov 11, 1909). 
Mutual Aid 
Little 1S known of how people banded together to help each other 
1n cases of emergencies in Fraser. What little remains in the documen-
tary record comes from Boone County newspapers. 
Orphans 
The way in which orphans were cared for in Fraser shows that both 
personal help and institutional help were important factors 1n provid-
ing mutual aid in Fraser. It also provides a case 1n which local vol-
untary organizations provided a vertical link with institutions provid-
ing mutual aid for many communities. In 1909, Charles Olsen died from 
pneumonia. He and his wife had just adopted a girl from Des Moines and 
his wife was unable to provide for her at his death. Another couple 
from Fraser, the Watsons who owned a store, adopted her (BCD, Apr. 9, 
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1909; BNR, Apr. 29, 1909). They later adopted a son. When Ira Showers 
died in 1906, his children were taken to the Odd Fellows Home in Mason 
City, Iowa (BCD, Apr. 13, 1906). When the three black children of 
Richard and Anne Payne were orphaned, they were raised by the Gospel 
Tabernacle orphanage in Boone (Nayse Daugherty interview, 1984; 
Lawrence Payne interview, 1984). 
Care for the indigent 
Apparently in the case of a mining accident, the mlnlng company 
could not be counted on to help the victim when they were no longer 
productive. In some cases, the community banded together to help the 
victims. In 1896, the Knights of Pythias gave a dance as a benefit for 
a member who had lost a leg as a result of a mining accident (BCD, Nov. 
27, 1896). When Charles Forbes experienced a similar amputation in 
1898, the community made a collection for him and received $135 (BCR, 
Feb. 3, 1898). When James Hulbert, a mine foreman, was killed under a 
fall of slate in 1902, he left a wife and eight children. The Odd 
Fellows took care of the funeral arrangements (BCD, July 4, 1902). The 
community made a fundraising event out of the July 4th celebration and 
gave the proceeds to his widow (BCD, July 4, 1902). When Phillip 
Showers suffered a stroke in 1906, the community took up a collection 
to help him (BCD, Apr. 27, 1906; May 18, 1906). Showers was on some 
kind of pension, which paid him $12.00 per month, and a group in Fraser 
was working to get that increased (BCD, Aug. 17, 1906). Apparently, 
the attempt was unsuccesful (BCD, Dec. 11, 1906). In 1907, a 
collection was taken to help pay for a second trial for Len Wemply from 
Fraser who was sentenced to 30 years in prison in Des Moines (BNR, May 
9, 1907). 
In many of the cases where mutual aid was provided in Fraser, the 
voluntary organizations in Fraser either directly provided the aid or 
became the vertical link to institutions outside of Fraser. 
Non-economic Institutions as Defiance of Company Control 
In some cases the company worked to gain control over non-economic 
institutions for its own advantage as it did with churches. In other 
cases the compay paid little attention to non-econom1C institutions, 
such as fraternities and recreation. Other non-economic institutional 
arrangements were formed, which the company could neither control nor 
ignore. The formation of the United Mine Workers of America and the 
incorporation of Fraser were two such insitutional arrangements which 
developed in defiance of company control. The case of the union 
involved the workers making an alliance with an external organization 
that could compete with the company for power over the lives of the 
workers. The incorporation of Fraser was an indigenous movement to 
arrest company control. 
United Mine Worker of America 
One institution that held the potential of mediating external con-
trol in company towns was the union. Through the union, the workers 
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could use a solidarity alliance with an external organization in hopes 
of winning concessions from the company. The solidarity included 
solidarity on a national level. In this way, the United Mine Workers 
of America was a vertical tie in defiance of the company's control of 
Fraser. 
Actually the United Mine Workers Union in Fraser did show Success 
~n mediating external control. In 1896, L. P. Joyce, the state 
president of the United Mine Workers, came to Fraser and discussed 
organizing a un~on at Fraser (BCR, April 14, 1898). This was 
immediately after a disastrous failure of striking miners to receive 
any concessions from the company in a five month work stoppage in 1897. 
The company had successfully broken the strike by importing black 
strikebreakers. 
In 1899, John Ream, District President of the United Mine Workers 
came to Fraser and was successful in organizing a local union (BCD, 
June 23, 1899). Initially, 94 miners, of which twelve were black, 
joined the union. The company fired a number of them, and the rest of 
the miners struck. The company imported black m~ners and a contingent 
of 200 white union ~ners from nearby Milford and Logansport came to 
Fraser to " ••• have a talk with the colored miners ••• " (BCR, Ju ly 27, 
1899). The blacks knew better than to show up for the talks, and 
formed an armed militia of 23 men with Winchester rifles and pistols. 
Blacks began holding target practice in the streets, and in a short the 
white miners and their families left town in large numbers BCD, July 
28, 1899). A number of violent incidents followed over the next 
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few months, with some blacks shooting blacks, and a white strikebreaker 
shooting a white striking miner (BCR, Sept. 21, 1899). While the 
violence showed no signs of being organized or racially motivated, it 
was indicative of the fact that the strikebreakers felt the need to 
carry weapons at all times. 
By October, there was a growing coal shortage, and Hamilton Browne 
recognized the United Mine Workers Union in Fraser, giving them a ten 
cent per ton pay raise (BCR, October 12, 1899; Nov. 9, 1899). The work 
of the Fraser miners also resulted in a raise for other miners in the 
county (BCR, Nov. 9, 1899). The union would play an important part in 
the lives of the miners Ln Fraser in the years to come. In 1907, the 
retail clerks also organized a unLon in Fraser (BNR, Oct. 17, 1907). 
It was surely through the unlon that a large portion of the Fraser 
population became socialist in their political persuasion. Although 
other parties exercised influence among Fraser residents, the Socialist 
Party became the party of choice. In 1906, four Fraser residents ran 
for Boone County positions on the Socialist ticket. Since Fraser had 
incorporated in 1904, they could elect local officials. Their full 
slate of local officials in 1906 were socialists (Nov. 30, 1906). It 
appears that the labor union movement had provided Fraser residents 
with a counter ideology to company control in the form of socialism. 
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Fraser's incorporation as ~ Town 
One of the keys to company control of a company town was not only 
ownership of the principal housing and businesses in the town, but 
political control as well. When the citizens of Fraser decided to 1n-
corporate the town, they met serious resistance from the owners. In 
1903, a Petition was presented in District Court in Boone to incorpo-
rate Fraser. It was signed by 112 workers, of which 82 were m1ners. 
The election was carried 1n favor of incorporation by a vote of 87 to 
57. However, the election was legally challenged by William A. Kelly. 
Kelly was one of the owners of the corporation that owned the town 
along with Hamilton Browne (BN, Sept. 25, 1902). Kelly, who lived 1n 
Fraser, could act 1n the interests of the company in a way that Browne, 
now living in Chicago, could not. The case went to court, but the 
judge finally ruled in favor of the incorporators late in 1903 
(Articles of Incorporation, Fraser, Iowa). 
The immediate effect of incorporation was to choose a local town 
government. Nobody representing the company was elected to office. By 
1906, the whole slate of elected officials in Fraser were from the 
Socialist ticket (BCD, Nov. 30, 1906). 
There were some other changes in Fraser following incorporation. 
The town built a jail (BN, June 8, 1904). The streets were graded and 
filled, and gravel sidewalks were laid (BCD, November 24, 1905). The 
Fraser Supply Store, the company store owned by the corporation owning 
the town, was sold to new owners. While the investors in the new firm, 
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the Fraser Mercantile, were not local, for the first time they were not 
the same people on the Board of the railroad that owned the town. With 
the new ownership of the Fraser Supply Store, came a decision to open a 
savings deposit system to function like a bank, paying interest on 
deposits for the first time (BCD, November 24, 1905). By incorporat-
ing, the citizens of Fraser had taken some control over their own 
lives. 
Ironically, the very time when the citizens were gaLn1ng some 
control over their own lives through communal initiative and vertical 
ties with organizations other than the company, was the very time the 
company was making ready to close down mining operations in Fraser. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that many of the non-economic institutions 
were examples of communal initiative and vertical ties with organ1za-
tions wishing to organize in Fraser. Warren (1972) did not paint 
vertical ties 1n completely negative terms. While the vertical ties to 
the company of Hamilton Browne and James J. Hill appear to have had 
negative effects on the lives of Fraser residents, other vertical ties 
may have been welcomed and even helpful. The question may not be so 
much whether linkages were vertical or horizontal, but who was initiat-
ing such linkages and 1n whose interests. Center and periphery 
literature describes the tremendous dissimilarity of interests between 
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ehe center and periphery. It appears that Fraser was on the periphery 
in terms of the economic organization of the town and this was found In 
the dissimilar interests to St. Paul, Minnesota. However, In the 
non-economic relations, the center and periphery relationship may have 
had no negative connotations at all. The Fraser residents both 
appreciated and were helped by these vertical ties. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
This thesis is a social-historical community study of a coal 
mining company town 1n the Midwest at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The theoretical perspectives of community literature 
(Warren, 1972), coal mining company town literature, and center and 
periphery literature, have been used to frame the story of Fraser, 
Iowa. 
This thesis found exception to Warren's (1972) great change thesis 
that suggested that communities in the nineteenth century did not 
experience the extent of vertical ties that predominate 1n communities 
in the twentieth century. In this study, vertical ties were found to 
predominate the economic structures and non-economic institutions from 
the very beginning of Fraser. The very growth in horizontal ties that 
took place, as many non-economic institutions took root in Fraser, were 
fostered in relations with organizations outside of Fraser. 
That vertical ties were common in coal mining and company towns is 
clear from the literature (Corbin, 1981). This thesis adds to that 
discussion the uniqueness of placing the town of Fraser in a context of 
external control that is intentional. This was done through the study 
of correspondence between James J. Hill of St. Paul, Minnesota, and 
Hamilton Browne of Boone, Iowa. Hill, as the correspondence shows, 
directly controlled Browne at every juncture. Both showed that they 
intended to control Fraser for their own profits. This thesis also 
documents Hill's control of Browne through debt servicing. 
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This whole phenomenon of external control of a community fits 
better into the existing center and periphery perspective through the 
Hill and Browne connection. Fraser can easily be understood as a pe-
ripheral community linked to a center metropolis through Hamilton 
Browne. But if this thesis challenges Warren's (1972) great change 
thesis in suggesting that Fraser was dominated by vertical ties from 
the beginning, it also offers a challenge to center and periphery 
literature. 
It may be that the vertical ties that were established in Fraser 
are not only significant because of their being vertical. It could be 
that the significance lies in the question of who initiated those ties 
and who benefitted from them. In the case of the company's external 
domination, the company initiated the ties and it was completely for 
the benefit of the company. In the case of the non-economic institu-
tional vertical ties, many of them were either initiated by community 
groups or welcomed by the community. They appear to have benefitted 
the community as well as the unit of groups external to Fraser. It may 
be that the center and periphery theoretical perspective has most to 
offer in its analysis of the economic bases of a social system, but it 
1S unclear if the non-econom1C vertical linkages were those of a 
periphery linking to the center. 
Having granted that rejoinder, external control by the center was 
still the key to Fraser's history. In the case of this coal mining 
company town, the very time when the townspeople were gaining control 
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over some of their lives through vertical ties and communal initiative, 
the company lost econom1C interest in Fraser. The most profitable coal 
had been mined shortly after 1905, and the company was no longer 
interested in Fraser. In the end, the econom1C control exercised by 
the center over this periphery was the decisive factor. When the 
company decided not to open any more mines, the town went into 
irreversable decline. 
Although Fraser was the theme of this thesis study, it was a 
peripheral concern of James J. Hill in St. Paul. Hill's control of 
Browne and Browne's control of Fraser dominated the life of that 
community but was only a small concern to Hill. For Hill and Browne, 
the abandonment of Iowa interests was a simple economic matter. Nute 
(n.d.) noted the way the decision was made. 
When Illinois coal became more easily available, cheaper, 
and of better quality for his purposes than Iowa coal, Hill 
with characteristic lack of sentimental loyalty abandoned the 
Iowa coal field in favor of the bigger and better field ••.. 
Hamilton Browne and James J. Hill turned their interests to 
Illinois (Nute n.d.) and Fraser was quickly forgotten. By 1914, when a 
historian visited Fraser, he considered it nearly a ghost town 
(Goldwaite, n.d.:2l4) 
A visit to the town ••• found the population reduced to less 
than three hundred. Half the buildings, both business and 
residences, were empty •••• 
••• it will not be long until the house of Fraser will be sold, 
torn down, and hauled away •••. 
The only reason that Fraser was not completely dismantled and 
moved to another coal mining site was that it had become the 
178 
center of a railroad, the Ft. Dodge, Des Moines, and Southern Railway. 
From Fraser they generated electric power through a coal fired gen-
erator. Ironically, coal was now shipped into Fraser to fire the gen-
erator to run this railroad. The townsite was sold to speculators in 
Boone County. The only peole who stayed in Fraser were a few small 
business owners and the workers at the power plant. 
Today Fraser has no businesses and has one church which continues 
to meet weekly with a few members. The town provides housing for 
commuters and retired people. The population is less than 150 people. 
The church is served by a pastor from Boone, who also serves a church 
in Boone. In every way today, the most significant ties in Fraser, 
what is left of Fraser, are vertical ties. It is the prototypical 
example of what Frank (1975) refers to as a "ghost region" after the 
center loses interest 1n the periphery. 
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APPENDIX 
There are no Tables 1, 9, and 10. 
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Table 2. 1900: u.s. born by state of origin 
State 
Iowa 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Missouri 
Kansas 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Virginiaa 
Kentucky 
Tennessee 
N. Carolina 
Georgia 
Alabama 
Otherb 
White 
372 
19 
18 
5 
4 
12 
23 
1 
1 
1 
15 
% 
58.7 
3.0 
2.8 
.8 
.6 
1.9 
3.6 
.2 
.2 
.2 
2.4 
Black 
14 
17 
12 
26 
8 
28 
17 
6 
13 
5 
11 
6 
% 
2.2 
2.7 
1.9 
4.1 
1.3 
4.4 
2.7 
.9 
2.1 
.8 
1.7 
.9 
Total 
386 
36 
30 
31 
12 
12 
23 
28 
18 
7 
13 
5 
12 
21 
% of u.S. Born 
60.9 
5.7 
4.7 
4.9 
1.9 
1.9 
3.6 
4.4 
2.8 
1.1 
2. 1 
.8 
1.9 
3.3 
aOften no distinction as to which Virginia. Probably most often 
West Virginia. 
bOthers include Colorado, Montana, Dakota, Wisconsin, Maryland 
Massachusetts, New York, Mississippi, and Indian Territory. 
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Table 3. 1900: U.S. born by state of origin, excluding Iowa 
State 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Missouri 
Kansas 
White 
19 
18 
5 
4 
Ohio 12 
Pennsylvania 23 
Virginiaa 
Kentucky 
Tennessee 
N. Carolina 
Georgia 
Alabama 
Otherb 
1 
1 
1 
15 
% 
7.7 
7.3 
2.0 
1.6 
4.8 
9.3 
.4 
.4 
.4 
6.0 
Black 
17 
12 
26 
8 
28 
17 
6 
13 
5 
11 
6 
% 
6.9 
4.8 
10.5 
3.2 
11. 3 
6.9 
2.4 
5.2 
2.0 
4.4 
2.4 
Total 
36 
30 
31 
12 
12 
23 
28 
18 
7 
13 
5 
12 
21 
% of U.S. Born 
14.5 
12.1 
12.5 
4.8 
4.8 
9.3 
11. 3 
7.3 
2.8 
5.2 
2.0 
4.8 
8.5 
aOften no distinction as to which Virginia. Probably most often 
West Virginia. 
bOthers include Colorado, Montana, Dakota, Wisconsin, Maryland 
Massachusetts, New York, Mississippi, and Indian Territory. 
187 
'" 
Table 4. 1905 U.S. born by state 
State 
Colorado 
Dakota 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Maryland 
Michigan 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire 
New York 
North Carolina 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Texas 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Virginia 
Washington 
Unknown 
TOTAL 
U.S. born 
Foreign born 
TOTAL 
U.S./foreign 
Missing value 
TOTAL 
Total 
2 
4 
44 
15 
733 
9 
3 
4 
7 
23 
18 
2 
9 
2 
15 
2 
42 
1 
2 
1 
6 
7 
2 
25 
978 
236 
1 J 214 
28 
1 J 243 
% 
U.S. 
Born 
.2 
.4 
4.5 
1.5 
74.9 
.9 
.3 
.4 
.7 
2.4 
1.8 
.2 
.9 
.2 
1.5 
.2 
4.3 
• 1 
.2 
• 1 
.6 
.7 
.2 
2.6 
100.% 
% 
All 
Fraser 
.2 
.3 
3.5 
1.2 
59.0 
• 7 
.2 
.3 
.6 
1.9 
1.4 
.2 
.7 
.2 
1.2 
.2 
3.4 
• 1 
.2 
• 1 
.5 
.6 
.2 
2.0 
78.7% 
19.0% 
97.7% 
2.3% 
100.0% 
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Table 5. 1905 : u.s. born by state of origin, excluding Iowa 
State Persons % 
Illinois 44 18.0 
Indiana 15 6.1 
Missouri 23 9.4 
Kansas 9 3.7 
Ohio 15 6.1 
Pennsylvania 42 17. 1 
Virginiaa 8 3.3 
Kentucky 3 1.2 
Tennessee 1 .4 
N. Carolina 2 .8 
Nebraska 18 7.3 
Otherb 65 26.5 
TOTAL 245 99.9 
aOften no distinction as to which Virginia. Probably 
most often West Virginia. 
bOthers include 25 persons of unknown origin. 
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Table 6. 1895 : Recent origins measure; children's birthplace 
Birthplace 0-4 yrs. 5-9 yrs. 10-14 yrs. Total 
County % % % % 
Boone 32 41. 6 44 50.6 29 45.3 105 46.1 
Webster 21 27.3 12 13 .8 14 21. 9 47 20.6 
Story 1 1.1 1 1.6 2 .9 
Polk 7 9.1 1 1.1 8 3.5 
Dallas 8 10.4 10 11.5 1 1.6 19 8.3 
Greene 2 2.6 4 4.6 2 3. 1 8 3.5 
Carroll 1 1.3 2 3.1 3 1.3 
Other 3 3.9 7 8.0 4 6.3 14 6.1 
u.s. 
(outside 
Iowa) 2 2.6 4 4.6 5 7.8 11 4.8 
Foreign 1 1.3 4 4.6 6 9.4 11 4.8 
TOTAL 77 100.1 87 99.9 64 100.1 228 99.9 
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Table 7. 1900: Blacks state of origin 
State Number 
Iowa 14 
Missouri 26 
Illinois 17 
Indiana 12 
Kansas 8 
Kentucky 17 
Tennessee 6 
Alabama 11 
Georgia 5 
N. Carolina 13 
Virginia 28 
Othera 6 
Total 163 
aOther includes one each for Michigan, 
Territory, Mississippi, and two from Texas. 
Percentage 
8.6 
16.0 
10.4 
7.4 
4.9 
10.4 
3.7 
6.7 
3.1 
8.0 
17.2 
3.7 
100.1 
Washington, Indian 
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Table 8. Fraser Ethnic Population: 1900, 1905, 1910 
1900 1905 1910 TOTAL 
Ethnic GrauE No. % No. % No. % No. % 
United States 455 60.1 609 49.0 224 46.0 1,288 51.8 
British Isles a 152 20.1 291 23.4 131 26.9 574 23.1 
Scandinaviab 87 11.5 152 12.2 54 11. 1 293 11.8 
Germany 40 5.3 37 3.0 14 2.9 91 3.7 
Slavicc 4 .5 25 2.0 19 3.9 48 1.9 
Russia 13 1.7 44 3.5 57 2.3 
Italy 2 .3 29 2.3 30 6.2 61 2.5 
Otherd 4 .5 26 2. 1 6 1.2 36 1.4 
Unknownd 30 2.4 9 1.8 39 1.6 
TOTAL 757 100.0 1,243 99.9 487 100.0 2,487 100.0 
aEngland, Ireland, Wales, Scotland. 
bSweden, Norway, Denmark. 
CHungary, Austria, Bohemia, Lithuania. 
dCana~a, France, Switzerland. 
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Table 11. 1895 age by gender 
Age Males % Females % Total % 
0 - 4 39 6.2 38 6.0 77 12.2 
5 - 9 48 7.6 42 6.7 90 14.3 
10-14 33 5.2 31 4.9 64 10.2 
15-19 30 4.8 32 5.1 62 9.8 
20-24 49 7.8 22 3.5 71 11. 3 
25-29 35 5.6 16 2.5 51 8.1 
30-34 47 7.5 20 3.2 67 10.6 
35-39 30 4.8 21 3.3 51 8.1 
40-44 14 2.2 5 0.8 19 3.0 
45-49 22 3.5 8 1.3 30 4.8 
50-54 11 1.7 9 1.4 20 3.2 
55-59 6 1.0 2 0.3 8 1.3 
60-64 3 0.5 3 0.5 6 1.0 
65-69 3 0.5 0 0.0 3 0.5 
70-74 3 0.5 1 0.2 4 0.6 
75-89 1 0.2 2 0.3 3 0.5 
Age 
Unknown 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 
Subtotal 374 59.6 252 40.0 626 99.6 
Missing values 2 0.3 2 0.3 4 0.6 
TOTAL 376 59.9 254 40.3 630 100.2 
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Table 12. 1900 age by gender 
Age Males % Females % Total % 
0 - 4 66 8.7 40 5.3 106 14.0 
5 - 9 41 5.4 44 5.8 85 11. 2 
10-14 47 6.2 46 6.1 93 12.3 
15-19 39 5.2 37 4.9 76 10.0 
20-24 35 4.6 35 4.6 70 9.2 
25-29 50 6.6 29 3.8 79 10.4 
30-34 30 4.0 31 4.1 61 8.1 
35-39 38 5.0 17 2.2 55 7.3 
40-44 22 2.9 15 2.0 37 4.9 
45-49 20 2.6 14 1.8 34 4.5 
50-54 18 2.4 5 0.7 23 3.0 
55-59 12 1.6 6 0.8 18 2.4 
60-64 4 0.5 4 0.5 8 1.1 
65-69 1 0.1 1 0.1 2 .3 
70-74 1 0.1 1 0.1 2 .3 
75-89 1 0.1 1 0.1 2 .3 
Age 
Unknown 3 .4 3 .4 6 0.8 
Subtotal 428 56.4 329 43.3 757 100.1 
Missing values 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 
TOTAL 425 56.6 329 43.3 757 100.0 
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Table 13. 1905 Age by gender 
Age Males % Females % Total % 
0 - 4 88 7.1 98 7.9 186 15.0 
5 - 9 73 5.9 76 6.1 149 12.0 
10-14 62 5.0 58 4.7 120 9.7 
15-19 70 5.6 62 5.0 132 10.6 
20-24 69 5.6 61 4.9 130 10.4 
25-29 64 5.1 46 3.7 110 8.8 
30-34 57 4.6 23 1.9 80 6.4 
35-39 41 3.3 35 2.8 76 6. 1 
40-44 30 2.4 27 2.2 57 4.6 
45-49 36 2.9 24 1.9 60 4.8 
50-54 21 1.7 10 .8 31 2.5 
55-59 21 1.7 10 .8 31 2.5 
60-64 11 .9 7 .6 18 1.4 
65-69 3 .2 4 .3 7 .6 
70-74 5 .4 0 .0 5 .4 
75-89 1 • 1 1 • 1 2 .2 
Age 
Unknown 23 1.9 18 1.5 42 3.4 
Subtotal 674 54.4 560 45.2 1,235 99,4 
Missing values 4 .3 4 .3 8 .6 
TOTAL 678.5 54.00 564.5 45.5 1,243 100.0 
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Table 14. 1910 age by gender 
Age Males % Females % Total % 
0-4 38 7.8 36 7.4 74 15.2 
5 - 9 35 7.2 32 6.6 67 13.B 
10-14 29 6.0 31 6.4 60 12.3 
15-19 23 4.7 21 4.3 44 9.0 
20-24 28 5.7 16 3.3 44 9.0 
25-29 21 4.3 15 3.1 36 7.4 
30-34 21 4.3 IB 3.7 39 B.O 
35-39 13 2.7 10 2.1 23 4.7 
40-44 9 1.8 7 1.4 16 3.4 
45-49 10 2. 1 12 2.5 22 4.5 
50-54 13 2.7 10 2.1 23 4.7 
55-59 6 1.2 7 1.4 13 2.7 
60-64 7 1.4 4 0.8 11 2.3 
65-69 6 1.2 4 0.8 10 2.1 
70-74 1 0.2 1 0.2 2 .4 
75-89 0 .0 0 0.2 1 .2 
Age 
Unknown 0 .0 1 0.2 1 .2 
Subtotal 260 53.3 226 46.5 99.9 
Missing values .5 • 1 .5 • 1 1 • 1 
TOTAL 53.40 46.6 487 100.0 
196 
Table 15. 1900: Age and gender of Fraser blacks 
Age Males % Females % Total % 
0 - 4 9 5.5 6 3.7 15 9.2 
5 - 9 3 1.8 9 5.5 12 7.4 
10-14 9 5.5 12 7.4 21 12.9 
15-19 4 2.5 10 6.1 14 8.6 
20-24 4 2.5 9 5.5 13 8.0 
25-29 11 6.7 11 6.7 22 13.5 
30-34 17 10.4 12 7.4 29 17.8 
35-39 15 9.2 1 .6 16 9.8 
40-44 3 1.8 2 1.2 5 3.1 
45-49 4 2.5 2 1.2 6 3.7 
50-54 2 1.2 1 .6 3 1.8 
55-59 2 1.2 1 .6 3 1.8 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 1 .6 1 .6 
75-89 
Age 
Unknown 2 1.2 1 .6 3 1.8 
TOTAL 85 52.0 78 47.7 163 100.0 
197 
Table 16. 1905 Gender by ethnic group 
Gender Gender 
Ethnic Male Female Total 
Sweden 25 17 42 
Norway 3 4 7 
Denmark 1 1 2 
England 22 12 34 
Scotland 27 14 41 
Wales 3 2 5 
Ireland 3 0 3 
France 4 1 5 
Canada 2 3 5 
Australia 3 0 3 
Germany 10 5 15 
Switzerland 0 2 2 
Austria 1 1 2 
Hungary 9 6 15 
Russia 26 7 33 
Italy 15 7 22 
Total Foreign 154 82 236 
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Table 17. 1895 - 1910a Number of households by household s~ze 
1895 1900 1910 
(587 ) (630 ) (630 ) (728 ) (728) (757 ) (487 ) 
ifo % % ifo .., % iJ % % iJ 10 
House- of of of of of of of of of of 
hold 
Size 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
16 
17 
TOTAL 
House- House- Popu- House- House- Popu- House- HOllse- Popu- House-
holds holds lation holds holds lation holds holds latioIl holds 
1 1.0 .2 5 3.2 .7 5 4.8 1.0 11 
9 9.2 2.9 21 13.5 5.5 9 8.6 3.7 39 
10 10.2 4.8 32 20.6 12.7 20 19. 0 12.3 62 
9 9.2 5.7 29 18.7 15.3 22 21.0 18.1 60 
17 17.3 13.5 16 10.3 10.6 19 18.1 19.5 52 
13 13.3 12.4 17 11. 0 13 .5 9 8.6 11.1 39 
13 13.3 14.4 14 9.0 12.9 9 8.6 12.9 36 
12 12.2 15.2 9 5.8 9.5 6 5.7 9.9 27 
4 4.1 5.7 7 4.5 8.3 5 4.8 9.2 16 
5 5.1 7.9 2 1.3 2.6 7 
3 3.1 5.2 2 1.3 2.9 1 1.0 2.3 6 
1 .6 1.6 1 
1 1.0 2.5 1 
1 1.0 2.7 1 
98 100.0 93.1i) I 155 99.8 96 .le I 105 100.2 100.0 358 
a190S data not available. 
bIn 1895, 6.7% of the population, or 42 people, lived in two boarding houses or hotels. 
cIn 1900, 4.0% of the poplation, or 30 people, lived in two boarding houses or hotels. 
TOTAL 
% 
of 
House-
holds 
3.1 
10.9 
17.3 
16.8 
14.5 
10.9 
10.1 
7.5 
4.5 
2.0 
1.7 
., 
• oJ 
.3 
.3 
100.2 
d3 .8% of the population in the three censuses totalled, or 72 people, lived 1n boarding houses. 
% 
of 
Popu-
lation 
.6 
4.2 
10.0 
12.8 
13.9 
12 .5 
13.4 
11.5 
7.7 
3.7 
3.5 
.6 
.9 
.9 
96.2u 
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Table 18. Fraser housholds with boarders 1395-1900<1 
l8YS I 1900 I 
Numbers No. % (630) J No. % % (757) J No. No. % 
of of of % of of of ;~ of of of 
Boarders House- notlse- at Boarders House- Hause- of Boarders House- all 
Household holds holds Populatio Households holds holds Populatio Households holds Households 
0 64 64.0 78.9 0 124 80.0 90.4 a 188 73.7 
1 10 10.0 10.0 1 16 10.3 2.1 1 26 10.2 
2 7 7.0 2.2 2 8 5.2 2.1 2 15 5.9 
3 7 7.0 3.3 3 2 1.3 .8 3 9 3.5 
4 4 4.0 2.5 4 1 .6 .5 4 5 2.0 
5 3 3.0 2.4 5 1 .6 .7 5 4 1.6 
6 1 1.0 1.0 6 1 .6 .8 6 2 .8 
7 7 7 
8 1 1.0 1.3 8 1 .6 1.1 8 2 .8 
9 9 9 
10 10 10 
11 11 1 .6 1.5 11 1 .4 
12 1 1.0 1.9 12 1 .4 
14b 1 1.0 2.2 14 1 .4 
l7 e 1 1.0 2.7 17 1 .4 
TOTAL 100 100.0 100.0 155 99.3 100 .0 255 100.1 
a1910 No households showed boarders. No boardinghouses or hotels operated. 1905 data unavailable. 
bMyers Hotel (Boardinghouse). 
cDonahue Hotel (Boardinghouse). 
'" I. 
of 
Popula.tion 
35.2 
1.9 
2.2 
1.9 
1.4 
1.4 
.9 
1.2 
.8 
.8 
.9 
1.2 
100. a 
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Table 19. Number of black boarders per household in 1900 
Number of % of % of Black 
Boarders Households Households Residents 
0 22 56.4 
1 9 23.1 5.5 
2 6 15.4 7.4 
3 
4 1 2.6 2.5 
5 1 2.6 3. 1 
TOTAL 39 100.1 18.5 
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Table 20. 1895 - 1900 Number of families a by family s~ze 
(496 ) 
No. 
Family of 
Size Families 
1 1 
2 17 
3 14 
4 9 
5 17 
6 15 
7 1.1 
8 11 
9 3 
10 2 
11 
12 
16 
17 
TOTAL 100 
1895 1900 
(496) (630) (682) (682) (757) Total % % 
% % No. % % No. of of 
of of of of of of all total 
f~a~.m~i~1~i~e~s __ ~P~o~p~u~la~t1~·o~n~~F~a~m~i~1~i~e~s~F~a=m=i=l=i=e~s~P~o~t~u~l~a~t~i~o~~n~F~a=o=i=l=i=e~s __ F~m=m=1~·1~i~e~s ___ P_o~p_ulation 
1.0 .2 I 11 7.1 1.5 12 4.7 .9 
17.0 5.4 24 15.5 6.3 41 16.1 5.9 
14.0 6.7 31 20.0 12.3 45 17.6 9.7 
9.0 5.1 26 16.8 13.7 13.7 9.8 
17.0 13.5 14 9.0 9.2 31 12.2 11. 2 
15.0 14.3 18 11. 6 14.3 33 12.9 14.3 
11. 0 12.2 13 8.4 12.0 24 9.4 12.1 
11. 0 14.0 9 5.8 9.5 20 7.8 11.5 
3.0 4.3 7 4.5 8.3 10 3.9 6.5 
2.0 3.2 2 .8 1.4 
2 1.3 2.9 2 .8 1.6 
100.0 78.9 155 100.0 90.0 255 99.9 84.9 
aFa~ily = one or more individuals related by blood residing in one place. (In the rare case where 
two families related to each other reside Ln one residence, they are counted separately.) ~fuen an 
indi~Tidual relative lives with a family J such as a mother-in-law J they are counted as part of the 
fami 1y. 
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Table 21. Black family Sl.ze: 1900 
Family Number of 
Size Families 
1 1 
2 8 
3 17 
4 8 
5 3 
8 1 
9 1 
TOTAL 39 
a132 or 81.0% persons lived 
persons or 18.4% were boarders. 
the fact that two Blacks boarded 
boarded with a black family. 
% of % of 
Families Black Persons 
2.6 .6 
20.5 9.8 
43.6 31. 3 
20.5 19.6 
7.7 9.2 
2.6 4.9 
2.6 5.5 
100.1 80.9a 
with relations as family. Thirty 
The discrepancy of .6% is found in 
with a white family and one white 
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Table 22. 1900 I 1910 HOI!:e atrne::-ship/rental by uulI'Oe::- of paid wo"Ckers in housI!holda 
No. of 
Paid % of % or % of % of TOTAL % of % of TOTAL % of % of 
Workers! % of 1900 % of 1900 % of 1910 % of 1910 1900/ 1900( 1900/ 1900/ 1900/ 1900/ 
House- 1900 1900 House-I 1900 1900 House- 1910 1910 House- 1910 1910 House- 1910 1910 1910 1910 1910 1910 
hold Own Owners holds I Rent Renters holds CY..m Owners holds Rent Renters holds Own Own Households Rent Rent Households 
0 I 1.9 .. 1 1.0 .7 1 .8 .4 1 .7 .4 • I 
1 28 51. 9 18.4 60 61.2 39.5 36 53.7 3l~. 6 26 70.3 25.0 64 52.9 25.0 86 63.7 33.6 
2 8 14.8 5.3 23 23.5 15.1 19 28.4 18.3 7 18.9 6.7 27 22.3 10.5 30 22.2 11. 7 
3 7 13.0 4.6 8 8.2 5.3 8 11. 9 7.7 4 10.8 3.B 15 12.4 5.9 12 8.9 4.7 
4 6 1l.1 3.9 3 3.1 2.0 3 4.5 2.9 9 7.4 3.5 3 2.2 1.2 
5 1 1.9 '1 • I 1 1.0 . 7 1 1.5 1.0 2 1.7 .8 1 . 7 .4 
6 
l 7 1 1.9 .7 1 .8 .4 
Missing 2 3.7 1.3 2 2.0 1.3 2 1.7 - .8 2 1.5 .8 
Value 
TOTAL 54 100.2 35.6 I 98 100.0 64.6 67 100.0 64.5 I 37 100.0 35.5 I 121 100.0 47.3 135 99.9 52.8 
3Exclusive of two boardinghouses/hotels found in 1900 and not found Ln 1910. In 1900, the Donahue Hotel housed 12 paid workers including 
the o~mer. The Mye"Cs Hotel housed ten paid workers including the owne!:' • Both hotels were ow~ed by Donahue & Myers respectively. 
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Table 23. Occupations 
1895 % 1900 % 1905 % 1910 % 
Agricultural 
Farmer 22 4 4 8 
Farm laborer 4 1 
Retired farmer 2 
TOTAL 22 10.2 10 5.3 4 .9 9 5.5 
Professional and semi-Erofessional 
Nurse 1 
Veterinarians 1 
Teachers 2 3 4 1 
School principal 1 
Physician 2 2 2 1 
Clergyman 2 1 
Druggis t 1 1 1 
Music teacher 3 1 
TOTAL 4 1.9 8 4.3 11 2.4 7 4.3 
Personal services 
Hotel/owner 2 2 1 
Hotel/ servants 2 
Barbers 1 2 2 1 
Restaurant(cook) 1 
Saloonkeeper 1 1 
Pool hall proprieter 1 1 
TOTAL 3 1.4 8 4.3 3 .6 3 1.8 
Business 
Merchant/manager 6 3 3 4 
Clerk/sales 1 6 7 3 
Bookkeeper 3 
Delivery 1 1 
TOTAL 7 3.3 9 4.8 11 2.4 11 6.7 
TransEortation/communication 
Drayman/teamster 1 4 7 1 
Postal clerk 1 1 
Postmistress 1 
Newsboy 1 
TOTAL 1 .5 5 2.7 8 1.7 3 1.8 
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Table 23. (continued) 
1895 i. 1900 i. 1905 i. 1910 i. 
Artsians 
Carpenter 6 1 3 1 
Blacksmith 2 3 1 
Dressmaker 1 3 1 3 
Butcher 1 1 3 1 
Machinist 1 1 
Well driller 1 
Wood cutter 1 3 
Mason 1 1 
Tinner 1 1 
Milliner 1 
Canvasser 1 
Cobbler 1 
TOTAL 10 4.7 10 5.3 16 3.4 9 5.5 
Coal ComEan~ EmElo~ees 
Superintendent 1 2 
Mine foreman 1 
Weighmaster 3 3 
Hoisting engineer 4 4 2 
(stationary engine) 
Fireman 1 
Driller 1 
Miner 159 89 322 89 
Night watchman 2 
Laborer 3 
Office clerk 1 1 1 
Bookkeeper 1 2 1 
Stenographer 1 
TOTAL 160 74.4 100 53.2 337 72.2 97 59.1 
Railroad 
General manager 1 1 
Engineer 2 1 1 
Conductor 1 
Station agent 1 
Section gang/laborer 3 4 
Locomotive fireman 2 
Unspecified 3 1 
TOTAL 5 2.3 6 3.2 5 1.1 5 3.0 
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Table 23. (continued) 
1895 % 1900 % 1905 % 1910 % 
Tile Factor~ 
Foreman 
. Laborer 4 
Engineer 1 
TOTAL 5 3.0 
Electric Eower Elant 
Superintendent 
Foreman 
Fireman 4 
Laborer 5 
TOTAL 9 5.5 
Laborer 
Day laborer 26 34 3 
Domestic servents 32 2 
Washerwoman 2 
Janitor 1 
Cook 1 
TOTAL 27 14.4 68 14.6 6 3.7 
Other 
Soldier 1 
Invalid 3 
Retired 3 1 4 
TOTAL 3 1.4 5 2.7 4 .9 
TOTAL 215 100.1 188 100.2 467 100.2 164 99.9 
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Table 24. Women's occupat ions: 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910 
Occupation 1895 1900 1905 1910 
Nurse 1 
School teacher 2 2 4 1 
Music teacher 3 1 
Store clerk 1 2 
Bookkeeper 3 
Postal clerk 1 
Postmistress 1 
Dressmaker 1 2 1 2 
Millinary 1 
Domestic servant 32 2 
Washerwoman 2 
Cook 1 
TOTAL 3 6 46 11 
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Table 25. Fraser's employed sector during 1895, 1900, 1905 and 1910 
1895 1900 1905 1910 
Number of workers 215 188 467 164 
Percentage of population 34.1% 24.8% 37.6% 33.7% 
Percentage of population 
15 years and older 53.9% 39.7% 59.3% 57.3% 
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Table 26. 1900: Number of workers per Black household 1n Fraser 
Number of workers Number of households % of Black households 
0 
1 18 46.2 
2 14 35.9 
3 5 12 .8 
5 1 2.6 
7 1 2.6 
TOTAL 39 100.1 
210 
Table 27. 1900: Number of workers per white household 1n Fraser 
Number of workers Number of households % of white households 
0 2 1.8 
1 70 64.2 
2 17 15.6 
3 10 9.2 
4 9 8.3 
5 1 .9 
TOTAL 109 100.0 
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Table 28. 1900: Home ownership/rental by male workers of a white house-
hold 1n Fraser 
Number of paid 
workers per % of % of Total of % 
household Own Whites Rent Whites white households 
0 1 .9 1 .9 2 1.8 
1 28 25.7 42 38.5 70 64.2 
2 8 7.3 9 8.3 17 15.6 
3 7 6.4 3 2.8 10 9.2 
4 6 5.5 3 2.8 9 8.3 
5 1 .9 0 1 .9 
7 1 .9 0 
TOTAL 52 47.6 57 53.3 109 100.0 
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Table 29. Ag~ of coal llU -:1Z1:5 by ye:1r 
1895 1900 1905 1910 I % % % % % 
of of of of I all 
Age no. ml.ners no. mine::-~ no. ml.ner'l no. miners i total rnl.-:1<!rs 
13-14 IU 5.8 1 .... I . .) I 
15-19 5 3.1 118 9.5 15.8 I 51 10 ll.2 I 12 1.6 I ~-20-24 27 17.0 12.2 60 18.6 17 19.1 I 84 11. 1 I ..... j 
25-29 29 18.2 I "3 I j 17.5 53 16.5 15 16.5 127 16.7 
I 14.8 30-34 32 20.1 28 l.4 13.7 12 13.5 130 17.1 
35-39 26 16.3 26 l3 .S 31 9.6 10 11. 2 116 15.3 
40-44 12 7.5 13 6.':1 17 5.3 8 9.0 93 12.3 
45-49 17 10.7 19 10.1 25 7.8 3 3.4 50 6.6 
50-54 9 5.7 10 5.3 18 5.6 7 7.9 44 5.8 
55-59 1 .6 5 2.6 15 4.7 4 4.5 25 3.4 
60-64 1 .6 4 1.2 3 3.4 8 1.1 
Age 
Unknown 3 1.6 3 .9 6 .8 
Total 159 99.8 39 100 .1 322 100.0 89 100 .1 759 100.2 
Total 
Employed 
All 
Occupations 209 285 495 167 1,156 
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Table 30. Coal miners; months unemployed: 1900, 1905, 1910a 
Months 1900 1905 1910 
Unemployed no. % no. & No. % 
0 3 1.5 8 2.4 14 15.6 
1 11 3.4 7 7.8 
2 2 1.0 17 5.2 8 8.9 
3 16 8.1 31 9.5 12 13.3 
4 165 83.8 113 34.6 16 17 .8 
5 4 2.0 49 15.0 6 6.7 
6 3 1.5 60 18.3 13 14.4 
7 7 2.1 7 7.8 
8 18 5.5 3 3.3 
9 1 .5 3 .9 1 1.1 
0 1 .3 
11 
12 1 .3 2 2.2 
Unknown 3 1.5 8 2.4 1 1.1 
Total 197 99.9 327 99.9 90 100.0 
(average) 3.9 months 4.5 months 3.8 months 
Other ml.nl.ng occupations, months unemployed 
0 5 83.3 3 23.1 5 71.4 
1 4 30.8 1 14.3 
2 2 15.4 
3 
4 1 16.7 
5 1 7.7 
6 1 7.7 
Unknown 2 15.4 
Total 6 100.0 13 100.1 7 100.0 
(average) .7 months 1.7 months .6 months 
aData unavailable for 1895. 
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Table 31- 1900 Mobility measure: number of state moves within familya 
Number of 
Moves Blacks Whites Total 
% % % 
0 13 41. 9 41 42.7 54 42.5 
1 14 45.2 45 46.9 S9 46.5 
2 2 6.5 7 7.3 9 7. 1 
3 1 3.2 3 3.1 4 3.1 
4 1 3.2 1 .8 
TOTAL 31 100.0 96 100.0 127 100.0 
aMeasured by number of states where children were born, which were 
different from the birthplace of both parents. 
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Table ]2. Fraser geogr3.phie lI'.obilicy/st.lbility measure: 1895, 1900, 1~h)5, 1910 
Very Hob Lle 'I· Somewhat Stab le I }federate ly S..:ablc I 
.;;.T.;;..e n~u.;;..r.;;..'2:..-..:1;.....:;C..:;e..:n..:s U_S~P;..;e;-.r;..;s~o-,-n-,-s-,-_2:::;.-.C;:,.;e;;.;;[l..:, s..:u..:;s~P~~ r~s: a n~ 3 Ce r. sus Pe n ens i 
TOTAL 
la 
1395 
Ib 
1900 
Ie 
I 
1905
1 
Id 
I 
i 
1910 I 
479 
434 
830 
136 
1,979 
X 1 
1,979 
2a 
1895 
1900 
2b 
1395 
1905 
2e 
1395 
1910 
2d 
1900 
19G5 
2e 
33 
21 
8 
116 
1900 9 
1910 
2f 
1905 
1910 
95 
282 
X 2 
564 
3a 
1895 I 
1900 
1905 
3b 
1900 
1905 
1910 ! 
Je 
1895 I 
1905 I 
1910 I 
3d 
1895 I 
I9GO i 
I 
1910 I 
44 
94 
18 
2 
158 
X 3 
474 
IJ~-.:y S ta b Ie 
4 CEUSUS P~r50ns 
411 
1895 I' 
1900 
1905 I 
1910 I 
----
25 
25 
X 4 
100 = 3,117 
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Table 33. 1895 Religious preference 
Wife a dif-
Head of ferent from 
Household husband Boarders Composite 
Religion No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Catholic 13 12 36.4 25 19.8 
Protestant 
Baptist 6 7.1 3 33.3 9 7.1 
Congregational 1 1.2 1 11. 1 1 3.0 3 2.4 
Presbyterian 2 2.4 1 11. 1 2· 6. 1 5 4.0 
Methodist 12 14.3 2 22.2 2 6.1· 16 12.7 
Christian 6 7.1 1 11. 1 1 3.0 8 6.3 
Lutheran 9 10.7 1 11. 1 1 3.0 11 8.7 
Mission 5 6.0 1 3.0 6 4.8 
Evangelical 2 2.4 2 1.6 
United Brethern 
E.P. 
Unitarian 1 1.2 1 .8 
Adventist 
Latter Day Saints 
Total 
Protestant 44 52.4 9 99.9 8 24.2 61 48.4 
None 27 32.1 13 39.4 40 31. 7 
TOTAL 84 100.0 9 99.9 33 100.0 126 99.9 
aThe category "wife different from husband" contained 9 wives, 
of whom 8 were Protestants while their husbands were listed as "none," 
and one was Protestant whose husband was Catholic. 
